( Collected Works, Vol. 1) Husserl

EDMUND HUSSERL
COLLECTED WORKS

VOLUME I

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCES

TRANSLATIONS PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
HUSSERL ARCHIVES (LOUVAIN)

EDMUND HUSSERL

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE SCIENCES

THirpD Book
IDEAS PERTAINING TO A
PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND
TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

TRANSLATED BY
TED E. KLEIN
AND

WILLIAM E. POHL

1980
MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS
THE HAGUE / BOSTON / LONDON

Translated from: Edmund Husserl, /deen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phinomenologischen
Philosophie. Drittes Buch, Die Phinomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften, edited by Marly
Biemel, Husserliana V, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data iP

Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938.
Phenomenology and the foundations of the sciences.

(His Collected works; v. 1)

Translation of Die Phanomenologie und die
Fundamente der Wissenschaften.

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Phenomenology. 2. Science—Philosophy
3. Ontology. 4. Phenomenological psychology.
1. Title. II. Series: Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938.
Works. English; v. 1.
B3279.H93P4713 142.7 80-16265

ISBN 90-247-2093-1 (this volume)
ISBN 90-247-2342-6 (series) B

ae alee
8011292, 7~//
Copyright © 1980 by Martinus Nijho nakicl bv, The Hague.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmilted in
any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written

permission of the publisher,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, P.O. Box 566, 2501 CN The Hague, The Netherlands.

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

TRANSLATORS’ INTRODUCTION vil
Hisrorico-CrRITICAL FOREWORD xiii
CHAPTER ONE: THE DIFFERENT REGIONS OF REALITY l

§1. Material thing, material perception, material natural science
(physics). 1
§2. Animate organism, apprehension of animate organism, and
somatology. 4
a) The specific determinations of animate organism. 4
b) The science of the animate organism: somatology. 7
§3. The delimitation of somatology and psychology. 9
§4. “Communities” as seen by natural science. 17

CHAPTER Two: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PsyCHOLOGY
AND PHENOMENOLOGY 19

§5. The relationship of phenomenology to the sciences. 19
§6. The ontological foundation of the empirical sciences. 21
§7. Regional concepts and “generic” concepts. 22
§8. Rational psychology and phenomenology — experimental
psychology. 33
§9. The significance of phenomenological description for the realm of
experience. 46
§10. Relation of phenomenology to the writings of Bolzano, Lotze, and
Brentano. 49
§11. Differences in the relations of physics and psychology to their
ontological foundations. The significance of description in both
sciences. 5]
§12. Further clarification of the relationship of rational psychology and
Phenomenology. 60

CHaprer THREE: THE RELATIONSHIP OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND
ONTOLOGY 65

§13. The field of phenomenological research. 65

vi CONTENTS

§14. Inclusion of the ontologies in phenomenology. 66

§15. The significance of ontological findings for phenomenology and the
difference of attitude in the two sciences. 67

§16. Noema and essence. 73

§17. Significance of ontological concepts for psychology. 77

CHAPTER Four: THE METHOD oF CLARIFICATION 80

§18. The dogmatic sciences’ need for clarification. 81
§19. Clarification of the conceptual material. 83

a) Logical-formal concepts. 84

6) Regional concepts. 84

c) Material particularizations. 84
§20. Making distinct and making clear. 86

SUPPLEMENTS 91
Text-CriricaL NOTES ON THE SUPPLEMENTS 93
SUPPLEMENT I: TRANSITION FROM Book II to Book III 94

§1. The constitution of the psyche.(Empathy.) 94
§2. Realizing apprehension of the pure Ego. 99
§3. First indication of the necessary distinction of natural-scientific and
cultural-scientific attitude. 102
§4. The connection of psyche and animate organism. 103
a) The animate organism as localization-field of the
sensations. 104
6) The animate organism as organ of volition. 106
S) The constitutive role of the movcment-scnsations in
comparison with other sensations and the relation between
the constitution of animate organism and of physical thing. 107
§5. Solipsistic and intersubjective experience. 112
Significance of the problem of constitution; phenomenology and
ontology. 116

SUPPLEMENT II, To p. 9. PERSONAL Eco AND ANIMATE ORGANISM. 119

SuPPLEMENT III, ro p. 15. IDENTITY OF THE PHysICAL THING AND IDENTITY
OF THE PsycCHE. 120

SUPPLEMENT IV, To §7-9. Type — EmpiricaL CLASSIFICATION. 121

INDEX 128

TRANSLATORS’ INTRODUCTION

There is no author’s introduction to Phenomenology and the Foundations
of the Scvences,' either as published here in the first English translation
or in the standard German edition, because its proper introduction is
its companion volume: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.* The
latter is the first book of Edmund Husserl’s larger work: Ideas Toward a
Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, and is commonly
referred to as /deas I (or [deen [). The former is commonly called /deen
Ill. Between these two parts of the whole stands a third: Phenomeno-
logical Investigations of Constitution,? generally known as Ideen IT. In this
introduction the Roman numeral designations will be used, as well as
the abbreviation PFS for the translation at hand.

In many translation projects there is an initial problem of establish-
ing the text to be translated. That problem confronts translators of the
books of Husserl’s /deas in different ways. The /deas was written in
1912, during Husserl’s years in Gottingen (1901-1916). Books I and II
were extensively revised over nearly two decades and the changes
were incorporated by the editors into the texts of the Husserliana
editions of 1950 and 1952 respectively. Manuscripts of the various
reworkings of the texts are preserved in the Husserl Archives, but for
those unable to work there the only one directly available for Ideen [1 is
the reconstructed one. A new edition of Jdeen J has been published,
however, in which the original text and the revisions and notes are
separated in two volumes.

"Edmund Husserl: /deen zu einer reinen Phénomenologie und phinomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes
Buch: Die Phdnomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. (Cited as Ideen I11) Edited by
Marly Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952. (Husserliana V).

*Edmund Husserl: /deen zu einer reinen Phinomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes
Buch: Allgemeine Evnfithrung in die reine Phdnomenologie. (Cited as [deen [) Edited by Walter Biemel.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. (Husserliana III). Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and
P. henomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by W.R. Boyce
Gibson. New York: Macmillan, 1931; Collier, 1962, and reprints.

*Edmund Husserl: /deen zu einer reinen Phéinomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie. Qweites
Buch: Pndnomenologisehe Untersuchungen zur Konstitution. (Cited as Ideen I1). Edited by Marly
Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952. (Husserliana IV).

“See the editors’ introductions to Husserliana [1] and IV, cited above. Also see the editor’s
introduction to the new edition of /deen I, Husserliana 11/1. Edited by Karl Schuhmann. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.

Vill TRANSLATORS’ INTRODUCTION

The text of PFS has had a different history. Although written in
1912 and not published until 1952, it received almost no revision and
was incorporated unchanged into all later versions of the whole work.
Translators of /deen [1] therefore face no problems of textual criticism
in order to establish the text to be translated. There is only one, and it
is readily available in the Husserltana volume edited by Marly Biemel.
We did, however, compare it with the original text in the Husserl
Archives.

Although text-critical work is not demanded in the case of PFS,
there is a need for historical criticism. For this, see the historical
foreword of this translation by Guy Van Kerckhoven.

In addition to the historico-critical considerations on the historical
foreword we wish to comment briefly on the structure of the text.

The train of thought of PFS begins with the different regions of
reality: material things, animate organisms, and psyches or psychic
egos. Each is a distinct type of experienced object, correlated apriori
with a typical way of experiencing. Out of this apriori correlation
arises in each case a distinct science or family of sciences. This is the
first stage of reduction to foundations. Out of the first and third arise
physical science and psychology. There is no difficulty in following
Husserl here, but out of the second correlation the science of
somatology is said to arise, and we know of no such science as such.
Husserl recognizes that and discusses the reasons. Even so, we know
the natural sciences that deal with animate organisms, such as biology
and physiology and zoology. Husserl encountered a problem which he
did not solve in this text in regard to the relation of the plant sciences
to those of animate organisms. His solution to the relations of the
other sciences to each other in terms of the role of sensations may be
the clue to this problem’s solution or it may be the problem blocking
one. There is no discussion of the social-cultural sciences or the
humanities in PFS for it is restricted to the general region of “reality” °
or material or natural things in causal interdependence, in contrast to
the region of “‘ideality.”

This starting point links the 1912 text with what are often
considered later developments in Husserl’s thought. He is clearly
following an ontological way here in developing his foundationalism,
and the advantages of that way are evident here. Further the option
of beginning with a formal ontology or logic or with a material
ontology or logic or with the ontology of the life-world in this way
receives a Clarification in practice here. In a sense, and especially
when the dependence of PFS on the constitution studies of Jdeen I] are
taken into account, the analyses begin with the sciences under

TRANSLATORS’ INTRODUCTION 1X

discussion and then turn to their formal and material ontologies and
logics. However, they do not stop there as if they were the final
foundations but turn to the most fundamental ontology and logic,
those of the life-world. The term “‘Lebenswelt’”’ or ‘‘life-world’’ does not
appear in this text, but the first few sections make it clear that the
regions of the sciences are founded upon regions of lived-experience,
the life-world.

The train of thought thus begins with the different regions of reality
as they are approached in the attitude distinctive of natural sciences,
then takes a different approach via a new phenomenological attitude
which focuses on the correlation of experienced and experiencing
within lived experience itself as a foundation of the sciences. The
constitutive rules which account for the necessary and universal
structures of this lived experience are the deeper foundation of the
sciences. The first set of problems thus focuses on the relations of the
sciences to each other, and these are ‘‘founding”’ relations, as well as
the relations of the sciences to their foundations in experience.

The title of the second chapter seems to indicate a narrowing of
focus to one of the sciences, psychology, and much of the chapter is
devoted to several psychologies. Nevertheless, the train of thought
does not completely abandon the other sciences here. The problem
guiding the analyses is that of the relation of the sciences to their
ontologies, and to a lesser extent their logics. These are eidetic
sciences and to an extent they are foundational for the empirical
sciences. Just as ‘‘sensation”’ is the key to Husserl’s solutions to the
problems of the relations of the regions and their sciences to each
other, so here the key is the different senses and uses of ‘“‘description.”

The third chapter brings the relation of phenomenology and
ontology into focus. Transcendental phenomenology is also an eidetic
discipline, but Husserl takes great care to distinguish it from logic and
ontology in a positive sense. Ontologies are like empirical sciences in
that they posit their objects, deal with actualities, and are one-sided
or focused only on the objects to be explained and not on their
constitution in lived-experience. Phenomenology turns to the ul-
timate foundations in the necessary and universal structures of lived-
experience.

_The method of clarification is presented in the fourth chapter as the
distinctive way in which phenomenology deals with the sciences and
the problem of their foundations. Here we return to the sort of
investigation begun in the first chapter with regard to the regional
Concepts and extend them to the rest of the concepts of the sciences.
Fresh insights are to be had here into the difficult issues of foun-

x TRANSLATORS' INTRODUCTION

dations, presuppositions, essences, types and degrees of evidence, and
even a look ahead to genetic constitution.

Readers familiar with the exemplary English translations of Husserl’s
works by Dorian Cairns will readily recognize our debt to his
translations and to his Guide for Translating Husserl.® For example, we
have followed his lead in translating Husserl’s ‘‘ego”’ as ‘‘ego”’ and his
“Ich” as ‘‘Ego” or “I”. The use of upper and lower case letters also
provides the reader a way of knowing whether the original term is
Latin or German in the case of “‘/ntuttion”’ (‘‘Intuition” in English)
and ‘‘Anschauung’’ (‘‘intuition’’), and in the case of ‘“‘objektiv”
(‘Objective’) and ‘‘gegenstandlich”’ (‘‘objective”). Whether or not
any point of interpretation depends on the difference we leave to the
reader to decide. Some people will object to our translation of
‘“Anschauung’”’ by ‘“‘intuition,” but Husserl’s use of this term in-
terchangeably with ‘“‘Jntuttion’’ in this text seems to justify our
decision. In reading a work like this one a reader must determine the
sense of such terms peculiar to it. Furthermore, terms like ‘‘an-
schaultch” (“intuitively”) are unmanageable with most alternatives.

The expression “‘des Zustdndlichen’’ in Section 9 has been translated
as ‘“‘the statal.”” The German word ‘‘Zustand’’ commonly means either
“state” or “‘condition,” and since “‘conditional’” has a more common
meaning that is not proper here we have used the same form with
“state,” that is, “‘statal.”’ A different sort of decision was made in the
case of ‘‘Eindeutung” beginning with its first use in Section 2. We
simply kept the German word in brackets and translated it as
“interpretation.” It is an unusual word, one Husserl abandoned later
for ““Einfihlung”’ or “empathy.” The term here used is significant for
understanding the approach he was taking in 1912 to the difficult
problems of intersubjectivity.

The frequent occurrence of ‘‘Zeib’’ in this text presented a special
problem. It would be most natural, and make for a more readable
English text, to translate it simply as ‘‘body.”” We followed Cairns,
however, and translated it as ‘“‘animate organism” in most cases,
because in English ‘‘body”’ includes both the German ‘“‘Lieb” and
‘‘K6érper” and probably ‘‘Ding” as well. Husserl is careful in the first
section to distinguish ‘‘Leibwahrnehmuag”’ from ‘‘Kérperwahrnehmung”’
and from “Dingwakrnehmung,” and we have tried to preserve his
emphasis on the animate organism in distinguishing somatology from
physics.

*Dorian Cairns: Guide to Translating Husserl. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.

TRANSLATORS’ INTRODUCTION xl

Wesen has been translated as “‘essence’’ although the presence of
diverse uses of that term in English-language philosophical writing
creates a problem. It created one in German too, and Husserl
acknowledges it but uses the term anyway. A careful reader will
diligently try to discern Husserl’s distinctive sense of the term from the
text. It means a typical way of being experienced (noematic essence)
or of experiencing (noetic essence). In view of Husserl’s use of the
almost synonomous ‘‘Eidos,”’ which we have translated as “‘eidos,’’ we
think it best to use “‘essence’’ and urge readers to avoid assuming that
he means what other thinkers have meant by the term. His sixteenth
section on “‘Noema and Essence,’’ and other discussions in PFS go a
long way toward clarifying his concept.

The words ‘‘Erlebnis’’ and “‘Erfahrung’”’ present a distinct problem.
We have translated the former as “‘lived-process”’ following Cairns
and the latter as ‘‘experience.”’ “‘Lived-process’’ puts the stress on
experiencing which is where Husserl’s term puts it in German,
while ‘‘experience”’ is just as ambiguous between “‘experienced”’ and
the whole of ‘“‘experience’’ as Husserl’s German word. The difference
should be clear enough from the context, or at least as clear in
translation as in the original.

Following what we believe to be the policy of the Husserl Archives,
we have attempted to translate as literally as English idiom and
syntax will allow, rather than to render the text more readable by
paraphrase and interpretation. Our aim has been to preserve not only
the substance of the original but, within reasonable limits, its
structure and style as well. Thus we do not see our task as one of
improving upon Husserl’s writing, but simply as one of faithfully
making his text available to readers of English.

We offer here, in addition to the main text of PFS, a translation of
the Supplements (Betlagen) which are found in the Husserliana edition
of [deen III. The first of these supplementary texts should be valuable
to students who do not have access to Jdeen II. Those interested in
Husserl’s development of a “genetic” phenomenology will be in-
terested in §6 of this Supplement. The remarks there relate “‘genetic”’
to “kinetic”? method, which is mentioned at the beginning of PFS.
Notes on the supplementary texts are given just preceding the texts
themselves.

We are especially grateful to the Husserl Archives of Louvain, under
the direction of Samuel Ijsseling, for assistance and encouragement in
Our project. In addition, we acknowledge gladly our debt to Reto
Parpan and his colleagues at the Archives who read the translation

Xi TRANSLATORS’ INTRODUCTION

and made valuable suggestions. Earlier drafts of it were also read by
James Street Fulton, David Carr and Jeffner Allen. An earlier
translation of Chapter Four, which appeared in The Southwestern
Journal of Philosophy in a special Husserl Issue, was read by J.N.
Mohanty. Each reader made valuable suggestions and pointed out
passages where further work was needed. In all cases, of course, the
use we made of their generous assistance is our responsibility.

Part of the work of translation brought to fruition here was done in
Paris, where we were able to use the resources of the Husserl Archives
there and Paul Ricoeur’s personal library. We are grateful to him, to
his assistant at the Archives, Dorian Tiffeneau, and to her colleague,
Mireille Delbraccio for their kindness and help. Dorian Tiffeneau is
preparing a French translation of Jdeen III.

The Texas Christian University Research Foundation provided us
with a travel grant that helped to make this work possible.

Our text was typed and retyped with great care and skill by Jan
Stone, Sally Bohon, and Julie Barker and we are grateful to them.

Tep E. Kuen, Jr. WiiuraM E. Pout
Department of Philosophy Department of Modern Languages
Texas Christian University Texas Christian University

HISTORICO-CRITICAL FOREWORD

In 1952, there appeared consecutively in the series Husserltana
(Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke), under the title Jdeen zu ener
reinen Phdnomenologte und phdnomenologtschen Philosophue. Kweites Buch:
Phdnomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution' and Dnittes Buch: Due
Phdanomenologte und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften,* the texts Husser!
conceived of as the sequel to the Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Etnfiihrung in
die reine Phénomenologie:* the latter being the only ‘“‘book”’ of the Jdeas
that Husserl published in his lifetime, and that in 1913, together with
Alexander Pfander’s ur Psychologte der Gesinnungen (Erster Arttkel) , in-
augurated the Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phdnomenologtsche Forschung.‘
In fact, the introduction® which Husserl allowed to precede the first
book explicitly promised a second and third “‘book”’ of the Jdeas, and,
at the same time, gave a short description of their contents.®
Nevertheless, that which appeared in 1952 as the second and third
book of the J/deas agreed only in part with this table of contents.
Responsible for this change, were the years of work Husserl had
devoted to the continuation of the project of the /deas, during which
he was aided by his assistants Edith Stein and Ludwig Landgrebe.
The text, translated here for the first time into English by Klein
and Pohl, reproduces those texts which comprise the main text

"Edmund Husserl, /deen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Qweites
Buch. Phénomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana Band IV), Ed. Marly Biemel
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952).

*Edmund Husserl, /deen zu einer reinen Phinomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes
Buch. Die Phénomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften (Husserliana Band V), Ed. Marly
Biemcl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952).

*Edmund Husserl, /deen zu etner reinen Phdnomenologie und phinomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes
Buch. Allgemeine Einfiihrung in die rein Phdnomenologie (Husserliana Band I11), Ed. Walter Biemel
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), [new edition by Karl Schuhmann (Husserliana Band
111, and III,) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976) }.

*Edmund Husserl, “‘Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen
Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einfihrung in die reine Phanomenologie,” in Jahrbuch fir
Philosophie und phinomenologische Forschung, v.1, part 1 (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913), pp. 7-323.

*Ibid., pp. i-6.

*Ibid., p. 5.

XIV HISTORICO-CRITICAL FOREWORD

printed in Husserliana V: IJdeen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologte und
phanomenologischen Philosophic. Drittes Buch: Die Phanomenologte und die
Fundamente der Wissenschaften,’ as well as the Supplements to the
Husserliana volume. The ‘‘Nachwort,” or epilogue to Jdeen J printed
in the same volume of Husserliana, is Husserl’s German version of his
Preface to Gibson’s translation of /deas J, a text accessible and well-
known to English readers and so not included here. Those readers
who, with this translation, encounter for the first time the entire
project of the Jdeas, will find in Karl Schuhmann’s “‘Einleitung des
Herausgebers”’ to /deen J (Husserliana Band III/1 and III/2),® as well
as in his monography ‘“‘Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und
phanomenologischen Philosophic” in Die Dialekttk der Phdnomeno-
logie,*° the required information regarding the origin and development
of this project. Of fundamental importance for a correct under-
standing of the place and meaning of the translated text within the
project of the /deas, are Marly Biemel’s historical and textual
comments in Husserliana IV.!! These textual comments also serve as
an introduction to the fifth volume.

Between September and December 1912,!* Husserl wrote a
comprehensive manuscript that has become known as the “pencil
manuscript” of the /deas. The preparatory work was done in a series
of shorter and, in general, preliminary drafts — the so-called “ink
manuscripts” of the Jdeas — written between the end of May and the
beginning of September 1912.13 The pencil manuscripts of the Jdeas
formed a relatively cohesive unit, a first ‘“‘major section,’’'* wherein
‘‘pure or transcendental phenomenology” attempted to establish

7Edmund Husserl, /deen zu einer reinen Phinomenologie und phinomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes
Buch. Die Phénomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften, pp. 1-105.

®*Edmund Husserl, /deas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Tr. W.R. Boyce Gibson
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1931).

®Karl Schuhmann, “‘Einleitung des Herausgebers,"* in Edmund Husserl, /deen zu einer reiMen
Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einfithrung in die reine
Phdnomenologte (Husserliana Band I11,), pp. xv-Ivii.

Karl Schumann, “Reine Phanomenologie und phanomenologische Philosophic.
Historisch-analytischc Monographic uber Husserls /deen /,”’ in Die Dialekttk der Phinomenologie I]
(Phaenomenologica 57) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

"Marly Biemel, ‘‘Einleitung des Herausgebers,”” in Edmund Husserl, /deen zu einer reinen
Phdnomenologie und phinomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phinomenologische Untersuchungen zur
Konstitution, pp. xiii-xx. Cf. also Marly Biemel, ibid., Appendix I, ‘‘Zur Textgestaltung,”” pp.
397-401.

'=MS. K IX | (author's copy of the /deen, from Jahrbuch special printing): ‘‘According to the
calendar, on September 18, 1912 I was up to the phenomenological reduction; MS. F III
1/38a (old Archive number F I11 1/37): “December 1912.”

'9See Husserliana III, (Erganzendc Texte [1912-1929]). “II: Manuscripts of Written Copies
of deen 1, A: Ink Manuscript.”

“See ibid., Beilage 6 (Plan for an Introduction to Jdeen J, ca. July 1912), p. 532.

HISTORICO-CRITICAL FOREWORD XV

itself as an independent science, different as well from psychology.'5 A
subsequent second part was to make explicit that this science could
establish itself as the true, fundamental science of philosophy.'® The
first time that Husserl appears to have explicitly considered a clear
division within the body of the first major section between a first and
second “‘book”’ of the Jdeas,!”7 viz., one dealing with the method of
introduction to and initiation within the field proper to phenome-
nology, and a second book devoted to the treatment of the group of
problems which would show the true scope of the phenomenological
field of investigation,’® is during the period of preparation for
publication in the beginning of 1913.'® Both the first and the second
books of the /deas appear to have originally formed a whole in the
pencil manuscript, which was drafted ‘in one stretch.”

For the most part, the pencil drafts of the manuscript of the Jdeas,
which between September and the middle of October 1912 “‘were
written in six weeks, without plans or supporting material, as if in a
trance,’2! and which comprise the basic text of the first book that
appeared in April 1913 in the Jahrbuch, have not been preserved. In
contrast, the drafts from ‘‘November-December 1912’? have been
preserved. 1.e., with the exception of the beginning of the manuscript
(pp. “1”—‘12”). Together, pages ‘“‘22a”—“‘45’"88 along with various
inserted pages, comprise the main text printed in Husserliana V: Die
Phdnomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften. Of pages
“13-22” 4 pages ““16b’’—“‘22”25 are reproduced in Husserliana V
as ‘‘Beilage I’? [Supplement I].2¢ In the original draft these pages
preceded the text translated here.

'STbid., Beilage 6, p. 530.

1®lbid., Beilage 6, p. 532.

'7Edmund Husserl, “Ideen zu ciner reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen
Philosophie. Einleitung,” in Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung, v. 1, part 1,
p. 3.

'®Ibid., p. 5.

‘Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, v. 1, Foreword to the Second Edition, p. x.

2° I bid.

*!Letter from Husserl to Arnold Metzger (dated September 4, 1919), printed in The
Philosophical Forum,v. 21 (1963/64), p. 63.

**MS. F IIE 1/38a (old Archive number F III 1/37), on cover-page: ‘Elaboration of Ideas
Book 11 November-December 1912."

MS. F III 1/39a—84a (old Archive numbers F 11! 1/38-83).

**MS. F 111 1/5a—-36a (old Archive numbers F 111 1/4-35).

MS. F HII 1/12a-36a (old Archive numbers F III 1/11—35), the text begins on the last line
of MS. F III 1/1 1b (old Archive number F III 1/10).

**See Marly Biemcl’s critical textual comments to Beilage I in Edmund Husserl, /deen zu einer
reinen Phinomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch. Die Phanomenologie und die
Fundamente der Wissenschaften, p. 164.

XV HISTORICO-CRITICAL FOREWORD

A fixed ‘“‘Nomenklatur,’’®’ or catalogue of subject terms, was not
present in the initial pencil draft of 1912. The original “old
envelope,’*8 which contained pages ‘‘22a’’—‘‘45’’, bore the title
‘‘Aesthesiologie, Psychologie, Ontologie-Phanomenologie.”’ Indeed,
it appears from the “original notes and supplementary sheets’’*®
which were later included, that Husserl considered to change the
‘“‘Nomenklatur,” especially with regard to the terms ‘Aesthesiologie’
[aestho-physiology] and ‘Somatologie’ [somatology]. Thus, pages
‘*22a”’—“‘45”’ are primarily distinguished from the previous pages by
their subject-matter. In the preceding pages (“‘1’’—“‘22”’), Husserl had
firmly established, ‘by means of the phenomenological-kinetic meth-
od,” and had examined the “phenomenological origins’’ of, those
‘fundamental distinctions” that underlie all Weltanschauung as such:
‘“‘material thing, body, soul.’ There followed the attempt to
validate these distinctions over against those sciences whose thematic
fields of study had been infringed upon.*! The pages concerning the
material thing, corporeal reality and the reality of the soul form a
genuine “opening chapter.”’*? The “Exposition of the Corresponding
Sciences and Methods, Methods of Physics, Somatology, Psychology,
Phenomenology, etc.,” on the other hand, ‘formed the
conclusion.” %$

In the beginning of 1913, according to Husserl, “during the
printing of Jdeen [’*™ (first book), the original drafts written in
November—December 1912 were again taken up; in particular, the
introductory chapters concerning material reality [Dingreal:tat] and
the realities of corporeal things and the soul. They needed to be
enlarged by the analyses of spiritual reality. Together with these
‘Drafts Nature: Spirit,”*> it also became necessary to take up and
rework ‘“‘some of the supplementary material to the projected
text.””56 “In 1913,” as Husserl later noted, “‘I began the systematic

®

*7MS. F TIE 1/111b (old Archive number F IIT 1/219).

See MS. F III 1/2a (old Archive number F III 1/1): ‘*22a—45 in old envelope.” This
envelope has been retained as MS. F. III 1/38a (old Archive number F III 1/37).

*°MS. F II] 1/87a ff. (old Archive number F III 1/195): “Original Notes and Supplementary
Material to Ideen II, May contain something important."

» Edmund Husserl, /deen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phinomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes
Buch. Die Phénomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften, p. 1; cf. MS. F III 1/39a (old
Archive number F III 1/38).

Ibid.

MS. F IIT 1/103a (old Archive number F HII 1/211).

See MS. M IIT 1 IT 1/1: Genesis of /deen J]. Ludwig Landgrebe's typed text, improved and
annotated by Edmund Husserl.

*Ibid., marginal note for insertion, written by Husserl.

**Ibid., marginal note for insertion, written by Husserl.

**Ibid., marginal note for insertion, written by Husserl.

HISTORICO-CRITICAL FOREWORD XV1l

formulation. of the part ‘Constitution of the Spiritual World’. The
preparation of a final draft never exceeded an opening fragment.” *?
Thereafter, in the middle of April 1913, there appeared in the
Introduction to the German edition of the first book of the Jdeas the
announcement of a second book, that ‘‘would deal, in a thorough
manner, with some particularly important groups of problems whose
systematic formulation and typical solution is the pre-condition for
the possibility of clarifying the difficult relationship of phenome-
nology to the physical sciences, to psychology and the socio-cultural
sciences [Getsteswissenschaften] and, on the other hand, to ail of the a
priort sciences.’’*8

The ‘“‘development and re-working’’®® of a second “‘book”’ of the
Ideas in 1915 concerned the opening chapters. In addition to the
research manuscripts, the lecture notes from 1913 and 1915 offered
the possibility of elaborating upon the first chapter of the pencil
draft.*° In 1916, Edith Stein received a large manuscript together
with the pencil drafts from 1912 as a “‘plan’’*! for a “first elab-
oration.’’4? Folio pages 1—294,** which represent a copy of Husserl’s
stenographical pencil drafts of 1912 and his attempted reworking of
these in 1915, are followed in pages 294-523 by “‘the theory of
science’s part” dealing with ‘‘Methods of Physics, Somatology,
Psychology, Ontology and Phenomenology.’’** These latter pages
were a copy of the concluding part of the pencil manuscript of 1912.*
In addition to the manuscripts with the title ““Nature and Spirit,”
Stein’s second revision of Jdeas [] (second book) in 1918 also employed
the pages “Concerning the Constitution of the Spiritual World,” *’
originally drafted in 1913. At this time, due probably to the
magnitude which the second book had taken on, the “explanations of
the theory of science’ (folio pages 294-523), which Stein had

37Ibid., marginal note for insertion, written by Husserl.

*%Edmund Husserl, ‘“Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen
Philosophie. Einleitung,” in Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung, v. 1, part 1,
p. 5.

3°MS. F. III 1/103a (old Archive number F III 1/211).

MS. F III 1/164a (old Archive number F III 1/87), marginal comment.

“MS. F IIT 1/163a (old Archive number F III 1/86), cover-page: ‘1915 my re-working and
plan for Miss Stein.”

“8MS. M III 1 1 7/1.

“MS. M III 1 I 7/1. These pages have only been preserved in part and are found in Edith
Stein's second “‘Ausarbeitung,”” MS. M III 111, MS. M HII 1 1 2.

“MS. M III 1 I 7/2-234.

“MS. M III 1 1 7/1.

“MS. M III 1 1 7/1: “from 22a of my pencil -, of my ‘original manuscript.”

“MS. M III 1 14 and MS. M. IIIT 115.

XVill HISTORICO-CRITICAL FOREWORD

transcribed during the first revision, were “entirely eliminated.” *
They were set aside with the note (written in blue pencil) ‘‘Jdeas
lI.” In 1924/25 Ludwig Landgrebe drafted a typed text which,
under the title “‘Ideas III: The Theory of Science’s Part,” represented
a copy of the original pencil manuscript of 1912 (pp. ‘*16’’—*‘45’’).5©
Husserl submitted this 1924/25 typed version together with
‘Supplementary Material Public Spirit I and II,” which was
intended for the main section concerning ‘“The Constitution of the
Spiritual World,” as a part still to be re-worked and not as an actual
book. The paragraph titles and divisions were taken over by
Landgrebe from Stein’s “‘first elaboration.’

Thus, the reader of Klein and Pohl’s translation Phenomenology and
the Foundations of the Sciences encounters a Husserlian text, the plans of
which were in a constant state of flux between 1912 and 1925. First
drafted in the pencil manuscript of the /deas in 1912, then projected
for inclusion with the second ‘‘book’”’ of the /deas in the beginning of
1913, it was finally withheld for a third “book.” With respect to its
content, however, the text underwent no essential modifications
between 1912 and 1925. This, in itself, is reason enough to read this
text.

Guy VAN KERCKHOVEN
Husserl Archives (Leuven)

MS. M III I I 1/2.

“MS. M III 1 1 7/1.

SOMS. M III I II 7/20-214.

51MS. M III 1 Il 7/20, Ludwig Landgrebe's ‘Preliminary Remarks.”’

CHAPTER ONE

THE DIFFERENT REGIONS OF REALITY
(MATERIAL THING, ANIMATE ORGANISM, PSYCHE),
THE CORRELATIVE BASIC SORTS OF APPERCEPTION,
AND THE SCIENCES ARISING OUT OF THEM.!

In our phenomenological-kinetic* method we have ascertained the
fundamental distinction among merely material thing, animate
organism, and psyche, or psychic Ego, which dominates all
apprehension of the world, and we have studied it at the same time
with respect to its phenomenological primal sources. As an intuitively
given articulation of experienced reality it precedes all thinking, and
specifically all scientifically theorizing thinking, and inasmuch as
experiential thinking in general is capable of drawing its ultimate
legitimizing basis from experience only by “‘adjusting”’ itself to it —
and, above all, this means by binding itself to the proper sense of that
which is experienced — it is thus certain from the beginning that such
basically essential differentiations of objectivities that arise out of
basically essential ones in the constitutive apprehension must be
decisive for the separation of scientific areas and for the sense of their
problematics. Let us now pursue this matter.

§1. MATERIAL THING, MATERIAL PERCEPTION,
MATERIAL NATURAL SCIENCE (PHYSICS).

First of all we have material things. However intimately — according
to our analyses — the constitution of these things may be interwoven
with the constitution of the other categories of reality, what gives
them unity is a particular type and nexus of constitutive acts. The
Originarily presentive act is the material perception (perception of physical
things), perception of bodies. With this, a basic sort of perception is
designated, fully delimited from every other sort of perception. We
intentionally do not say “‘external perception,” since the perception
of animate organism, which makes up a new basic sort, could also be
and would have to be so named. Then too, no one will be able to
disapprove of our expression on the grounds that perception is not

"See also Supplement I, p. 94 ff.
*Sce Supplement I, second paragraph of §6. Transl.

<I)

<2)

<3)

2 REGIONS OF REALITY

anything material. The designation of the perception of something
material as material perception is fully as justified as that of the
perception of something external as external perception — which, of
course, is not anything external either — and in general it is as
justified as any similar and completely unavoidable naming by means
of transference. Material perception is a special case of the perception
of something extensive, to which also, of course, the perceptions of
phantoms belong.

In the coherence of material experience the nature constituting itself
therein is experienced in its uniform spatial-temporal-causal
interconnection. Whenever this experience becomes theoretical
experience and whenever it grounds theoretical thinking about
nature, then material natural science arises. The Objectivity of this
nature, nature in the first and fundamental sense, zs based on mutual
understanding of a plurality of experiencing Egos which have their
animate organisms, animate organisms that appear to them as well as to
those in agreement with them. This interweaving of material nature
with animate organicity and the psychic does not hinder its
independence at all. The mode of theoretical experiencing and of
theoretical thought-intentions goes exclusively by way of the material
apprehensions of experience. In the cognition of nature the
investigator of nature is naturally there with body and soul, and not
only the individual investigator of nature, but also the community of
investigators to which each individual knows that he belongs. But
however essential this is for the constituting of the Objectivity of
nature, it is nevertheless a matter of two essentially different things:
on the one hand, to mentally undergo the total apprehension of
something material with all constitutive apprehensional components
belonging to it essentially — among them apprehensions of the
organismic-psychic — in such a way that the theoretically
experiencing regard is directed, fixing and determining, toward the
material being itself; and, on the other hand, to be directed
theoretically towards the animate organisms and psyches, and to
engage accordingly in physiological and psychological investigations
— of which we shall immediately have to speak. In general, where
apprehensions are founded on apprehensions and apprehensions of
higher order are shaped, there one must pay attention to this
possibility — grounded in the essence of complex apprehensions — of
a varying “‘attitude’’ of the thematic regard, which, as theoretical,
determines the theoretical theme, and determines it in the sense
prescribed by the apprehension. Since in the apprehension-complex
of the constitution of realities the experience of materiality represents

REGIONS OF REALITY 3

the lowest stage, which constitutes reality at all, the theoretically
experiencing regard therefore strikes the material as something
existent in itself, something not founded, something not presupposing
something else in itself and having something else beneath itself.
Material nature stands as something completely closed and preserves
its closed unity and that which properly belongs to it in this
closedness, not only in the mere coherence of theoretical experience,
but also in that of theoretical experiential thinking, which we call, or
would have to call, natural science in the usual sense, or, more
precisely, material natural science. How the various levels of the
cognition of nature are determined by the level by level constitution
of material Objectivity with its proper sense accruing to it therein,
and, in particular, how the difficult problems of the clarification of
descriptive, as opposed to explanatory, science are to be solved, how the
basically different manner of concept-formation and judgment-
formation can be illuminated in both — that is a separate area of
phenomenological investigation of the theory of science. We will
discuss matters relating to it in another place.

Let us here point out only one thing, which must be constantly
borne in mind in all cognition of reality, whether it be material or any
sort whatever. According to our analyses and with regard to the
essence of the experiences in which reality is constituted, the cognition
of reality and the cognition of causality are inseparably one. All sctence
of the real ts causally explanatory uf it actually and in the sense of Objective
validity wants to determine what the real is. The cognition of causal
relationships is not something secondary to the cognition of the real,
as if the real were first of all in and for itself, and then only
incidentally, as something extra-essential to its being, came into
relation with other realities, having an effect upon them and being
affected by them (undergoing effects), as if, accordingly, cognition
could bring out and determine an essence proper to the real that
would be independent of the cognition of its causal relations. The
point, rather, is precisely that it is fundamentally essential to reality as
such not to have a proper essence of that sort at all; rather, it is what it
is only in its causal relations. It is something fundamentally relative,
which demands its corresponding members, and only in this
connection of member and corresponding member is each a
“substance” of real properties. A substance that would be alone (in the
sense that every Objective real thing is a substance) is nonsense. A
Substance in the sense of the well-known definitions of Descartes and
Spinoza is therefore something fundamentally different from an
Objective reality in the sense of our delimitations. On the other hand,

<4)

<S)

4 REGIONS OF REALITY

causality 1s not so readily given in the context of experience, just as, in
another manner, the real itself that stands in causal relations is also
not readily given. To be sure, one can, in a certain manner, always
say: where there has been experiencing, something has been
experienced, is thereby given, and given without further ado, e.g., the
tree that we see. And it is given in its circumstances. But as for these
latter, they lie in the total surroundings viewed along with it, and that
in it which 1s actually a causally determining circumstance remains
vague. The theoretically experiencing regard easily grasps distinctive
traits in the perceived that are given in accordance with perception,
and to the extent that there is consciousness of something real, there 1s
also consciousness of causality — but completely unclear and able to
be brought out and prepared and determined conceptually only by
means of the theoretical experience-analysis and investigation. On
the other hand, the real itself, the subject term of the real relation, 1s
also something indeterminate; the real object is given only one-sidely;
the real state, although perceived, will be able to show itself ever more
richly in the process of perceiving, if it is unchanged; in the process of
its changes the property that announces itself therein will emerge ever
more perfectly under real conditions belonging to it, etc. Thus, as one
can see from the beginning, scientific investigation demands an ever-
renewed penetration into the real-causal connections. What methods
are required in order to obtain Objectively valid judgements about
reality (and what conditions must be prescribed in the essence of
experience itself for the possibility of such judgments) — to discuss
this in a theme all to itself. We have been concerned only to achieve
clarity on why causal investigation plays such a dominant role in
sciences of reality and why there is therefgre so much to be said about
causality in our further discussions as well.

§2. ANIMATE ORGANISM, APPREHENSION OF ANIMATE
ORGANISM, AND SOMATOLOGY.

a) The specific determinations of animate organism.

A second fundamental sort of apprehension, one that constitutes its object as
object of the second level, is the apprehension of animate organism. It isa
new fundamental sort considering the basically different way in
which the uppermost stratum of the animate organism’s objectivity,
the specific stratum of animate organism, is constituted in contrast
with everything that concerns the material of the animate organism.

REGIONS OF REALITY i)

With this there cohere as correlates (apriori, naturally) the des-
ignated essential differences between material determinations of
animate organism and the specifically animate-organismic ones. To
this stratum belong the really uniform sense fields in their states of
sensation that change according to real circumstances belonging to
them. First of all, those fields which actually show in an immediately
intuitive way the form of localization constitutive for this sort of
realization, i.e., above all, the tactual field as the primal field,
inasmuch as it has the first, fundamental localization, and the fields
stratified upon it, e.g., the hot-cold field (I do not say temperature
field, because temperature is a concept belonging to physics that has
no business here). In further sequence every sense field and every
essentially closed sensation group acquires a realizing connection to
the animate organism, showing different sides of its real sensitivity
and making up different strata of sensation contexts belonging really
to it. Thus I can, e.g., recognize my vtsual field as a continuously,
incessantly — even if variably — fulfilled visual spread (by disregard-
ing all objective apprehensions that build themselves on it and by
virtue of which I see a physical-objective field and know it in a certain
appearance), and I can recognize this lasting unity in contexts of
experience and thought as belonging to the animate organism, and
more precisely as belonging to this retina, as a whole corresponding in
its inner order as a spread to the two-dimensional order of the places
in the retina. I can then pursue the interconnections coming to
cognition through experience and thought between the stimulatory
system of the retina, according to the co-extensive ordering (whereby,
as with all localization, it is not a matter of the actual spatial form,
but only of the coherent integrating in the sense described by the
analysis of the situation) and the system of the visual sensations as
consequences of stimulation, according to the ordering of the field
itself.

In this manner, which is mediated by thinking, I cannot, of course,
see the visual field on the retina, but can apprehend it as belonging to
it analogously to the way I apprehend the tactual field as belonging to
the touch-sensitive surface of the animate organism. Thus, the universe
of sensations (of the sensuous impressions) of every Ego receives a
relationship to the animate organism and to its parts characterized
thereby precisely as ‘sense organs” and itself becomes something
animate-organismic, but not material. All the amplifications that
Possible experience can take on in the same regard are tied to the sense
already given beforehand through the apperception of animate
Organism, and this sense is laid down by perceived animate organicity

<6)

<7)

6 REGIONS OF REALITY

with perceived localization. And what is localizable is not just anything
and everything, but rather it is predelineated according to essence,
Sensuous pain, sensuous desire can spread out; therefore they are
localizable as they can be perceived factually in localization. Visual
sensations are spread out in a field; they are fundamentally localiz-
able, although, in the essence-type of animate organicity that can be
inspected in the human animate organism, the possibility of the
perception of localized visual sensation is excluded or, empirically
speaking, is lacking in us humans. Human animate organism,
however, is with regard to essence a particularization of animate
organism generally, and in this generality it is evident that the basic
condition for the possibility of localization lies in being spread out and
that thereby every species of sensation that offers itself mediately or
immediately in the manner of being spread out could be perceivable
as localized. But that which is organismically connectable 1s still
further amplified by the fact that even what does not fulfill this
condition can be proper to the animate organism as really dependent
through a fixed correspondence to the parts of the animate organism,
to the extent that, with material changes of that part of the animate
organism concerned, other real circumstances remaining constant,
corresponding changes are continually experienceable on the part of
that which is dependent, which is functionally dependent precisely by
virtue of this. The apprehension as localization is then not possible, of
course; but it does become a similitude.

As for the relationship of the animate organism to the material
substratum, different variations are possible. The animate organism
can include in itself material parts that can be removed without its
remaining an animate organism. But it is also possible for it to remain
animate organism with the removal of material parts, and even not to
lose all its fields of sensation. Likewise, the animate organism can
grow larger. :

If I cut off a fingernail or my hair, or if it grows back again, then
the animate organism loses something, or it acquires something. It
also gains if I take a stick or a tool in hand, likewise by means of
Clothes. A ¢ool is an enlargement of the animate organism, namely,
when it is “in use.”’ It is not only an enlargement of the sensing
animate organism, but also of the animate organism as organ of will. In
the fields of sensation that already belong to the animate organism
sensation-changes of a content occur that do not occur without the
enlargement. In the field of volition, free movements and changes
occur that otherwise do not occur. In the fundamentals nothing 1s
thereby changed.

b) The science of the animate organism: somatology.

Theoretical investigation can now turn to this realm of being; the
perception and experience of animate organism — somatology, as we
say — can be that which adopts the mode of theoretical experience
and determines theoretical thinking. Since the specifically soma-
tological is not a separate reality, but rather a higher stratum of being
that is built upon material reality, the theoretical experience and
cognition of the somatic being also requires material experience and
corresponding material cognition. But the latter belongs, logically
speaking, in material natural science. Therefore, when we call the
science of animate organicity somatology, it is material science to the
extent that it investigates the material properties of the animate
organism. But to the extent that it is specific somatology, it is
something new, something distinguished by a new basic form of
experience. But if one looks at it more closely, this double position
applies to all zoological sciences, e.g., the physiology of man and of
the brutes. They are natural sciences in the narrower sense, with
regard to the materiality of the animate beings; they are somatology
to the extent that they systematically establish relationships to the
spheres of sensation in the physiology of the sense organs and the
nervous system (which is better called the doctrine of the feelings of
the animate organism). Obviously the somatological experimental
apprehension predominates here, and without it nothing somatologi-
cal whatever can be found or indirectly reconstructed. The foun-
dation is finally the direct somatic perception that every empirical
investigator can effect only on his own body and then the somatic
interpretation [Eindeutung]* that he performs in the interpretive
apprehension of perceived alien animate organisms as such, and
performs in a manner which lends to this interpretation the.character
of an experience that may confirm itself through further similar
empirical apprehensions and positings, may determine itself more
precisely, and perhaps rectify itself — in short, legitimate itself. In the
larger sense of the word one can in the case of these interpretations
[Eindeutungen] even speak of ,perceptions, to the extent that the
consciousness of personal self-presence characterizes the perception
and to the extent that, in the perception of an alien animate organism
with the consciousness of the alien animate body’s own presence, we
also have a certain secondary consciousness of presence in person with

*'Translator’s note: Husserl uses the unusual word Eindeutung here. We have inserted it into

the text to call the reader's attention to its occurrence, even though we have translated it simply
as “interpretation.”

<8)

8 REGIONS OF REALITY

regard to the interpreted [etngedeuteten] moments — a consciousness,
<9» of course, such that upon closer examination it shows itself not as a
genuine originary being-given, but only as a being-given by means of
a kind of representation. In any case, it is not entirely without reason
that we say we see a brute or a human being, that we thereby “‘see on”’
it its pain when pricked, its sensuous pleasure while eating, and thus
also everything specifically psychic. Such acts belong to the sphere of
experience and not to the mere reproduction of experiences, such as
memories. We refer the reader, by the way, to the more detailed
presentations of the essence of interpretation [Eindeutung]. According
to this presentation, therefore, the whole doctrine of sensation dealt
with by physiology and psychology forms a unity with all the well-
known doctrines concerning the various peculiarities of the sense
regions in their dependence on the sense organs and sense centers as
well as on the nature of the physiological sense stimuli, a unity which,
with the corresponding doctrines of “‘affective sensations,’ of sen-
sations in the broadest sense, belongs to somatology. What is
investigated thereby is animate organicity in the sense of somatologi-
cal experience, the real property-stratum of sensitivities that belongs
to the animate organism as such, which sensitivities make themselves
known in the original feelings and generally in the sense fields as sets
of states of the soma. We should also mention here the reason why we
have not mentioned general biology, and specifically not botany. The
obvious kinship between brute and plant that thrusts itself to the fore
and brings with it so many parallel and closely related problems in
carrying out investigations directed at plant “‘life’’ and brute mate-
riality, 1.e., brings with it from this side a unity of the natural sciences
(with regard to zoology as the natural science of animate material
body), does not go so far that a definite interpretation of the plant as
an animate organism has become possible (and ultimately as an
animate organism for something psychic in the full sense), which
interpretation could have posed its definite somatological problems,
as is the case first with the higher brutes and then, pursuing the
sequence of levels of the brutes, also with the lower ones. The
universal and completely indefinitely performed empathy that per-
mits the analogy is not enough for the investigator; he needs concrete #
«10> experience of concrete sensitivities related to concrete organs, where-
by the analogy of the plant organs with brute-animal ones, to which
well-known sensitivities belong according to experience, must be
broad enough to ground the probability of the interpretation. If this is
lacking, then the treatment of botany as a material natural science
suffices — or rather, no other treatment then is possible. It would

REGIONS OF REALITY 9

therefore not exclude plants’ having sensitivities after all; it only
means that we would be incapable of recognizing them, because there
is lacking any bridge of empathy and of mediately determined
analysis. But I only wanted here to be as accommodating as possible
to the prevailing field of physiological botany and biology in general,
and I leave open the question whether interpretive experience cannot
play — or whether in fact it is not playing — its fruitful role after all,
as it undoubtedly does in zoology, although here, too, this is often not
appreciated.

§3. THE DELIMITATION OF SOMATOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY.

The separation that we have performed here under the title
‘‘Somatology” is a completely natural one; it encompasses a class of
investigations as radically as is conceivable in the case of a science,
namely, by means of a basic form of experience and experiential
objectivity. Nevertheless it is understandable that an independent,
proper somatology has never been formed, just as it 1s also under-
standable that the idea of such a science (as important as it is for
reasons relating to the theory of science) has never been conceived. Its
conception presupposes the pure separation of sensation from the
apprehensional texture into which it is woven, 1e., presupposes
unusual phenomenological analyses, and also presupposes a diverting
of the regard from that which is given in the full apprehensions and
which determines our natural directions of regard. We perceive the
animate organism but along with it also the things that are perceived
‘by means of” the animate organism in the modes of their ap-
pearance in each case, and along with this we are also conscious of
ourselves as human beings and as Egos that perceive such things by
means of the animate organism. The animate organism, apprehended
as animate organism, has its localization-stratum of tactual feelings,
but we touch this thing here, we “‘sense”’ the contact of our clothing,
etc. Hence the ambiguity of “‘to sense.”” The animate organism senses,
and this concerns what is localized. Through it we “‘sense’’ things;
here, ‘‘sensing”’ is the perceiving of spatial things, and it is we who, in
Perceiving, have directed our intellectual regard at the thing, and this
animate organism is our animate organism.?

But if we analyze phenomenologically the interconnections of ap-
prehensions, then the stratification of apprehensions that we have

*Sece Supplement II, p. 119.

C11)

«12>

10 REGIONS OF REALITY

described in detail becomes evident. And whether it is correctly
recognized reflectively or not, it dominates theoretical experience and
the problems to be posed on its ground, to the extent that they are
correcdy posed and successfully worked out problems, as they are in
all genuine theories and genuine sciences. And to these belong, of
course, zoology and especially physiology and, on the other hand,
psychology, all of this understood within the proper limits. For on
both sides — and precisely in the sphere of the specifically somatologi-
cal, which is here in question — great masses of wrongly posed
problems are not lacking and attached to them, theories of cor-
responding value (as, e.g., the whole complex of problems and
theories posed under the heading, “‘psychological origin of the ideas of
space, of time, of physical thing,” is full of countersense, and
especially with regard to that which would have to be included in the
somatological sphere). The apprehensional stratum in which the
sensitivities of the animate organism, and therefore the latter itself,
are constituted showed itself to us, on the other hand, as intimately
fused with those strata that are constitutive for the psyche and the
psychic Ego, and indeed so intimately that the apprehension of
psyche must necessarily take into itself the sensation states of the
animate organism. Of course, from the standpoint of pure conscious-
ness sensations are the indispensable material foundation for all basic
sorts of noeses; and if the consciousness that we call experience of a
physical thing or even experience of an animate organism essentially
contains in its concrete unity sensations as materials of apprehension
(in the Logical Investigations I used the misunderstood expression
“representative contents’), as every consciousness enters into the
apprehension of psyche and becomes the real state of the psyche and
of the psychic Ego, with relationship to real circumstances — if that is
so, then it is evident that the same sensations that function in the
realizing apprehension of material perception as presentive contents
for material characteristics receive localization as sensation states and
make specific animate organicity appear in the new realizing appreh-
ension we call experience of animate organism; and third, finally,
they are components of the psychic under the heading of states of
perceiving of the Ego (material perceiving and, likewise, experienc-
ing of animate organism) and therefore belong to the psyche (i.e., sets
of states of the psyche) and correspondingly to the life of the Ego. One
can see all that, can bring it to clear givenness for oneself; and whoever
has followed our exhibitions Aas seen it with us. Therefore it is not
accidental, but rather to be understood on essential grounds, if
psychology, understood as science of the psyche, also has to do with

REGIONS OF REALITY 1]

all sensations. The question of how it has to do with them or must
have to do with them — that can only be taken from the sense
inherent in “psychological experience,’’ from the psychic-real that is
constituted in this new basic form of experience. We have to examine
this experience, to see how the psychic is given whenever the intention
of this sort of experience, univocally finding fulfillment, effectuates
itself — and this not factually, but according to essence. And the same
holds regarding the general question of what it has to do with in
general, what belongs to it and in what sense, and what principles of
method the sense of this “‘what’’ prescribes for it.

Others might think differently about this and maintain that one
must go to the psychological institutes and interrogate the experts in
order to inform oneself about the essence of psychology and its
method, as, indeed, one generally finds corresponding convictions
widely disseminated among the “‘experts”’: among mathematicians or
investigators of nature, e.g., that only a professional mathematician
or a professional investigator of nature can provide information about
the essence, goals, and methods of mathematics or natural science,
respectively — and so it is everywhere. I cannot dispute with anyone
so judging the matter, since he has not yet reached the point of
understanding what philosophy, as opposed to non-philosophical
sciences, is properly about — and must be about. But whoever has
understood this knows that methodological technique is not the interest
and affair of the philosopher, but rather of the dogmatic investigator,
of dogmatic science; that, on the contrary, the fundamental essence,
the idea of every science of a categorial type and the idea of its
method as the “‘sense’’ of every science, precedes the science itself and
can — and must — be established from the proper essence of the idea
of its objectivity, which determines its dogma, that is to say, can be
established apriori.

To grasp the ‘‘essence’’ of number, to clarify the basic concept of
arithmetic and understand the fundamental sources of its metho-
dology, no theory of integral equations nor any reflections on such
theories can instruct us; for that, we do not even need to know the
multiplication tables. To clarify or to determine scientifically the
essence of the psyche and therewith the possible goals and methods
(in fundamental universality) is not the business of the psychological
technician, i.e., the psychologist, but rather of the philosopher. This
holds for all categories of being that lead correlatively back to
categorial basic forms of bestowing consciousness. Statements like
these: that all scientific method is one and the same; that therefore
philosophy has to proceed methodologically according to the model of

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12 REGIONS OF REALITY

exact science, e.g., mathematics and especially natural science; that
philosophy obviously has to lean on special sciences for support, to
further process their results — such statements have been repeated so
often that they, with all accompanying elucidations, have become
completely trivial. The grain of truth that lies in them has not become
larger through repetition; on the other hand, the damage caused by
the much greater portion of untruth in these distorted statements has
become enormous. It threatens to consume German Philosophy.

I find it justifiable that the dogmatists do not listen to the
philosophers if they simply want to be experts in their fields and not
philosophers, undoubtedly quite sure nonetheless of their dogmatic
progress. But if they do want to be philosophers and consider
philosophy to be a sort of continuation of dogmatic science, then they
are like people who imagine that with sufficient progress in physics
and chemistry mankind will come so far that, by remedies a la
Ehrlich-Hata, it will cure not only physical but also moral syphilis.

As for the sensations, the answer obviously goes: while according to
their mode of experience these are in somatology manifestations of
sensitivities of the animate organism, and while it is, therefore, the
task of the theoretical thought in this science to pursue the causal
connections that belong to these sensitivities, psychology, following
the sense of its experience, has to pursue precisely those causal
connections that belong to its experiential unity, the psyche, and has
to direct toward sensations that real-causal interest which cor-
responds to their place in the psychic context. We gain all the desired
clarity if we enter immediately into the general discussion. If the
psyche is the reality that has its sets of states under the heading of
consciousness, then, according to what we worked out earlier, this
consciousness, whether through self-perception or through inter-
pretive perception, is given as something belonging to an animate
organism. That is to say, the Objectivation of animate organism lies at
the foundation, and in such a way that the animate organism gets the
position of a reality founding the psyche. All in all, a human being is
given, given as a reality that includes in itself the material animate
thing, that becomes a full human being through the psychic stratum
interwoven with the feeling-stratum. We have an intermingling of
three realities, each successive one in the series including in itself the
preceding one by virtue of the fact that it merely brings in a new
stratum. Sensation stands as something common on the boundary, so
to speak, between the second and the third level. On the second level
it is the manifestation of the sensitivity of the animate organism. On
the other hand, it is, on the third level, the material foundation for

REGIONS OF REALITY 13

perceptive apprehensions, e.g., for material perception, in this case
standing in the dual apprehensional functions discussed above: as
kinesthetic in the function of the motivating, as the presentive
sensation in the function of the motivated, under the circumstances
presenting something from the statal content of the material object
(e.g., color, smoothness, etc.). All these apprehensions now become
involved with higher specifically Egoical consciousness. But whether
or not an Ego’s regard from this stratum goes through them, whether
or not the Ego holds sway in them with its spontaneous Ego-acts, they
are in any case (like the spontaneous acts also) not merely occurrences
of a pure consciousness. Rather, they themselves undergo their
apprehension, precisely their apprehension as psychic states. A
human being or a brute is not a mere animate organism with whose
sensation-states consciousness is somehow connected; but rather, a
human being has a specific psychic character all his own, by virtue of
which he so takes up into his consciousness the sensations that he
senses by means of his animate organicity, so apprehends them, bears
just such a relationship — theoretically experiencing, thinking,
evaluating, acting — to that which thereby appears, that the play of
his reproductions runs its course precisely in such constellations and
with it connects to itself the process of the originary impressions (the
sensuous and the non-sensuous), etc.

If we now look by way of comparison at the manner in which
sensation functions in somatic experience on the one hand and
psychological experience on the other, or at what comes to givenness
with sensation, a sharp distinction confronts us. In the two cases
sensation is apprehended in a basically different way, and therefore
something different also comes to givenness in the two cases: on the one
side, a sensitivity of the animate organism, or a feeling as behaviour of
the animate organism; on the other side, the feeling, as that which
makes known something organismic, has nothing to do with the
experience of a psychic state; this somatic apprehension is not, say, a
component part of the apprehension of the psychic state, or more
precisely, of the state of the perception of a physical thing, in which
the sensation functions as presentive, or of the receptive apprehension
of a picture-figment (of the painted “‘picture’’) and the like. Nothing
in all of this in any way alters the circumstance that the apprehen-
sion of psyche is in general founded in the apprehension of animate
organism. Both apprehensions become interwoven with one another
through the double function of sensation, which is not only a factually
double one but one that is also double in its basic nature; and though
the two are interwoven, neither enters into the other. That holds for

15)

14 REGIONS OF REALITY

all sensations. It holds also for the sensory feelings founded in the
primary sensations, which feelings on the one hand somatologically
manifest feeling-sensitivity of the animate organism, while on the
other hand they enter into emotional functions and do not import
into the latter any somatic apprehensions.

{16> With this is connected the fact that the question about the How of
the investigation of sensation, and, in particular, of the causal
investigation of sensation, is answered very differently for somatology
and for psychology. Regarded psychically, sensation is merely ma-
terial for apprehensions (objectivations in a certain sense that must be
firmly delimited), whereby we do not forget the background appre-
hensions by virtue of which the conspicuous foreground apprehension
(perhaps going through a primary attending or a secondary noticing)
necessarily makes an object of consciousness of something that has
surroundings, that “steps out” of its surroundings. Psychological
causality is causality that relates to the specifically psychic states.
From the psychological standpoint the material is simply there; it is
functioning: that is the specifically psychic. A particular causal
concern for it comes out of the psychological level. When we inquire
about the causality of the material, we have changed our attitude and
are doing somatology. There are no other causal questions that might
be directed toward sensation than the somatological ones. If we
consider now the sphere of specifically psychic causality, it must first
of all be said:

It is inherent in the sense of the apprehension of psyche, or the
apprehension of the human being, that the human being, with regard
to his somatic and psychic states, is dependent on the material
animate-organismic thing not only by virtue of the fact that it is the.
latter’s sensations, but also in respect of the specifically psychic. The
extent of this is determined, as with any experiential apprehension, by
the continuing process of actually occurring experience, which more
precisely determines what the form of the apprehensional sense leaves
open, what it implies in itself as determinability. Thus do the course
of sensory reproductions and, consequently, the course of the repro-
ductions in general, and the entire mode and rhythm of the
apprehensional life and further of the intellectual and emotional life,
dependent on it show themselves to be dependent on the physical
organization of the animate organism.

With regard to the kind of causal dependence, the reality of the
psychic seems at first to behave quite analogously to the reality of the
organismic. But very soon one sees the essential differences. As a
fundament of the structure of the founded reality that we call an

REGIONS OF REALITY 15

animate being we have the material of the animate organism, and to
it belongs a self-contained causal nexus that finds its place in material
nature. But the issue does not rest with the material causality of the
physical animate organism, in which it proves itself a material
substance. Rather, if the physical animate organism, in a determinate
interweaving of causal circumstances, assumes a material state
definitely belonging to it, there then occurs in the somatic sensation-
stratum that belongs to it as animate organism a determinately
accompanying alteration of feeling. This alteration, for its part, has
no reverse effect back into the nature-stratum. The sensations seem,
like a sort of shadow (as epiphenomena), to follow certain material
states of the animate organism. The situation would be the same for
the psychic stratum, if it too, like the somatic stratum of the feelings,
could be regarded as an unambiguous functional sequence of organis-
mic states. Psychology,or anthropology and zoology, would then be
basically somatological sciences of a higher level. Naturally, all spon-
taneity, such as the psychic spontaneity manifesting itself in the free
mc-vement of the animate organism, would then be a mere “epi-
phenomenon,” and what in free movement we call “willing,” and
with regard to the psychic Ego call the Egoical act, would all be a
pure sequence of certain organismic flows, and the movement itself
would be a process brought about purely in the sphere of material
causality. Looking at it more closely, however, we found in psychic
reality, in view of its dependence on the animate organism and on
matter, something essentially different as opposed to every other
dependency, even that which is proper to the animate organism:
namely, the fundamental impossibility of the unchanging persistence
of the psyche and, at one with it, the fundamental impossibility of a
return to the same state.® Already in this a countersense of the psycho-
phystcal parallelism shows itself. If the psyche were dependent on the
physical animate organism in the same manner as sensuousness, it
would have to be possible in principle for the psyche of the aged
person to develop backward to the psyche of the child — the same
child with identical states, who has become an aged person. But
that is in principle excluded by the psyche’s own specific character, its
necesarily developmental character.

In all this the following must be kept in mind: the unilateral and
uniform dependence that the occurrences of the sense fields have on
the materiality of the animate organism (its determinate material
constitution at any given time) does not change the fact that a novel

2See Supplement III, p. 120.

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16 REGIONS OF REALITY

objectivity with a novel stratum is constituted by the somatic
apperception, or experience. The novel stratum is not eliminated, but
rather presupposed in the exploration of the physio-somatic causal
relations. And in that case animate physits and animate organism stand
in causal relations, two realities of which the one is founded in the
other: and, as with causal relations of realities generally, so here
too, the occurrence of states of the one reality is what is causally
dependent (effect) on the occurrence of the pertinent states of the
other reality under the appropriate circumstances. The relation to
circumstances here, however, means only material circumstances;
that is, the unilateralness consists precisely in the fact that the
founded reality brings with it no circumstances of its own, that is to
say, has no causalities of its own along with those that belong to the
foundation. This would also be the case with psyche-apperception,
even if the psyche were in this manner a higher annex of the animate
organism.

It is certain that dependencies on the psychic run over into the
physical-organismic. How far they actually reach is a matter for
psycho-physiological empirical investigation to decide. How far they
can reach, on the other hand, that is to say, how far questions about
‘‘physiological correlates’’ and corresponding hypothetical construc-
tions can be senseful and guiding for the process of actual research, 1s
a matter for the phenomenological inquiry into essences. It prescribes
limits for psycho-physical investigations that are just as absolutely
fixed as those which geometry prescribes for geodetic investigations.
But there will be more to say about this when we consider the idea
of a rational psychology.

Our investigation has now progressed to the point where the zdea of
a psychology emerges as a science which is directed toward the psychic
reality and which must be differentiated from somatelogy, and indeed
from physical somatology (which finds its place in the general science

¢19> of material nature) as well as from the aesthesiological, and, on the
other hand, is involved in it, corresponding precisely to the foun-
dation of the realities. If the psyche is not a proper reality, but only a
stratum of reality over the body, then it cannot ground any self-
sufficient science. Physical natural science is a self-sufficient sciences
and relatively self-sufficient in its disciplines, as is physical soma-
tology; somatology is a self-sufficient science, but somatological
aesthesiology is not self-sufficient, while anthropology (or zoology
fully understood), again, is self-sufficient. But that does not prevent
an outstanding investigative interest from being turned toward the
psyche and the questions of reality belonging to it, and therefore also

REGIONS OF REALITY 17

questions of causality. In this case, however, as with all sciences of
reality, the peculiar Object is precisely the sort of realzty in question,
that is to say, the psyche, or the human being with regard to his psyche;
and the psyche is not a “‘bundle’”’ of conscious processes, but rather,
the real unity that manifests itself in them. One can maintain dead
silence about the psyche, one can scornfully designate it as a fagon de
parler: it is still the dominant thing in the apprehension and, with the
ideas that correlatively belong to it, the determining thing in the
investigation. But it is better if one speaks correctly and does not
interpret away what must, insofar as one is supposed to think
correctly, always remain alive.

Our considerations up to this point appear incomplete to the extent
that they have not particularly taken into account the pure and
psychic Ego, that is, have not more closely considered the way in
which it determines the task of psychology and the context of causal
investigation. In this regard, however, it must be seen at once that the
exploration of the psychic apperceptive Ego is only one level of the
general investigation of psyche. How the Ego makes its appearance as
pure Ego — that falls in the psychological sphere, to the extent that
the latter explores the appearance of acts in the context of nature.
How the Ego, as empirical Ego, develops itself, transforms itself,
always acquires new dispositions therein — that is only a particulan-
zation of the question of how the psyche develops itself, transforms
itself, etc., generally. Not everything psychic is something specifically
Egoical. Associations are formed, whether the Ego takes part therein
or not. Whether and to what extent one’s own idiopsychic regulations
belong to the Ego and its acts is a matter for special psychological
investigations; in any case, the psychic Ego is co-determined by the
whole psychic context, even as it stands under rules which, extending
beyond its own proper sphere, are psychically valid in general. We do
not need to linger here any longer.

§4. ‘“*COMMUNITIES’’ AS SEEN BY NATURAL SCIENCE.

Taking a foothold first of all in the material world in which the
animate organism finds a place, and then, following the sequence of
levels of founded experience, we have determined the original
domains for a series of corresponding levels of experience. The
Phenomenological clarification of the apperceptions and the basic
Sorts of objectivities that are constituted in them affords radical
Insight into the characteristic sense of corresponding sciences. We

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18 REGIONS OF REALITY

could still further enlarge the sequence of levels, but without gaining
anything especially instructive ourselves. If psychic Objects are
connected with one another, are combined into associations, societies
of various levels, this produces no new Objectivenesses with respect to
the foundation by original nature. For no new psyche arises hereby as
a psyche of higher level built upon the sum of the animate organisms
and their psyches, no unitary nexus of consciousness on the ground of
which a new reality, that of a communal psyche, might be con-
stituted. What one has here, from the point of view of natural science,
is a number of individual human beings each with a particular
consciousness, a particular psyche with a particular Ego belonging to
each. In the psycho-physical interrelated context that is made
possible by the material interrelations of the animate organisms, there
arise in the individual psyches acts that are intentionally directed at
something psychially external. But what appears here is always only
new states of the individual psyches. It is not otherwise than when a
plurality of material things has a relatively closed coherence of effect
and thereby produces material systems that must perhaps be regarded
as material unities. A fundamentally novel science does not thereby
arise. It is a different question whether we would also — and would
also be allowed to — say such things, if not psyches but rather the
mental personalittes were taken as the elements of these unity-formations.
But now there are for us no minds. We stand in natural science, defined
by the universe of those realities that are either themselves material
nature or founded in material nature.

CHAPTER TWO

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND
PHENOMENOLOGY

§5. THE RELATIONSHIP OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO THE SCIENCES.

Now we want to turn our particular attention to the relations
between psychology and phenomenology. All the analyses of this
section were themselves phenomenological ones and could not be
misinterpreted as experiential-scientific, even where they began
with actual experience. The single datum of experience, e.g., of some
“apprehension,” ‘‘perception,”’ or the like, counted throughout only
as an example; we always shifted immediately to the eidetic attitude
and explored eidetically what belongs to the essence, the possibilities
included in the essence of certain apprehensions: the possibility of
passing over into series of intuitions, series of experiences, of thereby
univocally fulfilling themselves, and of explicating their sense, i.e., the
sense of what is intended, what is experienced as such, and with it the
sense of the objectivities concerned. The phenomenological analyses,
in pieces of intuitive eidetic analysis, exemplified on the one hand the
method and the sort of results sought; but at the same time they
served to draw from the primal sources the essence of the reality-
Categories of matter, animate organism, psyche, and psychic Ego,
Categories that are founded in one another and therewith to grasp the
originary sense of the corresponding sciences, which is determined
thereby. At the same time, through these analyses — which, if
necessary, can still be further developed in the same sense in various
directions — all the preconditions are fulfilled (or, can be fulfilled
supplementarily) for determining the fundamental characteristics of
the method of these sciences and for bringing to intuitive understand-
ing how far, e.g., the method of physical natural science and the
Psychological method can run parallel and to what extent they must
be basically different. Norms that emerge here originarily cannot be
disregarded without bringing the course of science into confusion and
misleading it into wrong ways of setting problems and wrong modes
of experience. It is not what calls itself ‘modern science” and not
those who call themselves ‘experts’ that make the method; but

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20 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

rather, the essence of the objects and the appurtenant essence of
possible experience of objects of the category concerned (that is the
apriori of the phenomenological constitution) prescribes everything
fundamental in the method; and it is characteristic of the expert of
genius to grasp this essence Intuitively (even if not to bring it in a
philosophical way up to the level of rigorous concepts and formulated
norms) and to orient the particular problems and particular methods
according to it. All discoveries and inventions of the experts move
within the framework of an absolutely intransgressible apriori that
one can draw not from their doctrines but only from the phenome-
nological Intuition. To grasp it scientifically, however, is a special
task of philosophy and not of the dogmatic sciences themselves. To be
sure, what normatively determines method in general is the theme of
general noetus, which reaches out beyond all categories of objectivities
and constitutive Intuitions. But we do not yet possess this. It will be
possible only after a general phenomenological eidetic doctrine of
cognition has been carried through far enough with respect to
Intuition and with respect to specific thinking. But this much is clear
even without a completed noetics: that the method of every science
must be determined by the sort of originarily bestowing intuition, or
the basic sort of originary apprehension,‘ essentially belonging to the
object-category to which it is related (perhaps along with other
sciences). It is a commonplace that all cognition of nature has its
ultimate source in experience, or to put it concretely: that all scientific
grounding ultimately rests on acts of experience (on the act which
originarily bestows nature-objectivity). And if, as we must, we accept
this as valid, it is clear that methodological norms that experience
brings out of itself and that are obviously grounded in their essence
must be determinative for the natural-scientific method. The same
must naturally hold for all sciences in general; in all of them,
grounding necessarily leads ultimately beyond the sphere of thinking
to intuition and ultimately to originarily bestowing intuition, which
can only not be an experience if its objectivities are other than
experiential objectivities (realities of the sphere of nature). We have,
of course, already established this: that essentially different con-
stitutive apprehensions, and therefore also basic forms of originarily
bestowing acts, must correspond to the different object categories.

‘According to our terminology, the theoretical attitude does not, nor in general does any

‘look at” anything, belong to mere apprehension.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 21

§6. THE ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE EMPIRICAL SCIENCES.

The method in all sciences is also determined by the universal essence
of the objectivity that Intuitively comes to light in the complete
presentation of such objectivity, that is to say in the complete
unfolding of the intentions lying in its apprehension, and naturally in
the eidetic attidute and in the direction not of apprehension but of the
objective affair that is being constituted. The universal essence can be
unfolded in thought, and its unfolding necessarily leads to an ontology.
Complete method presupposes the systematic development of the
ontology, 1.e., the eidetic doctrine that belongs to this object-category
involved. The total inventory of cognitions that it offers is an
unconditional norm for everything that possible empirical cognition
of the factual sciences related to the categories can ever offer, and it
goes along simultaneously into the factual cognition. Every step
forward with regard to ontology — and in particular with regard to
the formulating of ontological basic cognitions or ontological discip-
lines that bring to ontological apprehénsion an as yet not onto-
logically apprehended side of the objective category concerned
— must be to the advantage of the empirical science. We have
already talked about that, and we only bring it up here in order to
establish the legitimacy, indeed the unconditional necessity, of a
rational psychology. It was in the investigations toward the phenome-
nology of cognition (in the Logical Investigations) that we first became
aware that there must be such a discipline, and, to be sure, one of
enormous scope, one not construed from above out of empty
“concepts” (vague word-significations), like the old metaphysical
psychology, but rather, an eidetic doctrine drawn from pure
Intuition. This seems to have completely escaped all earlier in-
vestigators of cognition, investigators of consciousness generally,
despite all the age-old talk of an apriori of thinking and will under the
titles of logic and ethics. For, what they gave and wanted to give under
these titles was anything but psychological eidetic doctrine in the sense
in question here. In the above-mentioned work phenomenology was
given as a purely immanent description of what is given in inner
intuition (in a lax manner it is sometimes called there “inner
experience’’), a description that does not, however, establish empirical
facts, but rather, in the attitude of ‘ideation,’ essential inter-
connections only. Precisely on this rested the definitive refutation
(attempted in the ‘Sixth Investigation’’) of the psychologism of the
theory of cognition. Thereafter in the Logical Investigations phenomen-

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22 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

ological eidetic doctrine and rational psychology coincided. That it is
in various ways incorrect that a rational psychology must be
apprehended as the ontology of something real becoming constituted
in the nexus of lived-process and cannot then coincide with the essence
of a nexus of lived-process, we will be able to see after we have clarified
the idea of reality in general as well as that of the psychic reality and
have given up the old mistrust (still controlling even the author of the
Logical Investigations) of psychic and Egoical reality. The remarkable
relationship between phenomenology and psychological ontology
which permits the former to find its place in the latter and again in a
certain manner also permits the latter, like all ontological disciplines,
to find a place in the former, will occupy us extensively, and we will
learn to see parallel relationships for the ontology of the mind.

e¢

§7. REGIONAL CONCEPTS AND ‘‘GENERIC’’ CONCEPTS.®

First of all it is of greatest importance for the philosopher and
phenomenologist to have made perfectly clear Intuitively what is
distinctive about concepts I have called objective regional ones:
namely, the method according to which they can be derived apriori.
This derivation is not meant in the sense of a ‘“‘transcendental
deduction” from some postulate or other or from some system of
thought that is not itself given through Intuition (like the system of
the forms of judgment in the Kantian deduction of what he calls the
categories), and yet according to an apodictically evident “‘transcen-
dental clue,”’ in following which we cannot deduce the concepts but
rather can find them ourselves and step by step in seeing grasp them
ourselves. It is necessary to make clear to oneself what gives these
concepts their unique signification and predestines them to be
regional concepts of ontologies in such a way that there must
apriori be as many ontologies as regional concepts: whether these
ontologies then are rich or poor in content, whether they break up
into great sciences or exhaust themselves in small groups of pro-
positions. It is then further necessary to see that all radical classifi-
cation of the sciences, the experiential sciences above all, must be
dependent upon this concept-formation: “region,” particularly that
there must be as many fundamentally different empirical sciences (or
groups of disciplines) as ontologies. Without exhausting the matter
here we only want to say what is necessary in order to exclude
misleading empiricist objections.

$See Supplement IV, p. 121 ff.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 23

Why, the empiricist will ask, should the concept ‘“‘material thing”’
(which we present as a regional one) be something basically different
in essence from, or play an essentially different role from, that of the
concept “heavenly body’’? Naturally it is a very general, one might
say In a certain way a most general, concept, encompassing whole
groups of disciplines. But concepts arise out of experience through
generalization; it must remain open to us to find in generali-
zation experiential grounds to progress still further, and then the
more general concept would play the same role as the concept of
physical thing. And all the more so the concept of brute (another
example of a regional concept): it does not come into being
otherwise than does the concept of frog or of reptile; it is only more
general. Indeed a further generalizing leads from this to “living
being’’ — and perhaps one could go yet a step further. All concepts,
the general as well as the particular, stem from expéience, and their
usefulness must be confirmed in the continuing process of further
experience. We must always be ready to change them in accordance
with it.

On the other hand it is necessary to make clear to oneself the
following: no matter what the much-discussed, even ambiguous,
“stemming from experience’ may mean — and no matter how,
whether in our sleep or by a miracle, we have acquired the disposition
to use general words in identical signification — the word-
significations can de valid as logical essences only if according to ideal
possibility the “logical thinking” actualizing them in itself is adapt-
able to a “corresponding intuition,” if there is as corresponding
noema a corresponding essence that is graspable through /ntuttzon and
that finds its true “expression” through the logical concept. The
logical essence that constitutes itself in pure thinking and the Intuitive
noema stand there in the determinate eidetic relationship of the
“fitting expression.” If this is the case, the concept is valid in the sense
of the ‘‘possibility” of a corresponding object. Thereby the eidetic
Intuition can be performed on the ground of a single instance of
imagination. This Intuition is sufficient for me to grasp the general
essence, presupposing that it is so far-reaching that it really brings to
givenness the corresponding Intuitive noematic essence, i.e., does not
leave remaining any component of the thought-conception that
would not fit as pure expression of a component of the intuitively
given noema. On the other hand, the concept has existential validity
only if, not imagination, but actually occurring “experience,” i.e.,
originarily giving and indisputably giving intuition, posits individual
actuality as actuality that is meant in the noetic essence; or if (through

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24 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

‘‘mediate grounding’) on the ground of further experiences the
positing of such actuality is motivated rationally. Where concepts
relate to reality, the legitimating intuition and experience in principle
leave many things open. In accordance with their sense they leave
room for closer determinations and altered determinations; the
Intuitive noematic essences, and parallel to them in the sphere of
expression, the logical essences, the thought-concepts themselves, are
accordingly variously encumbered with indefiniteness. In keeping
with the endless possibilities, it is then necessary to become better and
better acquainted with the real object, to determine more exactly in
the ongoing course of experience what remains open (or to imagine
the object more and more definitely in the fictive intuition), con-
stantly to bring in new concepts which with those that are first to be
expressed are ordered together into more perfect expressions in
thought. But since the real actuality is no chaos but rather a
regionally ordered whole, there is no need of actual infinities of
concepts in order to become acquainted with the thing. It becomes
plain that to many real determinations infinitely many others attach
themselves as consequences according to cognizable rules, and that
there is such a thing as classification, according to which generic and
specific concepts can be formed that coordinate limited groups of
characteristic conceptual traits to which according to experience
innumerable others so attach themselves and from which innumer-
able others are so excluded that with a systematics of objects under
these genera and species there is carried out an actual division of all
individuals of a most general existential sphere that is sufficiently
separated off by highest class traits. Concepts of such accomplishment
are obviously not to be drawn from merely noematic Intuition. It 1s
indeed clear that in addition to their essential signification they all
have an existential signification. To put it more correctly: théy bring
with themselves in addition to their pure signification (their sense free
of all assertive positing) a knowing, a thesis which has a relation to
complexes of assertions, scientifically already fixed, about the real
actuality, a precipitate from already obtained cognitive results for the
actual factual existence. In general it holds for all sciences (even for
ideal sciences) that the formation of concepts, and to be sure of
‘‘possible’’ ones, concepts obtained out of clarity, concretely fixed
through adaptation to intuition, serves them for the obtaining of true
judgments; it holds that they also end by encumbering the concepts
with judgment-values, whereby they themselves become judging
concepts for the sphere of objects of science. With such judgment-
values the concepts subsequently enter into all further connections.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 25

Thereby the concept of the concept receives a dangerous ambiguity.
We must sharply distinguish: the pure sense free of all positing and
the sense of the expressions in question which is encumbered with
judgment-theses. It is clear that valuable judicative concepts, like
those that every investigator of reality seeks, can only be drawn out of
actually occurring experience. When he therefore says: all concepts
stem from experience, he obviously has in view from the outset the
judicative concepts that concern him constantly, that form the
constant goal of his work. Understandably he tends to evaluate
concept-formations that move on the ground of mere imagination as a
‘spinning out of empty possibilities,’’ as “‘scholasticism.’’ But it 1s
clear that, no matter how right he is where it is a question of gaining
valuable judicative concepts, nevertheless he cannot be right in every
way. And not even with regard to these concepts themselves. They
possess after all a pure essence fixable prior to all judicative content,
which essence may integrate itself into essential interconnections that
may conceal in themselves valuable cognition with regard to the
possibility of corresponding objects. And it is of course obvious that
these noematic essences make up the sense which is proper to the
objectivity which in that case is intuited or thought, and that any
pure eidetic truth having its ground in these essences prescribes in
general an unconditionally valid norm for possible objectivities of
such a sense.

Therefore, if we go back to these noematic essences (whose mere
thought-expresston the univocal concepts form), then they possess
purely as essences their separations and connections, especially their
subordination to more general essences and finally to highest genera,
which in themselves are absolutely closed, absolutely sharply limited.
All differentiations of genus and species to be carried out here in pure
Intuition provides something basically other than the genera and the
species of the empirical sciences of reality, which gain their sense not
through mere essences but rather through a judgment-based
cognition-stock of experience.

Now what especially interests us here are certain highest eidetic
universalities such as physical thing, animate being, or basic concepts
according to which the basic sorts of realities are differentiated. And
finally also such an eidetic-universality, an even higher one, as is
presented by the concept of reality itself which is fixed by us through
eidetic definition (that is to say, drawn purely out of Intuition).

Let us proceed from some definite reality or other that lies before us
in an actually occurring experience. Let it be a material thing, more
precisely: a piece of gold. It is apprehended by us in this actually

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26 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

occurring experience in a definite sense, and according to a part of
this sense it authenticates itself as actually given. Carrying out eidetic
focusing, we now proceed to the pure sense; we abstract from the
existential positing of the actually occurring experience. The sense is
an only partially determinate one; it is necessarily indeterminate
insofar as it is the sense of something real which as such would exhibit,
in endless and manifold series of experience, ever new sides and
properties that are not predelineated in a firm content by the sense
fixed by the experience that is the starting point, but rather are held
open only as indeterminate but determinable possibilities. Through
suspension of the experiential positing of their requirements, we are
now free from all fetters which physics and chemistry could impose
upon us. We move about with free power of choice in the realm of
‘empty possibilities.’” Making unlimited use of this freedom, we keep
the identity of sense, insofar as the objectivity presented with it is
supposed to be able to appear as identical, univocal in itself, in any
series of variations that we carry out. Thus freely phantasying we let
the thing move, deform its shape in any way we like, let its qualitative
determinations, its real properties change themselves as we like; we
play with the well known properties and. laws of properties as
conceived in physics, let the changes of properties so proceed that the
laws must be reshaped, must be transformed into completely different
ones. We even invent for ourselves new senses or new qualities for the
old senses (even if in an indirectly suppositional inventing); we let
them extend themselves in spatial shape in place of the old ones and
in them let real properties or unheard of transformations of the old
ones authenticate themselves. Freely proceeding in this way the
phantasy produces the most incredible deformities of things, the
wildest physical spectre, scorning all physics and chemistry.

It is clear that the totality of arbitrary productions whichwe gain
out of one physical thing are identically obtainable also from every
other one; in fact, everything can be continuously converted into
everything, the totality of shapings is the same and a fixed one. And
yet we see thereby that, even in this phantasy and variation averse to
all restriction by natural law, the system of the offspring of our
phantasy still retains its rules which justify speaking of a closed
system: they are offspring of a phantasy that shapes and reshapes
physical things, constitutes physical things and again destroys physical
thing constitution, carries out genuine physical thing properties and
again gives them up as apparent properties. The physical thing that
served us as starting point is transformed, remains a little while
something appearing to be a physical thing; and if we proceed too

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 27

freely, if we do not respect the essential relation of real properties to
real circumstances, if we don’t take care that our phantasy so orders
the formations that it allows this relation to be sustained, then the
thing falls apart in manifolds of phantoms (sensuous schemata),
flowing as manifolds that constitute real things simply cannot and
may not flow. Physical thing is simply not an existent in general but
rather something identical in the combination of causal dependen-
cies. It is something that can live only in the atmosphere of causal
lawfulness. But that demands definitely regulated organizations for
the constituting sensuous schemata. If freely ruling phantasy breaks
through these organizations in an unbridled manner, then not only is
an individual schema transformed into a “‘mere phantom,” but the
whole world becomes a flow of mere phantoms; it is therefore no
longer nature. But it is not for that reason completely lawless. In his
singular genius Kant foresaw that and it is expressed in his works in
the distinction between transcendental aesthetics and analytics. For
the mere phantom-world the pure theory of time and pure geometry
still hold; it is however a world without any physics. Also with regard
to the sensuous fullness of phantom-extension there exists regularities,
but the sensuous fullness authenticates no material properties.

Let us now leave this phantom-world. Let us now hold our
phantasy in check. Let us begin again with an experience of a
physical thing, say the perception of a tree, of that tree there. We take
the thing exactly as that which appears in this perception; we
disconnect all indirect knowing, even by physics and chemistry. With
this there is fixed a determinate objective sense, which can be
described. There appears a tree, a pine etc. That which is appearing,
precisely in the given sense, appears actually only by certain sides and
is nevertheless meant, though indeterminately, as a ‘‘more,” over
against that which is “‘actually” appearing. This indeterminateness
directs us into the actually occurring perception and further possible
perceptions; on the ground of this indeterminateness belonging to the
perceptual sense, we can indeed ask, and this question guides us
constantly in experience, how this object looks according to its other
sides, how it is determined through ever new perceptions and is to be
described according to them and is to be determined in thought.
Thereby every new experience poses new questions. However un-
known the thing is, however little we may, therefore, know what future
experience may perhaps teach us, one thing is clear apriori, namely,
that an absolutely fixed framework for the course of possible ex-
perience is already predelineated and, to be sure, already through the
sense of the perception that is the starting point. With it is posited not

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28 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

only an object in general, but a physically real thing, a substrate, even
if of unknown real properties related to real circumstances no matter
how indeterminate. If the perception that is the point of departure is
to retain a legitimacy at all, if the objectivity posited in its sense is to
be capable of being actual, then the course of possible experiences
related to this same object univocally determining it more exactly is
prescribed.

Let us try to invent in free choice, holding fast only to this initial
perception and its legitimacy; let nothing of other experiential
knowing restrict us, no physics, no natural science of any kind. Let us
freely invent a progression of experiences which would harmoniously
authenticate on all sides and completely that which 1s perceived; the
fixed perceptual sense will force us then to invent real circumstances
which as causal correlates of the properties authenticating themselves
would fit and would preserve the harmony. If we pursue these
environmental realities and also develop them more precisely, while
remaining true to the beginnings once made, that is to say, sustaining
harmoniously the appurtenant real unities and construing in phan-
tasy the experiential series constitutive of them, then a whole world 1s
finally construed for us, a world that has its laws as conceived in
physics but that still in no way would have to be the same world that
we would have brought to cognition not out of fiction but rather out
of experience and out of experiential science. For in our procedure in
phantasy we can, though restricted by the initial starting point, set
out upon innumerable ways; each way restricts us anew, but leaves
open for us in the further procedures again endlessly many possibi-
lities for experiential progress, and so it is with every new experiential
fiction, which is restricted only by the fact that that which is already
posited and invented as determinate in ever new experiential be-
ginnings is supposed to be retained harmoniously in itg determi-
nations. According to the manner of our inventive determining, we
can construe completely different worlds, which would all be worlds
for the physical thing that is the point of departure; each of these
worlds would have its own and distinct set of laws, its distinct natural
science; and therefore in each world the physical thing that is the
point of departure (which according to its sense and being is variously
outfitted precisely in accordance with the sense of the various worlds)
would be a different one, in another nature — of another nature.
Phantasy can therefore still rule freely enough; it can no longer pose
as world destroyer, but only as world builder; but in this endlessly
many possibilities remain for it. So restricted is it, however, by the
mere presupposition that the starting perception is supposed to be

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 29

valid, that it is supposed to be sustained harmoniously as perception of
its object, just as it posits it as an extensively real thing, with all
indeterminateness remaining open. As soon as we drop this pre-
supposition and demand in general merely a unity sustaining itself
(which the phantom already offers), the reality falls apart, and
everything is dissolved into a chaos of phantoms, which, if we exhaust
all possibilities, would conceal among other things the regulated
connections of phantoms in which all possible worlds, realities, are
constituted. But finally there also lay in the idea of the phantom a rule
that encompasses the circle of possibilities, a law self-regulating in
certain directions. Accordingly in the course of all possible experience
an apriori is actually predelineated and obviously predelineated by
the essence of the physical perception as a basic kind of perception, or
experience. Precisely for that reason the idea of physical thing has a
unique distinction; it designates a categorial (or, as we might better
say, regtonal) framework for every sense pertinent to and possible for an
experience of such a basic sort, a framework to which, as a necessary
form, 1s bound apriori all more precise determination of an object
posited indeterminately in some experience or other. If something is
experienced at all (within this experiential system), then there is posited
therewith eo ipso not only an object in general but a res extensa, a
material thing; and this expression determines not a content, but a_form
for all posstble objects of posstble experience of this sort in general. However
experience may run then; even if the object is other than it was
posited at first; however far its determination may be altered and
revised, as long as it is to be retained at all as existing, all experience,
as determining it according to its “how constituted,” is regulated;
everything due it is correlatively regulated by a formal sense-
composition, which the idea of the thing includes. The idea of
physical thing accordingly has a quite different status than the idea of
any other universal based on experience. Of course the idea of
mineral, the idea of plant, and the like, also prescribes a rule for the
course of experience. But in a quite different sense from the idea of the
thing. One must not confuse that which a universal concept pre-
scribes and that which the essence of the universal perception as a
basic kind of experience prescribes. The concept, more precisely, the
conceptual apprehension as mineral, prescribes in the mode of
thinking. If the apprehension is to be valid, then it must legitimate
itself and legitimate itself in experience as conceptual apprehension to
whose sense it belongs to be conceptual apprehension of a physical
thing: in the object as it comes to givenness in experience, the
objective moments that were conceptually meant must become

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30 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

apparent. But experience with its demands precedes conceptual
thinking and its demands. If it is experienceable at all, then it has its
form, it is a physical thing. It comes naturally to expression in the
concept mineral together with its particular content; it “contains,”
we say, the concept of the physical thing. But that is just what is
peculiar, that the demand for fulfillment that this conceptual
composition makes is essentially different from the demand that all
other components of such a concept as mineral make: it expresses
merely the regional form, the correlate of the basic sort of experience,
but the others express particular determinations. A conceptual
apprehension and positing of actuality as mineral can be false;
experience can prove these or those moments belonging to the
concept stone to be invalid; there is only one thing it can never prove
to be invalid so long as any experienceable object at all sustains itself
validly: precisely that which belongs to the object as object of such a
regional sort of experience: the physical. We therefore understand
why a concept of the sort “extensive thing’? must claim a quite
distinctive place as opposed to any other concepts we like.

And we understand it when we study the phenomenological
connections of physical thing and constitution of a physical thing.
Physical thing is not a generic concept of the same sort as mineral,
ranking equally with it and similar generic concepts, only perhaps
more general. As long as we ascend in the formation of Species and
genus and form genuine genera, we ascend from the full materially
filled essence of the object to universal eidetic traits that could be
common to several, innumerably many, objects; from the materially
filled essences of species singled out something materially filled that is
“‘common’’ can then again be singled out, etc. In this way we acquire
from the essence of a determinate tone, placing it in a series with the
essence of other tones, the essence of tone in general, th€ acoustic in
general, sensuous quality in general and the like. All its material
content, however, is in our sphere of realities ‘“‘something accidental”
that is bound to something ‘‘necessary,”’ a necessary form, precisely
the one which the concept physical thing expresses. All material
content can change and does change in physical alteration; only one
thing cannot change: the universal physical-thing form. A heavenly
body can be altered; the stock of materially filled properties that
characterize it can variously change; it finally ceases to correspond to
the idea of heavenly body; other generic concepts then take its place.
But however it may be altered, even if it were to dissolve into gas and
disperse into space: physical thing remains physical thing, and even
the dispersal or fragmentation does not change anything in that, for

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 31

its possibility is itself predelineated in the universal form ‘physical
thing.” Everything materially filled is accidental; it is that which is
given through experience and that which is to be determined through
experience in its alterations or non-alterations. How it changes: that is
fact. But however it may change, so long as there is experience at all,
so long as the perception that posits the object retains any legitimacy
at all, physical thing is physical thing. However the what of the
physical thing, its material content, may change, foreseeably or not
foreseeably, the universal that the words “physical thing’’ signify
there (and it signifies very much), cannot change; it is the framework
in which all alteration takes place. Just as naturally in the free
phantasy. I may in my phantasy quite arbitrarily change the physical
thing that hovers before me; if I phantasize it as a thing, i.e., if I
phantasize myself into an experiencing and maintain the experiential
positing “in the phantasy,” then I am restricted. And in eidetic
attitude I can therefore bring out what is essentially necessary to this
restriction, 1.e., the essence “physical thing.’’ Thus there is in the
world of the essences themselves and of the eidetic concepts a
distinction predelineated between priority and postertority, which
justifies speaking in a certain sense of apriort and apostertori concepts. This
sense of apriori belongs to the concepts of realities and is a “‘transcen-
dental”’ distinction insofar as it and its distinction from the aposterion
has its source in the basic property and the realities have of
“constituting” themselves as unities of multiplicities.

The whole consideration that we have carried out here can
obviously be understood as an example. What we have made most
evident to ourselves in the idea of the physical thing as res extensa 1s
equally evident to us in all similar cases. In the essence of the
originarily bestowing consciousness in general are grounded cardinal
distinctions according to basic sorts, which it is one of the most
important tasks of phenomenology to seek systematically and to
describe scientifically. To every such basic sort there obviously
corresponds a regional concept which delimits the sense-form of the
respective basic sort of presentive intuition, and there corresponds in
further sequence a region of objects, encompassing all objects to
which this sense is proper. With regard to the fact that in the essence
of these originarily presentive acts basic sorts of foundings are also laid
out and that with the latter new basic sorts of presentive intuition
arise that are founded precisely in the old ones, there result (as we
have studied thoroughly in one case, that of the founding of
psychological perception) orders of lowest regional concepts and
concepts founded in them and corresponding foundings of regions of

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32 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

object (e.g., material thing, aesthesiological thing, human being, or
psyche).

The apriori in the sense of the region is the source-point of the ontologies
whose necessity and distinct position in the system of all sciences and
whose unique methodological function in carrying out factual sci-
ences for the corresponding regional spheres now actually becomes
understandable out of the deepest, indeed the primal, bases of
phenomenology. It is indeed fully clear that an eidetic science
belonging to the regional apriori, e.g., physical thing in general,
psyche in general, must have a position and significance regionally
different from that of all other eidetic cognitions which attach
themselves perhaps to ‘‘accidental”’ particularizations of the idea
physicalness, psyche, etc., that is, to materially filled concepts no
matter how universal. The series of experiential sciences of real
actuality (as factual sciences) is therefore confronted in a particular
manner by the ontology of physical nature as theory of essences of
natura formaliter spectata, likewise the ontology of animate or psychic
nature.®

That there must be such ontologies is obvious. No essence without
eidetic truths; and it is obvious that even real essences, to whose form
as reality belongs already manifold and, according to the sort of
reality, very different involvement, cannot be without a rich stock of
eidetic cognitions. With regard to the ontology of nature we have here
sciences that are integrated into it under the ttles geometry and
kinematics; here belong likewise the apriori truths of pure theory of
time, which of course are common property for all sciences of reality
whatsoever. What is still lacking up to now, what has not been
constructed in any sufficiently systematic-scientific form — that is the
ontological sphere of specific materiality, precisely the nucleus of any

‘“pure’’ regional natural science.

*Of course the reason cannot here become evident why the ontology of nature absorbs every
particular apriori for the physical sciences to the extent that they want to move and do move on
the level of physics or, as we can say, the level of the ultimately valid and full Objectivity, in
contrast to the descriptive natural sciences, which do not attain full Objectivity, why every
materially filled apriori is lost to us, why the idea of the determinate physical thing of physics is a
mathematically formulatable idea that leaves no room open for other concepts as mathematical
particularizations of mathematical universality.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 33

88. RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY —
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Let us consider the psychological sphere. That there must be a
rational psychology, whether we have it or not, is evident. The
rational existence of science as idea precedes its being possessed. The
necessity of a rational geometry was just as discernible before its
development as the necessity of rational psychology is now for us who
do not possess it. However, that is no longer quite right. Even if there
is a lack of a systematic explication of the idea of psychic reality, still
we possess already — in the form of phenomenology — a considerable
portion of a rational psychology. And here we come back again to the
chief interest that guides our investigation, no matter how much this
latter still has other necessary functions to fulfill with regard to our
further nexus of interests.

In considering the idea of a rational psychology let us disregard all
the eidetic truths that belong éo the universal idea of realtty in general. they
constitute a closed stock to which, according to that which was
already touched on earlier, the rational chronological truths belong,
and they are not the sole possession of rational psychology but rather
a common possession of all the rational sciences that in general belong
to the region of reality. It is then fully certain from the outset that
whatever rational truths may otherwise be integrated into rational
psychology, in any case all phenomenological truths belong to it also.
First and foremost all those which relate to the really immanent eidetic
moments of possible lived-processes, in further sequence also im-
mediately evident cognitions that belong to the various stages of
intentional correlates.

Let us consider the state of affairs more closely. This is all the more
necessary since at the present time the naturalism predominating so
greatly among psychologists, as among all natural scientists, has as its
consequence an almost universal misunderstanding of the sense of
phenomenology and of its possible achievements for the psychological
science of experience. With this is connected the basically perverted
view that with phenomenology it is a matter of a restitution of the
method of inner observation or of direct inner experience in general.
Only in this way also are explained those superficial (indeed not even
superficial, because not understanding at all the sense of the matters)
literary rejections of the claim that phenomenology makes, and must
make through its own specific character, of paving the way for a
reform of psychology (as also, on the other hand, of philosophy) that
in the literal sense is fundamental and novel.

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34 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

An ontology of the psychic or animated realities (if we are not
afraid of traditional antipathies we can calmly say: rational zoology and
anthropology) has primarily to do with the apriori of the particular
real sort of unity of real properties that belong to the idea of the
animate real in general and, included therein, also to the idea of the
psyche. Talk about real properties leads us to real states. With them, it
is a matter of dispositional determinations, of abilities. Abilities are
abilities to do something, dispositions are dispositions to do some-
thing. And to do what, is clear. We come upon corresponding groups
of “‘lived-processes”’ in the context of the “‘psychic’’ life, and we know
that no group of lived-processes is omitted here. Every lived-process 1s
a psychic state, as psychology in general speaks of psychic states in
relation to the total sphere of lived-process. Now we already know
that there is in the framework of the phenomenological reduction an
exploration free of all co-positing of real factual existence, of all
positing of factuality, an exploration of that which belongs to any sort
of ‘“‘consciousness,”” to everything which is there called “psychic
lived-process,”’ an exploration, for all genuine moments, for corre-
lates of consciousness, for all possible connections in the nexus of
lived-processes: an apriori or eidetic investigation. We have to do
with states. If we grasp the psyche not as fact but as eidetic essence,
then the states are also taken as eidetic essences and have the eidetic
form of the set of states. We can have an interest in disputing this and
can see the possibility of doing this. We can limit our eidetic analysis
to the lived-processes in themselves, disregarding what distinguishes them
as sets of states, as authentications of a real psychic unity with psychic
properties. But everything that we explore in the framework of
such a lived-process would naturally also belong in the framework of
rational-psychological investigation. For it is evident that the peculiar
essence of every lived-process (as idea and not as fact) is not altered by
the realizing apperception and cannot be changed.

Let us recapitulate in order to make it easier for psychologists
taking a natural-scientific attitude to understand through examples
what must here be accomplished: suppose there are perceptions given
in factual experience, perceptions of a physical thimg, let us say. In
inner perception, in reflection in Locke’s sense, they are originarily
given; in “‘acts of empathy” in the manner of ‘‘noting”’ such lived-
processes in the external state of another, or also in recollections of
previously performed reflections or acts of empathy, they are not
given in an originary manner but rather in the manner of pre-
sentiations. In any case, tney are given there as our lived-processes or
as lived-processes of other human beings or brutes, organismic-mental

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 35

realities that have their real surroundings, which belong to a spatio-
temporal world. The exploration of such psychic states, called
perceptions, as states of actual real individuals of the actual world, is a
matter for psychology, for inductive experiential science. How
lived-processes of that sort occur in humans and brutes, under what
real conditions and with what consequences, according to what
general or specific natural laws — that can and must be ascertained
according to the methods of the experiential sciences, through
observation and experiment. Perceptions, however, can be explored
not only as factually existing states in the nexus of factual unities of
consciousness, belonging to factual psycho-physical individuals in the
factual world, irrespective of whether in the singular individual case
or in experiential-scientific universality; rather, we can undertake an
“eidetic reduction,” exclude all questions about real factual exis-
tence, about the judgment-positing of the latter, and carry through
the attitude of purely eidetic investigation. We concern ourselves then
with the eidos, the essence “‘perception,”’ and with what belongs to a
‘perception as such,”’ as it were to the sense, ever the same, of possible
perception in general. And likewise for every essential sort of
perception, e.g., perceptions of physical things, perception of sensuous
appearances (which are not given in consciousness as physical things),
perceptions of lived-processes of consciousness and the like. We
therefore differentiate the ‘‘possible” perceptions in general accord-
ing to basic types; for each one we ask what belongs to it essentially
and what it requires according to its essence as necessarily belonging
to it, what changes, transformations, connections it makes possible
purely through its essence, whether with phenomena of the same sort
or with those of another sort, etc. Precisely the same problems result
for recollections, phantasies, expectations, obscure ideas, processes
of thinking of every sort, processes of feeling, of willing. They, like
every not only experiencable or factually experiencable but generally
experiencable being (or, as we can also say, every Objectivity of
fundamentally possible experience), present their essence to us; the
individual intuition turns itself around, which itself is an eidetic
Possibility, into eidetic intuition, or into the attitude of the thinking
which on the ground of Intuition grasps eidetic states of affairs in pure
eldetic concepts and expresses them. The eidetic theory of lived-
Processes must take the lived-processes with the whole content with
which they present themselves in the eidetic intuition, and as eidetic it
rests (directed toward essences of psychic states, as it is) on psychol-
ogical intuition, whether it be on psychological experience or on
psychological fiction. The whole content of a lived-process standing

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36 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

in the view of reflective inner experience, to the extent that this view
can grasp at all, or the whole content of that which is given in the
view of the reflection of inner phantasy, changes into the essence in
the eidetic attitude. It loses only the relation to the fact of the
experienced nature-actuality; the factually existent is changed into an
essentially existent, the individually unique into a “universal’’;
likewise the fictive factual existence disappears with the fictive
nature-actuality, the fictive individuality. From the lowest essences
which stand as mere this-here in the eidetic view and, in complete
fullness of content, are not apprehensible in rigorous concepts,
consideration passes over to higher universalities, to the sharp
separations according to sort, such as perception and recollection,
perception and phantasy, thinking and willing, etc. Separations are
to be carried out on concrete lived-processes through analysis; there
are components to be picked out according to sort, basic sorts of non-
selfsufficient moments to be distinguished; and every rational goal of a
systematic analysis of lived-process is to be strived for with an
immediately forthcoming multitude of special and completely deter-
minate and obviously solvable problems. Since the “relation to
something”’ and all sorts of correlates belong inseparably to the
essence of the lived-processes that are there called intentional and
that in a separating manifold of shapings will govern the pre-
ponderant interest, then these also cannot remain unmentioned and
uninvestigated. The imposing themes of noesis and noema are
necessarily to be treated both out of psychological interest and in the
psychological-eidetic apperception. I say in psychological apper-
ception because what is presented to the psychologist in his psychol-
ogical intuition is precisely something psychic, psychic-real, that is to
say the lived-processes in a given case as psychic states. And they
enter into this realizing apperception with all that it requires, that is
to say, they enter with the relation to space and time into the eidos.
Every experiential thesis drops out, even the actuality-thesis of the
whole of nature with the space belonging to it, the time belonging to
it, as with any eidetic intuition. The pure essence contains no
other thesis than an eidetic thesis. That which ise experienced
is therefore precisely the same as that of the geometrician who
turns usual empirical intuition of spatial things into the eidetic,
whether it be figures on the board or even models that he gets out of
the model closet. His interest is directed to the spatial shape, but not
the experienced shape or the shape quasi-experienced in his phantasy,
but rather the ‘“‘pure”’ spatial shape, i.e., the shape-essence to be
grasped in the eidetic attitude on the ground of empirical apprehen-

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 37

sions. To the extent that shape is a basically essential moment of the
material thing as the res extensa, the geometrician, the essence-
investigator of possible thing-shapes, is eo ipso simultaneously a
rational physicist. Precisely so in the case of psychology. And precisely
so everywhere that a region of realities is isolated originally and
necessarily provides the foundation for two kinds of sciences, for
experiential sciences and eidetic sciences. Experiential science pur-
sues factual existence, the eidetic pursues the essence, and the same
essence that makes up the “‘content”’ of the factually existent and the
possible factual existent in general. Eidetic science everywhere
precedes experiential science. What the region and what the eidetic
content of the reality-shapes apprehensible in Intuition, and therefore
also shapes of possible states and circumstances, prescribes aprior! —
that the experiential science can in no way do without. The eidetic
truths are valid and are valid in unconditional universality and
necessity for everything possible as well as for everything authenticat-
ing itself as actual in actually occurring experience. Theoretical
experiential investigation does not presuppose the eidetic; the
theoretical interest can direct itself to that which is experienced, can
observe universal regularities in the experiencing, ascertain, order
them, etc. There was an art of surveying before geometry; there was
an astronomy before mathematical mechanics. There was also a
developed psychology before eidetic psychology; there was one and
there still is one in the form of modern experimental psychology. On
the other hand it is clear that the constitution of this science must
mean a decisive step forward by the corresponding experiential
science, if in general the sum of the eidetic truths that belong to a
regional sphere of reality is so great that it makes up the field of a
proper great science. A science: that means an infinity of systemati-
cally connected truths explorable in systematic unity and naturally
truths that do not lie at hand but rather are discovered only as fruits
of arduous investigation. To recognize as possible and bring into
methodical process a rational discipline that establishes or holds out a
sure prospect of an infinity of truths for one of the great regions of
experience, truths that are valid in unconditional necessity for
everything of this region that is experiencable — to do this is to raise
to a new level the regional experiential science belonging thereto. In
this way physical natural science in the 17th century was raised to a
new level through the recognition that geometry, long since estab-
lished of course, is the foundation of a mathesis of nature encompass-
ing not merely the shape of a physical-thing but the complete
material thing, and that its construction must provide a foundation of

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38 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

method for a new science incomparably more productive because
illuminated by the light of rational mathematics. The belief that
experience and induction (which was used, after all, long before
Galileo and Kepler) made modern exact science — that amounts to a
failure to understand the sense and the history of this science. As for
psychology, on the other hand, to anyone who has assimilated only a
bit of actual phenomenology in its sense and, out of the wealth of
definite problems, has grasped with understanding a few connected
groups of them (perhaps those touched upon in the present treatise) it
must be clear that phenomenology, or better, the eidetic theory of
lived-processes that is incorporated in the idea of a rational psy-
chology, opens up an infinite field of truths which, as relating apriori
to psychic states, endlessly enrich psychological cognition, and do so
in a sense similar to that in which mechanical or kinematic and in
general mathematical cognition apriori enrich empirical natural
science. Whoever believes that psychology accomplishes through
inner experience alone what is accomplished in phenomenology
speaks just as wisely as does one who thinks that physical observation
and experiment alone accomplish what geometry accomplishes for
the physicist. Of course the state of affairs, without prejudice to a
general analogy, is not the same, and so the comparison must not be
exaggerated. Rational psychology is not mathematics, and specifi-
cally the phenomenology of lived-processes is not mathematics of
lived-processes. Common to both is the fact that they are eidetic
theories and eidetic theories connected to the regional apriori. But not
every eidetic theory is of the mathematical type. Rather, that is a
quite definite scientific-theoretical type, the form of which it is a task
of another ontology to bring out systematically: namely, formal
mathesis universalis (at one with formal logic). Which scientific-
theoretical shaping (theory-form as I called it in the Logical
Investigations) a regional eidetics has depends on the regional apriori.
If to such an apriori there belongs the idea “space,” a certain
‘Euclidian Manifold,” then this theory-form determines a mathe-
matics; but the stream of lived-process offers in its essence nothing like
a space, no orderly system of coexistence somehow analogous to
space; it is not a field of a mathematics. Much is connected with the
fundamentally different scientific-theoretical type. Obvious above all
is this: that the number of immediately evident eidetic truths of
geometry and of all nature-ontological disciplines is very small (to the
extent that we have a right to orient ourselves according to physics
and not according to the so-called descriptive natural sciences, about
which investigations shall be made and appropriate clarifications

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 39

given in the continuing course of this work). The great mathematical
sciences that give natural science the apriori of its sphere of being
arise in pure deduction out of the few axiomatic bases. It is quite
otherwise in rational phenomenology. The field of immediate insights
is an endless one, and mediate derivation essentially plays a role only
in the roundabout way via other sciences and their psychological
significance.’

Connected with the sort of eidetic insights required here, however,
is the fact that the beginner at first tends to let descriptive psychology
and phenomenology blend with one another without distinction. Let
us persist at first in not separating the eidetic theory of states of
consciousness from transcendental phenomenology (as I did not yet
separate them even in the Logical Investigations) since, for what follows,
it does not matter. Phenomenology would immediately be recognized
as an essentially new discipline and would in any case arouse
respectful attention, if it built towers of formulae one on top of
another and drew deductions in a mathematical manner and made
an impression with the accessories of indirect methods, with tables,
drawings, with instruments and experimental arrangements. Since it
draws purely from intuition, what is it supposed to be that is new,
what that 1s especially scientific? The psychologists say that if
intuition is not something mystical then it is experience, and we use
that anyway. Now, if the phenomenologist immerses himself in the
inner analysis of experience instead of going over into the higher
problem-situations of experimental psychology, he then performs a
quite useful preliminary work, which best finds its place within
modern “psychology.” However, those who speak thus have not yet
gone to the trouble of studying attentively what lies before them and
have not heeded Chwolson’s famous XIth Commandment, which
one can also formulate in this way: never write a critique before you
have understood what is being criticized, according to its simple
sense. It makes no pleasing impression to observe how the critic
disagrees where the author has asserted nothing, and a still less
pleasant one if, along with that, he amiably agrees where the author
likewise has asserted nothing. I have nothing else to say on the matter
than the Logos article said, perhaps somewhat too conditionally. In
every sphere of reality there is description, and description ascertains
factual existence, real factual existence. That is: all description expresses
in words and word-significations what is experienced, whether in the

7On the difference between mathematical and phenomenological-descriptive methods, cf.
also Book I of /deas, §72.

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40 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

singular case or as universality of the experience, with which is
connected the presumption that future experience would also estab-
lish something similar again as actually occurring in the world.
‘““Experience teaches”” — that means therefore: something of that sort
has been established through perception as factually existent in
nature-actuality, thus it is customarily in actuality according to
collected experiences. Every description of nature, as carried out in
the descriptive natural sciences, is of this sort. There is the des-
cription: the lion is yellow. Let us phantasize blue-green lions, lions
of all colors, but experience shows no such lions; therefore they do not
occur in any natural history. Of course, the experiential science that
we Call psychology also describes objects that fall in its sphere; it
describes types of characters, dispositions, etc. Not fictive ones but
experienced ones. That is to say: they occur. Such is the actual
human being of the actual world, or the actual brute. Fictive
character types, dispositions, and the like are simply fictive. Newborn
persons with a finished language, with complete mathematical
knowledge, can be phantasized, but no psychology will inquire about
them. If it further describes various sorts of lived-processes, sensations,
representations, feelings, then these again are naturally lived-
processes that occur in actuality with brutes and humans. When, not
infrequently, we hear that psychologists highly praise the works of the
great poets as sources of psychological instruction, there are two
reasons for it. In the first place, their opinion is this: it is a
characteristic of the poetic genius that its experiential intuition,
nature-observation, is the liveliest, richest one, carried out with the
greatest intensity of the intuiting interest. Therefore that which 1s
typical of the actual factual existence impresses itself upon the poet
most deeply, and in his artistic forms he gives the complete expression
to it. In the second place, their opinion is this: lively phantasy-
intuition is for the psychologist just as good as actually occurring
experience brought into play perhaps by external stimuli, since
““psychologically” the “‘phantasy-image’”’ has essentially the same
psychic existence as the corresponding (only stronger, more lively)
experiential image, even if not the same ‘“‘Objective signification.”
Of course that is one of those fundamentally absurd assertions, as
are only possible prior to phenomenology: in truth it demonstrates
that phantasy and perception are radically separate sorts of lived-
process. As always, even with such interpretations of the phantasy
and the imaginative achievements of the artist, it holds that what
intuition offers here and scientific description derives from it are
exclusively facts of Objective actuality, lived-processes or types of

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 4]

lived-process, as well as character types and types of disposition that
have factual existence in human actuality.

On the other hand, in eidetic phenomenology there is not any
description in this sense at all. In its domain every real factual
existence, the whole spatio-temporal actuality, is in principle discon-
nected. Its ascertainments concern not realities but essences; its truths
state what is valid for such essences, i.e., for everything falling under
such essences as suck in unconditioned necessity and universality.
They speak therefore of lived-processes just as geometric truths speak
of bodies, arithmetic truths of numbers, kinematic truths of move-
ments: as little as these speak of the earth or even of the factual
universe and the bodies, movements, numbers occurring in it, so little
does phenomenology speak of psychic essences and psychic states in
this universe, in some sphere or other of actual factual existence.
Therefore, whenever the phenomenologist says there are lived-
processes, there are psychic states such as perceptions, rememberings,
and the like, his “‘there are” says exactly as much as the mathematical
“there are’; for example, a series of numbers: there are relative prime
numbers; there is no regular decahedron. This “there are” is
established in both cases not through experience, but through eidetic
seeing. Experience is a title for acts exhibiting factual existence, acts
originarily grasping as perception. But what the eidetic seeing brings
to originary grasping are not particulars of factual existence but
rather essences of lowest universality or, as species and genera, of
higher universality; there does not need to be a particular correspond-
ing to them, and if there should be something like that, then only
actually occurring experience can exhibit it. Eidetic truths are
absolutely binding ones, are intransgressible ones, not to be confirmed
or refuted by any experience. Experiential truths, statements that
posit factual existence according to their sense, that is to say require
the experience of factual existence for their establishment, are acciden-
tal truths, which, just as they are established through experience, are
also modified and annulled through experience: they are valid only
presumptively, subject to further experiential confirmation. Even if
the description of one’s own and another’s psychic states and flow of
psychic states that binds itself to fact, that limits itself by experience,
could satisfy the psychologist, in however narrowly limited a
province, in such a way that in it eidetic descriptions and insights
related to essential interconnections were dispensable, then there
would exist in this a powerful enlargement of the cognition that the
factual, in its descriptive make-up, has validity not only factually but
also as a matter of eidetic necessity. And so in general it is very

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42 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

important that we see that not only physical nature but also, in a still
much wider scope, psychic nature, and in particular the stream of
psychic states of animate subjects, is bound to apriori laws; that all
cognition of matters of fact, all laws of matters of fact are regularities
which stand out from a powerful background of apriori and ab-
solutely necessary eidetic laws and which only in the individually real
factual existence restrict what the stock of eidetic laws has left open:
just as physical laws, under the forms of motion that kinematics fixes
in absolutely firm and scientifically cognizable lawfulness, make their
selection as possible according to experience, as possible under the
given real circumstances a real actuality. That this is the case is
indubitable truth for him who actually devotes himself to the sense of
the present pieces of actual phenomenological research. To find one’s
way into the completely unaccustomed manner of eidetic seeing and
inquiring is of course not easy, and moreover whoever is so fully
satisfied by the manner and method of present-day experimental
psychology as most representatives of this discipline seem to be, to
him it is humanly tempting to do as the Abbé Galiani, who, as is
known, refused to look through a telescope: he too was completely
certain of his astronomy and fully satisfied with its manner. Here, too,
the future will probably teach that evident data cannot be removed
by not looking at them, and someday the psychologists will consider
the “instrument” of phenomenological eidetic theory to be no less
important, indeed at first probably very much more important, than
mechanical instruments. The metaphor of the instrument naturally
ought not to be pressed. The phenomenological method of course,
enters just as little into competition with the experimental-
psychological one as do the mathematical methods in physics with
the physical ones. Experimental psychology should not be abandoned,
but rather made incomparably more fruitful through the phenom-
enological founding, shaped through it in the genuine sense into an
exact, rationally elucidating science. But of course the recognition of
phenomenology will also contribute toward removing the over-
estimation of the possible achievements of the experiment and toward
making it evident that the state of affairs for psychology is for essential
reasons not one fully analogous to that in physical natural science,
and that with this is connected an incomparably greater significance
of Intuitive eidetic cognition for the former. And that will also hold
quite especially for that completely different sort of psychology which
we have not yet appreciated and whose quite differently founded sort
has become important only to individual investigators: psychology as
socwo-cultural science. Of course, whoever says such things is listened to

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 43

nowadays very reluctantly and exposes himself to strong repudiations.
One speaks of an “attack” against experimental psychology, one acts
as if through such utterances (and I did not in the Logos essay make
others) this science and its investigators were being disparaged, as if
an unworthy note were being sounded against them, etc. If I may
insert a word here to counter this, then I would like to point to the
fact that I have never uttered a word that would go against the
obvious respect to which the new experimental psychology is fully
entitled, as much as any other science, by virtue of the earnest and,
within certain limits, also very fruitful work and by virtue of the
significance of its representatives. Opposed to this, there is of course
no fundamental criticism reaching to the roots of pyschological
method. Are the great surgeons such as Volkman or Billroth less great
surgeons because surgery, and likewise the whole of medical thera-
peutics, is only to a slight extent so founded on natural scientific
theory as must be required and as they themselves of course have
required? Would anyone have encroached upon their greatness who
had furnished through radical criticism the demonstration for this, if
they had themselves not perceived it?

Of course I have also said, and I thereby touch sensitivities that I
had to touch for the “sake” of the plight of modern academic philos-
ophy, that the mixing of natural scientific psychology and philosophy
has lent support to a not only false but also shallow philosophy that
considers itself to be philosophy and yet sees no fundamental
philosophical problem at all. Every genuine philosopher in our time
knows this state of affairs; there is only one voice concerning it; and
each one values in the same manner a broad stream of our
philosophical literature that goes under the banner of psychological
and natural-scientific philosophy. The older representatives of psy-
chology, who as a result of their education still had an inner feeling
for philosophical problems and also took part in genuine philosophi-
cal work, underestimated the danger of our situation. The younger
generation of psychologists, crushed by the monstrously swollen
experimental-psychological literature and the difficulties of the con-
struction and control of the technical means, necessarily lacks this
feeling, which is simply not to be acquired incidentally through
zealous philosophical reading. It falls prey to an unclear and
superficial naturalism that goes over so comfortably with the scientific
investigator of nature, and it shows its appropriateness for philosophi-
cal lecterns through literary productions that sin against the idea of a
scientific philosophy. I will never take back a word of this judgment,
but it does not concern psychology and also not the psychologists as

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44 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

such and in general, but rather precisely those psychologists who take
philosophy too lightly. An excellent example of this is G. Anschitz in
his treatises on psychological method: treatises that deal with the
fundamental essentials of method, that is, claim to be philosophical.
Every word that he says about phenomenology there is not only wide
of the mark but completely misses the sheer sense — not to mention
all the censure that must fall on him because of an unbelievably
frivolous account. The author appears not even to have become
aware that reports publicly made about literary utterances of
another must be drawn from an attentive study of his writings, that
frivolous falsifications of alien views serve only to degrade their author
in the eyes of non-oriented readers, in short, that there are rules of
literary decency and that there is such a thing as literary
responsibilities.

Let it here be expressly added that the critical refutation of the
opinion that one can obtain phenomenological results from natural-
scientific experimental psychology, which has arisen only out of a
misunderstanding of phenomenology as an empirical analysis of one’s
own sets of psychic states (or, if one wishes, of one’s own lived-
processes grasped in inner perception or memory), in no way implies
that experimental arrangements cannot acquire phenomenological
function in a good sense. Whenever I spoke in my critiques about
experimental psychology I stressed sharply enough its essence as
experiential science. Indeed the word “‘experiment’’ expresses this; it
is supposed to have, of course, the same sense as in talk about
experimental physics. On the other hand, the exclusion of expertence
for the grounding of cognition does not imply the exclusion of
experience as a foundation for the Intuitive conception of the essence.
The scientific investigator of nature needs experience because he seeks
factual truths; the investigator of essence needs no experience,
because he seeks eidetic truths: experience grounds none of his truths
for him. What he needs, however, is intuition; he needs clear
apprehensions of single moments of the essence to be viewed; he
operates with exemplary intuitions. In principle now, of course,
intuitive phantasies can serve him just as well as perceptions, and it
lies in the nature of things that to an incomparably broad extent his
eidetic thinking is guided by phantasy. Only it, with its freedom of
shaping, gives him, as it does every eidetic investigator, the ability
to run through freely and on all sides the endless manifolds of
possibilities, here of possibilities of lived-process (to see universalities
according to eidetic law, to attack problems like those of the
constitution of real things in general). On the other hand, however,

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 45

phantasy has well known disadvantages. It does not stand firm, even
if it was clear; it quickly loses its fullness; it sinks into the semi-clear
and the dark. Naturally the phenomenologist will therefore, wher-
ever he can, draw from the primal source of clarity, from the fully
living ‘‘impression,” no matter how little he may be interested in
factual existence. And why then should instrumental aids and
experimental arrangements of the same sort as otherwise serve
expertentia not also be able to help obtain intuitive material of the best
sort? Even if that is not possible everywhere and in the freest measure,
it is possible to a great extent particularly in the field of sensuousness,
not merely of the sensuousness of sensation but also of the sensuous
intuitions and valuations and volitions. But naturally also beyond
this. In this sense every phenomenologist continually makes experi-
ments; naturally without useless protocol, with the fixing of all
experimental conditions, description of all arrangements, etc. For the
experiment indeed is not supposed to furnish any experience of
something real (which is the object of investigation in its ‘“‘circum-
stances”’ by virtue of being directed toward its causalities), but rather
a bare exemplary intuition as foundation of an eidetic seeing. The
excellent instrumental means of the psychological experiment can
also function usefully in this regard, with completely altered method
again, according to the altered purpose. In this regard, there are
already little beginnings, arisen not out of psychology itself but out
of the suggestions of phenomenology, which will surely find their
continuation. One should note well that this is not a retreat, but
rather confirms precisely what has been said in the Logos article and
here. (Concerning this possibility of artificial arrangements for the
procuring of the exemplary intuitions I have often enough spoken as
an academic teacher for a number of years, and I already took the
first works of the Wurzburg school on the experimental psychology of
thinking as the occasion once for discussing in seminar exercises the
methodological differences between the psychological and phenome-
nological experiment, precisely in the manner described here.) The
way the external arrangements function here is in principle com-
pletely of the same sort as those which the geometers use. The
beautiful collections of models that our mathematical institutes keep
serve fruitful investigation and teaching, just as well as the drawings
on the board and on paper. In principle they achieve no more than
the geometrical phantasy over into which they are obviously simul-
taneously called to lead one; they serve indeed the grasping of essence,
but they excite exemplary intuitions, and that has the advantage
spoken of. If the phantasy does not want to do us the favor of

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46 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

furnishing us clear intuitions, then we force the intuition precisely
through perception® and thereby simultaneously make possible an
aliveness of freely transforming phantasy relating to it.

§9. ‘THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION
FOR THE REALM OF EXPERIENCE.

The assertion, that psychology must attain a new rank through the
phenomenological investigation of consciousness and the total sphere
of lived-processes with their eidetic correlates, is not, however,
constructed apriori but has arisen out of the recognition of the
enormous difficulties in the phenomenological analysis of lived-
process according to their moments and strata of lived-process,
according to the interweaving of their connections, of their modes of
flow, according to their Ego-relations and noematic relations, and
this naturally in connection with the obvious insight that all of that
enters into the empirical apperception as psychological states and
must be well known if psychology is to have at all the capability of
expressing in rigorous concepts what the stream of lived-process as a
total state of the psyche continually altering itself really 1s and what
the psychic fact within such a total state really is, whose causal-real
connection it wants to bring to cognition. Whoever is a stranger to
phenomenology does not have the remotest idea of the difficulties,
complications, and the manifold eidetic necessities that hold sway
here, even if he has done research all his life in the style of the new
psychology. For that simply does not lie on the paths of the latter, as
any glance into the psychological textbooks and treatises readily
shows. Therefore it is indeed wrong when one tries to obtain
phenomenologically relevant results by the polling of experimenters, that
is to say, highly skilled psychologists, and by the study of their
protocols. Certainly, every analysis carried out in actual experience
can be phenomenologically useful, but on the one hand the limiting
to analysis of experience would not make possible any phenome-
nology that is in any way sufficient; on the other hand, it is no small
matter to let the purely given actually come to expression vis a vis all
transcendences surging into the intentionality of the experiential
attitude. The natural scientific attitude is, according to its essence,
directed toward the real-causal in the context of actual factual
existence. One must radically alter this attitude in order to be able to

®Cp. the treatise of Geiger, who expresses himself the same way.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 47

obtain any serious description of the statal, as it is a lived-process.
Through the fundamental suspension of the experiential attitude and
of all interests directed toward cognition of the real actuality, which
phenomenology as eidetic theory carries out, much is therefore
already obtained. Whoever lives with the experiential-scientific
interest does not see the lived-process from the outset even if he wants
to see it, wants to direct his gaze toward it; only when this interest
ceases to be the driving force, only when the transcendences that it
forces into the gaze lose their power does the lived-process stand firm;
then the approach to the given can progress with patient research.
Only then can there also come to consciousness the necessity of the
further reductions that are interwoven with the growing insight that
one must distinguish between immanent and transcendent even in the
case of that which is grasped in the eidetic attitude, and that in this
regard various things must be separated which of course belong
essentially to the lived-process. Whoever is phenomenologically
skilled sees right away that all the well-meaning descriptions of
psychology scarcely scratch the surface and are essentially wrong
even for the surface. One only needs to look at the naive way in which
one currently operates with the key words: act, content, object of
objectifications, and how under each of these headings, so to speak,
everything possible is confused; or to look at the inability of the usual
descriptions to understand and to describe in rigorous concepts such
cardinal distinctions as those between presentiation and the various
modes of presentiation, e.g., between material perception, cor-
responding phantasy, memory, expectation, image-intuition, as well
as the inability of seeing thereby that in every presentiation, in the
purest phantasy, a higher level of intentionality, and a radically novel
one, is already at hand. And so one could take hold at whatever
places one wanted; it would be instructive to illuminate all the
completely false problem formulations (e.g., in the so much discussed
questions about the “‘origin’”’ of ideas of space, time, and thing) that
arises only out of the lack of pure phenomenological analyses.

But we cannot enter into that here, and moreover it is not even
necessary. Anyone who has become acquainted with the phenome-
nological method and has learned pure seeing, sees it right away and
with all desirable clarity. In fact, it is only a question of that, while, as
long as such acquaintance is lacking, the impression is predominant
and quite understandable that with phenomenology it is a matter of a
few meagre distinctions, of something like analytical space-work that
one would incidentally tend to where it was necessary between the
toils of experimental work. One just cannot see ahead of time what a

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48 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

wealth of difficult and absolutely fundamental investigations are
necessary here, and how poor is that which we know so far about
consciousness and its eidetic structure. Not until we know something
about it and only insofar as we know something about it, namely
through pure Intuition, do we have the ground of the describing
concepts, the scientifically rigorous and valuable psychological
concepts.

What makes them valuable is not verbal univocalness, obtained by
differentiating the empty word-significations already at hand, but
rather the adaptation to the essences separated out in Intuition by
analytical study and differentiated from everything interwoven with
them. A great number of new concepts is obtained, and the
connection to words of the language has only the function of
indicating the approximate direction in which they lie, or of making
easier by means of pictorial expressions the retention (and for the
learner the grasping) of the eidetic moments that are seen. ® If one has
conquered the thorny path through the entrance gate of phenome-
nology, if the endless horizon of the new science that appears here as
the foundation of rational psychology opens up, then one comes to
understand how much phenomenological purposes owe to phantasy-
Intuition (and naturally also artistic imagination), and how without
the freedom of its movement there would be no thought at all of
pursuing systematically and according to essence the connections of
the possible formation of consciousness (noematic and noetic) and of
penetrating beyond the accidental singularizations of essence-
apprehensions to the overwhelming insight into the total structure of
consciousness, into the fundamental constitutions that govern it with
all its noematic possibilities and, therefore, for all possible worlds
Anyone who has obtained even an inkling of what must actually b
achieved here, obtained it through our explanations of the problem of
the constitution of realities (or better said: through our suggestions —
for only great systematic presentations can give real explanations)
will understand, even if he has no philosophical interest at all, what a
sum of possible cognitions the free phantasy, if it is the underlying
basis of phenomenological eidetic research, would have to offer a
scientific psychology. It is actually as the old rationalists believed: an,
infinity of possibilities precedes actuality. Thus the systematic infinity
of the geometric possibilities of physical actuality; thus the infinity
of possible formations of consciousness and noematic formations of

*Concerning the use of pictorial expressions, cf. the apt discussions by Pfander: ‘“‘Zur
Psychologic der Gesinnungen”: Jahrbuch, Vol. I, p. 330.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 49

psychological actuality and psychology regulated by eidetic nec-
essity — pervasive eidetic necessity. It does not help at all to close one’s
eyes here; rational psychology is a great science, and it circumscribes
the apodictic regulative possibilities to whose absolutely fixed frame
the psychological actualities are bound.

§10. RELATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY TO THE WRITINGS OF
BoLzANO, LOTZE, AND BRENTANO.

For the cause which I espouse here the following remark will also be
useful: with the misunderstanding of the essence of phenomenology is
connected the fact that recently, and probably with regard to the
impulses that I have received from Lotze and Bolzano and of which I
am aware as always with the greatest gratitude, some have called
these great investigators founders of phenomenology and have done so
in such a manner that it must simply seem as if the best way into
phenomenology would be by returning to their writings as the primal
sources of the new science. But the great Logic of Bolzano has so little
pertinence here that he had not even the slightest inkling of
phenomenology — of phenomenology in the sense that my writings
represent.!° From the idea of an eidetic investigation of Intuition,
from that of an apriori that arises here, a founding of philosophy and
psychology upon eidetic cognition, Bolzano is as far removed as Mill,
since extreme empiricist utterances are found in his works which are
no less so than those of Mill. My way to phenomenology was
essentially determined by the mathesis universalis (Bolzano did not
see anything of this either), and for the conception of the idea of such
a mathesis, to which I was pushed by my studies on formal
mathematics, the sketch by Bolzano of a limited bit of this idea, a bit
of the theory of propositions in themselves and truths in themselves,
was of inestimable value. Had I not already had the pure idea in the
mathematical sphere and not already had it also for the sphere of
logical mathematics, which in the most recent period has been
worked out (independently of Leibniz), then I would have seen the
sense of Bolzano’s theory just as little as all those have seen it who use
and cite his Theory of Science. The extensive working out of a pure logic
of ideas and propositions in themselves, which in no way were
recognized by Bolzano as ideal essentialities of the eidetic Intuition in

*I must add here that the word has become a vogue-word and now just about every author
Who undertakes to endow the world with a philosophical reform is pleased to bring his ideas into
Circulation under the heading of phenomenology.

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50 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

my Platonizing sense, gave me a firm substrate for reflection; with
this, as with the whole formal mathesis, are connected the problems
that forced me to progress from psychology to phenomenology. But
even the problems were alien to Bolzano. One can learn from him
much formal logic, for he was a great investigator in that and not, as
Windelband says, an insignificant ponderer; but phenomenology is
just as little to be learned from him as critique of reason.

As for Lotze, on the other hand, for all his ingenious remarks in
individual cases, he lacks a sense for the radical investigation of
principles. It was nowhere his way to return to the ultimate roots and,
while putting aside all theoretical preconceptions, to feel his way
laboriously upward along the branchings of the problems to the clear,
radically established truth. He had his system continually before his
eyes at every step; he continually lived in the interest of reconciling
understanding and emotion. Radical research, however, is disinteres-
ted research. His ingenious interpretation of Platonic theory of ideas
will be his greatest, his unforgettable achievement. He haz so little
drawn the consequences that even today I must still characterize his
epistemology as a contradictory hybrid, a product of the incomplete-
ness that balks at ultimate consistency. His “phenomenology”’ re-
duces itself to the reference to a few apriori relations in the sphere of
sensuous contents; in this connection he lacks, if one looks more
closely and does not ascribe to his beautiful sentences a sense foreign
to them, the genuine concept of the essence to be grasped by eidetic
Intuition, which could present an absolute measure of the truth. He
occasionally touches on this sense but only to let it go again in favor of
quite worthless concepts of aprioris. Finally, that there could be such
a thing as an eidetic doctrine of consciousness at all, and further an
eidetic doctrine of the relations of consciousness and noema of
consciousness, a constitution of objectivities, etc., of that he never had
a notion and therefore had no notion of what we here call phenome-
nology. We do not detract from his greatness, the importance of his
impulses, and the gratitude that we owe him when we ascertain this

fact.

Finally, some take phenomenology as a kind of continuation of the
psychology of Brentano. However highly I value this ingenious work,
and however strongly it (and also the other writings of Brentano)
influenced me in younger years, it must, nevertheless, also be’ said
here that Brentano remaired far from a phenomenology in our sense,
and that remains so to the present day. But this so much so that he
completely declines to recognize the new movement as a step
forward. Nevertheless he has acquired epoch-making merits precisely

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 51

for making phenomenology possible. He offered the modern period
the idea of :ntentionality drawn from the consciousness itself in
immanent description; although he often oversteps (as I would say)
the lines of pure description, at least many of his concept formations
have their source in actual Intuition. Thus they could and had to
have educative effect for Intuition in general and therefore also
according to the performed turn in eidetic Intuition; but he did not
see the essence of intentional analysis."

811. DIFFERENCES IN THE RELATIONS OF PHYSICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY TO THEIR ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
DESCRIPTION IN BOTH SCIENCES.

Not the least thing that leads the psychologist into error is that in the
conviction that his science is natural science he is so very inclined to
let himself be led by the model of physical natural science and
understandably then of physics. To be sure physics rests on rational
disciplines, but of quite different fundamental character from that of
phenomenology. Phenomenology is an infinite field of eidetic analyses
and eidetic descriptions, but not a field of deductions; rational natural
science, e.g., pure geometry or kinematics, is an infinite field of
deductions but not a field of eidetic analyses and descriptions.
Geometry begins by fixing a few concepts derived from Intuition.
Obviously the conceptual essences are taken from the intuition of
spatial formations in a manner that demands no great formalities
(“‘reductions,” ‘‘analyses’’). There arise immediate eidetic insights
which are expressed as axioms in conceptual thought: a few axioms
and everything else is formal deduction according to the principles of
the formal mathesis (for which, by the way, mutatis mutandis, i.e., in
= framework of formal eidetic Intuition, exactly the same thing
olds).

In empirical natural science we find then, to be sure, very much

description, whole ‘descriptive natural sciences,” and for the de-

''Not in the sphere of sensuous materials, the apriori of the color and tone orders noted by
Lotze, but rather in the full and whole stream of lived-processes and above all in the
Consciousness with its intentionality and its intentional meantnesses lie the great problems and
Investigations of phenomenology. It is those that lay the ground specifically for psychology and
on the other hand for the critique of reason. Whoever thinks here that, in the case of
Phenomenology related to the concrete, complete stream of the pure Ego-processes with the
Pure Ego itself, it is a matter of something analogous to colour and tone orders does not of course
find the way to phenomenology and understandably does not comprehend how such things
should mean so much psychologically and philosophically.

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52 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

scriptive concepts one immediately looks around, when one is coming
from phenomenology, for the eidetic regions from which the de-
scriptive concepts would, through Intuition, have to draw their
normative essences. There must nevertheless then be a rational
discipline that would have to be a fundamental field for eidetic
descriptions and would have to serve as the valid foundation of
natural science. But here we find the amazing situation that de-
scription in the sphere of nature claims no objective validity in the full
sense at all, that it claims and strives for nothing so little as for that
conceptual rigor which we in psychology, if it is supposed to be a
rigorous science, set down as a vital matter, and that description in
part even plays a total different role in external nature than in psychic
nature. As it is also shown therein that the external description of the
descriptive sciences is no theoretical foundation for the explanation of
the “abstract” sciences, the nomologically explanatory sciences.
Minerology, geology and all so-called descriptive sciences are not
foundations of physics at all. Physics “‘explains’’ what they “de-
scribe,” but it itself is not built up on descriptions. The procedure of
physics, the science of objective nature in its pure objectivity, is a
remarkable one as regards the concrete intuitional basis of which it, of
course, like every science, makes use. It operates, works with
intuitively given things; it names them; it therefore also uses de-
scriptive concepts. But there is nothing to be noticed of a toilsome
fashioning of concepts out of sensuous intuition, of a complicated
scientific work of clarifying the pre-given empirical concepts that
everyday life has formed on intuitions, a grasping of essences and a
delimiting of essences to be carried out by eidetic analysis. But there
does not have to be present any need at all for these, since it is a
matter of such. a highly developed science. The psychologist, now
consciously, now unconsciously imitating the procedure of physics,
likewise has a fresh go at it; he takes the human being and his psychic
life in the context of nature as the physicist takes the material things:
without entering into eidetic descriptions, he goes immediately into
the causalities; he experiments, varies the circumstances and pursues
the real dependencies, contenting himself at first, simply and rightly,
with the concepts that he has beforehand and that he transforms only
according to the motives that the causal investigation offers him and
that he connects with other concepts already transformed in accor-
dance with such motives. On the other hand, it had always been felt
within psychology itself that something was lacking, that the state of
affairs was not the same after all. Hence the esteem, at least with
regard to theory, of “‘descriptive”-psychological research and the

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 53

repeatedly and vigorously stressed necessity of such research; indeed,
according to Brentano’s procedure one went so far as to demand a
spectfically psychological discipline under the heading “‘descriptive psy-
chology,” as a lower-level of “‘genetic,’”’ real-causally explanatory
psychology. In this connection it is significant that under this heading
“descriptive psychology” there is not missed, sought, or used a
description of the sort which really forms the analog of the descriptive
natural-scientific sort, that is to say, not anything like description of
the different types of habitual dispositions, character-, racial-types,
and the like, but rather the descriptive analysis of the ‘‘data of inner
experience.’’ And therewith it was not even noticed that in de-
scriptive psychology, to the extent that it actually did some good,
experience as such — the restriction to the actuality of the imminent
‘psychic phenomena””’ that is fixed by the actually occurring doxic
theses — was completely irrelevant, and all investigation was to be
carried out without further ado in the etdettc attstude, wherever not
already carried out unnoticed. The full clarification of the situation
on the part of the phystcal natural sciences, an understanding of the
sense of natural-scientific description and explanation drawn from the
essence — the answering of the questions touched on above about the
apriori of the description: those are problems whose solutions are of
great importance in themselves and particularly significant in the
context of the sphere of problems of the phenomenological con-
stitution of nature-objectivity, and therefore also for a phenome-
nology and theory of nature-cognition. We shall let the investigations
relative thereto follow below. What we have said here will probably
suffice, however, to arouse the consciousness of differences in the states
of affairs on the natural-scientific and psychological side.

We give it a form still richer in content by pointing to the fact that
the chief essential make-up of the description-concepts of descriptive natural
scuences stands in a fundamentally different relationship to the objects
of physical nature than does the whole eidetic content of the
descriptive concepts of ‘descriptive psychology” to the objects of
psychic nature.

Let us observe the situation on the side of natural science. One
notices that its descriptive concepts mainly stem from that level of the
object-constitution on which realities are already constituted as
complete for intuition, but realities which, from the standpoint of the
ultimately valid idea of nature-Objectivity, are mere “appearances.”
All properties of these appearances (therefore already real proper-
ties), which have not yet shed the relation to the accidental subject, or
to the accidental sensibility, belong in the class of the ‘‘secondary

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qualities,” while the ‘“‘primary’” ones are defined accordingly as
‘“‘Objective” properties. Precisely this difference is the matter in
question. Vis a vis the real as appearance stands the real as thing
itself, as a thing of physics. The first is the thing experienced
univocally by the individual subject of normal sensibility, colored,
brilliant, sounding, etc., found thus by it and legitimating itself as
truly existent. For each subject of the same normal sensibility there is
constituted a corresponding phenomenal thing which is identified
reciprocally in the reciprocal understanding: the unity being con-
stituted in the univocal experience of the I, is the same as the one
constituted in the experience of the I,. But even if all experiencing
subjects were actually of the same “normal organization of senses”
and were all experiencing under corresponding “‘normal”’ circum-
stances, so that the appearances belonging to the different subjects
agreed exactly, which appearances are related in the identification to
the same Objective thing — even if this were so, agreement would
nevertheless be accidental. Physics el:minates the relation to the
‘‘normal organization.” It says: normality is something accidental,
completely relative, and accordingly that Objectivity which is con-
stituted out of such agreement is not any less a relative and accidental
one. What is at one time called normal can at another time be called
abnormal, and conversely. Physics therefore rejects as a measure of
Objective being this and any normality, and also the relation to
‘“‘normal circumstances,” such as bright daylight and the like, which
plays a pervasive role for the constitution of the true thing in the
sphere of intuition, or in the sphere of accidental subject-relation.
Rather, it apprehends the thing really (intuitively) experienced by
the subject as appearance, and if the subject, entering into dealings
with other subjects and coming to agreement with them, identifies its
phenomenal thing with that of the others and experiences that they do
the same, then physics does not for that reason apprehend this thing
according to the stock of identifiable predicates of intersubjective
intuition as the Objective one, but only as intersubjective ‘‘appearance”’ of
the true one.

Because it is so easily overlooked, it must be especially stressed for
the understanding of this state of affairs that there is posited by the
subject engaged in physics and by his intuitive surrounding world a
fixed circle of other subjects with their intuitive surroundings who
have dealings with him, and, to be sure, not merely with regard to the
accidental, factually experiencing subjects, but the possible subjects in
general. The subject, we can also say, has his surrounding world,
which through the stock of his constitutive experiential intuitions is

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 55

posited as an infinite one, a world of limitlessness in the progression of
possible experiences. With it endlessly many organisms for other
subjects are included as experienceable entities, and thereby a
determinate framework is predelineated again for infinitely many
subjects agreeing with the subject and among one another, which,
although encompassing infinitely many possibilities, is nevertheless a
framework for prescribed possibilities. It belongs to the essence of this
ideal, infinite, communicating group that each subject in it represents
every other one, that each one can withdraw and new ones can
always enter, but that on the other hand the total framework is fixed
by some one individual and factual subjectivity and its sphere of
intuition which belongs to this framework, to the extent that this
subjectivity, if it is the point of departure of the constitution of this
manifold, is not only included in the latter but also deems equal to
itself every other subject posited through interpretation [Eindeutung }.
To this ideal infinite plurality of subjects that is nevertheless en-
cumbered with factualness through individual factual existence the
objectivity of nature is essentially related. The subject in physics, that is to
say the one thinking in terms of physics in a particular case, takes his
intuitive things, likewise those of any other subject of his social
environment, completely as appearance. Many subjects can “‘acci-
dently,” but not necessarily have the same phenomenon, 1.e., it can be
accidental that they find themselves agreeing with each other, that
they perceive the same thing and harmoniously experience the same
thing in their — each in his own — experiential sphere, and that each
one must describe with similar experiential concepts what he has
experienced, which is the same for all. The intersubjective thing thus
described is merely ‘‘phenomenal thing” by virtue of its contingency.
It is stipulated, however, that experiential factual existence, and, to
be sure, a real factual existence, is motivated and that the agreement
motivates the factual existence of the same real thing as being
experienced by different subjects. This same thing, however, has its
true being not in the relative and accidental, but in something
necessary, in something that any possible subject of the predelineated
ideal community can bring out and determine in rational experiential
thought on the ground of his ‘‘appearances” and the communications
of others concerning their “appearances” (i.e., concerning their
experiential thing with merely ‘“‘secondary” predicates), and that
each one can bring out and determine as identical substratum of
completely identical properties and, if it proceeds rationally (in the
natural-scientific method), must bring out and determine in full
according with every other one. The method of this determination is

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56 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

the achievement of physics. The Objectively true thing receives
exclusively physical (“‘primary’’) properties that document them-
selves in the ‘“‘appearances’’ with their ‘‘phenomenal properties,”’ the
“secondary” ones, but do not themselves appear in them, are not
themselves phenomenal properties of higher order. In other words:
with the establishment of natural science mankind made the dis-
covery that the world of actually present experience, the actual,
subjectively and intersubjectively intuitive world, has a “true”’
“nature,” a nature in a new sense according to which this whole
experiential world is the mere appearance of an Objective nature
exclusively determined by “exact’’ mathematical-physical predic-
tates, absolutely not intuitable, not experienceable, and, to be sure, a
nature cognizable by the methods of the investigation of nature on the
basis of the experiences in experiential-logical thought. The sudyect
itself as Objective factor, however, enters this Objective nature in the
following form:

There is a unique physical nature (belonging éo “‘our’’ deal soctality
in the sense described above) with the one Objective space and the
one Objective time, consisting of nothing but physical things that are
characterized purely by concepts having the exactness ascribed in
physics. To the class of physical things belong, among other things,
organisms, which are according to their physical “‘nature’’. therefore,
likewise mere carriers for abstract thought symbols peculiar to
physics, but appurtenantly distinguished by a new stratum of real
properties, the “‘aesthesiological’’ one. These properties are not,
therefore, unities for thinking, related to unities of “appearances,”
but rather are given or to be given themselves, experienceable
according to their very own being, excluding according to their
essence anything like making known through appearance. Every
organism has, without prejudice to the type of the aesthesiological
reality, its varying ‘‘sensuous organization,” functionally dependent
on the varying physical nature of the organism. To the organisms
belong psyches with real psychic properties, again new real properties
again themselves given and making themselves known in the intuition
itself and without appearance. Every psyche has, without prejudice to
its general psychic sort, its particular and varying psychic organiza-
tion. All these real unities and their real properties are determinable
in their manner, according to the particular and general, in the
interconnections of their foundation, that is to say on the ground of
the interconnected experience. By recourse to these interconnections
and Objectively valid truths belonging to them a physiological (aes-
thesiological) psychology explains the fact that to every psyche, or to

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 57

every psychic subject, the same nature-thing can, and, in any
particular case under the given real circumstances, must appear
different; and different even to the very same psyche, if the sensuous
organization of its organism and perhaps its psychic apprehensional
dispositions undergo alterations that are conceivable even under its
real circumstances. In the same manner as the alterations of ap-
pearance, the alterations of objectively invalid, even though perhaps
subjectively useful, modes of judgment, and further, all differences
of subjectivity and Objectivity, must be capable of being explained.

If we have correctly characterized the essential sense of the natural-
scientific cognition and cognitional Objectivity, and have done so
correctly also in the connection — important for us — with the
aesthesiological and psychological cognition, then we can now draw
the conclusion.

Accordingly, from the standpoint of Odjectwe natural science,
descriptive natural science represents only a lower level of cognition,
that level where the ultimately valid Objectivation is not yet carried
out, one satisfying aesthetic and practical and whatever other
interest, but not the theoretical interest in nature as it is ‘“Object-
ively” “in itself.” A closer examination of the method of physics
allows it to be understood why the physics indeed starts as a matter of
course with “‘appearances,”’ since it is only from appearances of this
sort that something Objective can be brought out and determined;
that physics, therefore, no less as a matter of course talks about them
and describes them; that it has no interest at all, however, in fixing the
appearances (in the style of the descriptive natural sciences systematt-
cally in relation to a human normality), but only in naming them
sufficiently for the purposes of Objective-causal analysis according to
the universal phenomenal-properties that come into question. Fine
distinctions do not matter to the physicist, since all exact de-
termination pertains to the Objective sphere and the appearance ts
not in itself the Object of interest but rather only a manifestation of
Objective properties: not the actually experienced color manifolds as
such, but the experienced color as a manifestation of the Objective
optical occurrences brought out by thought in the experiential
thinking and determined according to thought, of which occurrences
mathematical optics sketches and theories; and likewise everywhere.

Quite different is the state of affairs in the sphere of psychological
and aesthesiological description. The psyche is not a substance of
appearances; the parallel of appearance in the sense indicated above
is lacking, as, of course, in general there is lacking here the entire
exceedingly complicated system of constitutive unities, each of which

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is ““appearance’”’ in relation to the unity of the higher level and is for
its part a unity that appears in appearances of lower level (sensuous
schemata, sight things of various levels and strata, adumbrations).
The psychic unity is constituted directly in its states, and the psychic
states — those are the “‘lived-processes of consciousness,” themselves
given adequately and without mediation by appearance in the plane
of immanent temporality (in which all our analyses are kept). The
falling away of “relativity” onto the apprehending subjects. There
exists the possibility of “‘deception” but not of the “consideration
from different standpoints.’’)

These lived-processes as belonging to the true being of the psyche
itself are therefore the theme of psychology itself and not, say, merely
media through which the theme can first be obtained. There is here,
therefore, a cardinal difference in the mode of the psychic constitution
vis a vis the thing-constitution, which difference determines the
method. The intuttive thing, the thing of my direct experience,
legitimates itself in the sensuous scheme similar to the way the psyche
does in its states of consciousness. If the intuitive thing were the
Objectively actual one, that of physics, then the physicist, too,
would have to describe the sensual schema in any particular case as
the momentary and changing state of the physical property, and the
physical properties themselves would contain as unified the secondary
qualities that would now find their expression in the descriptive
concepts. By virtue of the fact that the intuitive thing is a mere
‘‘appearance”’ of the thing of physics, which is itself not even to be
had intuitively, and therefore is never properly speaking experienced,
that which is experienced and its experiential properties are also not
the theme as conceived in physics but only a means of coming to the
theme. In psychology, however, there are no ‘‘appearances’’ of the
psyche, but rather experience of it itself, experience, as there can be
experience of something real at all through those states being.
experienced which now belong to the scientific theme as states of the
real and require scientific description. We can also say: if we
understand by ‘‘description” the conceptual expression of the per-
ceived itself, i.e., of that which is in the proper sense experienced, then
the psychological description determines the psychic itself, and the
psychological description of the lived-processes determines the psy-
chic itself with regard to its states, to which we are obviously led back
in all other psychological descriptions. The natural-scientific description
determines only an appearance, not, however, that ttself which is
supposed to be determined. Thus the infinite field of lived-processes
becomes for psychology an infinite field of determinative description,

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 59

without whose rigorous scientific shaping it cannot make the claim of
being rigorous science. The rigorous shaping of the description,
however demands phenomenological analysis; the concepts are only
scientific if their pure essences are grasped and rigorously separated
and differentiated in their essential interconnection. If one considers
now the enormous difficulty (and that is no exaggeration) of keeping
apart even only real and ideal components of the lived-process and of
avoiding any interminglings from the actually present intentionality
of the experiential attitude and of all the actually performed acts that
are founded in what is to be described and interwoven with it; if one
considers that all such differentiation can succeed only if the lived-
process to be considered is subjected to modifications of essence that
set its various sides and components in motion, or, if it is compared
with many other kinds of possible lived-processes that contain similar
sides or components of differing functions; if one recognizes the
necessity of carrying out innumerable variations in the manifesting of
the intentionality and reflections on the manner of the manifestations
— then it is clear that any description restricting itself to the single
lived-processes given in the actually present experience cannot
furnish any valuable and binding results. That holds for the entire
sphere of the psyche, not quite so much for the aesthesiological
sphere, although here, too, the goal-conscious phenomenological
investigation affords a far more profound insight.

The true method is therefore this: that not in experience, but in the
pure essential interconnection, that not in empirical psychology, but
in rational phenomenology, the entire work of differentiating essences
and of conceptual apprehension of essences is performed, and that
then in experiential science the mere application of the phenome-
nological results takes place. Therewith the cognition of the rational
essential interconnections, which must nonetheless find their con-
tinual and necessary application in the sphere of experiential science,
in that of psychology in the usual sense, is as a matter of course
connected simultaneously with the description of essence.

Phenomenology is therefore nothing so little as it is mere de-
scriptive psychology, and it is not even empirical-descriptive ezdetic
theory, i.e., exploration of the essences of lived-process in the context
not of the actualities of lived-process given in experience, but rather,
exploration of ideal possibilities of lived-process: however much this is
something totally different from what has always been understood
under the heading of descriptive psychology. Description of essence
does not yet in itself produce eidetic law. On the other hand,
however, the cognition of eidetic interconnections attaches itself

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immediately to the description of essence (namely, grasping of
essences in Intuition and conceptual fixation of them), and in each
one there already lies concealed a lawfulness in itself of an apriori sort.
But, that this is so and that the stream of lived-process in general is no
mere fact, but rather a singularization of an idea to which a great
number of apriori interconnections belong that make up the fixed
framework of all empirical possibilities — that is what one must, as a
psychologist, make clear to oneself. (As, quite generally, the idea of a
mere fact not standing under eidetic laws is a countersensical one,
originating from a wrong interpretation of natural-scientific
cognition!)

But it cannot then be an empty universal truth, but rather the
recognition is necessary that the total domain of the phenomenologi-
cal apriori, the total manifold of essences and eidetic laws, must be
systematically worked out, and, to be sure, in the interest of
experiential psychology itself. In hts regard we can again reach back
for and seize the comparison to physical natural science, since here
again the analogy holds: one does not study the figures of the material
bodies by description in experience, but rather at first apriori, as
geometric ones. All study of the figures of factual bodies is application
of geometric knowledge, and has to be. That is the only correct
method. And the study of the pure body-shapes produces the system
of geometric eidetic laws that make up the absolutely fixed framework
to which all empirical movements and formations are restricted and
which one must know in order to be able to deal scientifically with
their empirical matters in mechanics. And precisely the relationship
between phenomenology and natural-scientific psychology is exactly
like that, with no prejudice to the differences that have been
presented in detail and in the main, no doubt, made clear.

§12. FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF
RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY.

We live in a time of great reversals. Rational ontology and rational
psychology — how long will it last, and also rational cosmology and
theology — the much maligned and apparently permanently abol-
ished disciplines of past epochs, seem to be awakening again to life.
But it would be bad if those dead should be awakened again which
were alive only as materially insufficient convictions and had to pass
away because what they set down as truth had no place in the realm
of truth, of eternal life. Only the general idea of such rational

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 61

disciplines, but with completely new content, comes to life again in
our analyses, and we may calmly trust that a rational psychology like
that required here will hold its own sub specie aeterni. To such a
rational psychology belongs along with the eidetic doctrine of lived-
processes much else of course. Let us only point to the apriori
make-up of the psychic Ego, to the doctrine of the pure Ego,
etc. I cannot enter into more detail here; the reader will the
more easily forego this as in this deliberation the thought has surely
already thrust itself upon him that phenomenology really includes all
of rational psychology, that remarkably, therefore, the part here
devours the whole. If we pass from the empirical world, the empirical
human being, the empirical psyche, to the psychic idea, we grasp the
idea of all of the psychic sets of states, we isolate them abstractly as we
isolate space and spatial shape when we do geometry, and we
establish a pure eidetic doctrine of the lived-processes. Wherever the
essence reigns, there we must not stop so long as eidetic necessities
hold sway; we must pursue all necessary connections, all ideal and
therefore inseparable connections, until the circle is closed. But what
wonder! The stream of lived-process contains according to ideal
possibility (that is therefore a necessary and apodictically necessary
possibility) the cogito with Ego and cogitatum; and it contains in
itself all sources for possible world-constitutions and_psyche-
constitutions. Pursuing the apriori we hit upon the eidetic doctrine of
possible nature-cognition in general and therewith, in view of the
correlates, upon all the transcendencies that we have come to know as
various levels of physical constitution, as visual things, etc. And we hit
upon empirical Egos, upon animate organisms. The eidetic analyses
that are related to them are necessarily made members of the analyses
of lived-process; the inquiry into the essence of the lived-processes
requires that of the noemata, that of the regulations according to law
which are laid out in them as ideal possibilities, that of the
multifarious ‘‘unities” of ‘“‘manifolds,’” each of which indicates a
regulation of consciousness in general according to eidetic law. But
consciousness in general is nothing other than lived-process in general
and nexus of lived-process, or is included therein. Thus really, the
part devours the whole, and rational phenomenology finally embraces
not only the remaining rational psychology, but all rational ontologies
— at least according to their axioms, to the extent that these express
immediate essential interconnections of possible consciousness. But
then do the deductively derivable propositions of ontology — the
clarification of the sense of deductive performance makes this evident
— not also in turn express possible interconnections of consciousness?

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Therefore, is not all of geometry, rational kinematics, rational natural
science in general and thus every rational discipline a piece of
phenomenology? In proceeding from empirical psychology, as we
continue on to the idea of rational psychology, phenomenology springs
up for us as mere eidetic doctrine of the lived-processes, as states of a
psyche that is thought of as being in regional universality. The psyche
itself is subject to rational deliberation with all that which is due it as
reality according to real properties, real circumstances, and real modes
of behaviour. That eidetic doctrine is therefore a mere part. Rational
psychology itself is presented as one rational discipline among others,
interconnected with them, as the idea of its reality-mode requires as a
mode in physical nature, then further, realities founded in
aesthesiological unities. In addition, realities are objects and, like
objects in general, stand under the laws of the formal mathesis, which
therefore also stands as the mother, so to speak, of all ontologies in
their series. But as we consider the necessary content of phenome-
nology we see ourselves pressed to fit into this ostensible part of
rational psychology the whole of it, and now it devours all ontologies
step by step.

It is of the greatest importance to gain the fullest clarity about the
true state of affairs. For the psychologist, who treats phenomenology
only as an auxiliary discipline and no more has a pure and
independent interest in it than does the physicist in geometry, such
questions are of little importance. For the investigator of experience it
is really only a matter, here just as there, of his having the rational
discipline belonging to his sphere and, where he has it imperfectly, of
acquiring it through the actual effecting of the eidetic attitude and
the investigations that are to be freely shaped within its framework.
Thereby it is purely a question of his doings and not of his reflective
““philosophical”’ ideas about it: as, indeed, it does no harm at all when
the scientific investigators of nature, after they have done geometry in
the eidetic attitude, not at all rarely explain afterward that this is
nothing other than empirical science. Quite otherwise when the
prevailing interests are precisely not experiential-scientific ones, but
rather ones belonging to the theory of science, metaphysical ones,
philosophical ones in some good sense, and when in particular the
psychologist himself claims to be a philosopher at the same time. If he
is not able to get rid of his prejudices that so easily become involved
with the naive and experiential-scientific attitude, then he simply
cannot be a genuine philosopher; he then engages in a shallow
philosophy, a monster of natural science and philosophy. If he does
not want that, then he must gain pure clarity, as we others do who

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY 63

from the outset claim to be philosophers and nothing else.

We shall see that analogous questions will occur with régard to the
cultural sciences and the ontology belonging to them. Wherever one
begins, all eidetic truths, immediate or mediate, and therefore all
rational disciplines that we already know or do not yet know, are, it
seems, devoured by phenomenology; and since we tend so much,
wherever the word “consciousness” or ‘‘lived-process” occurs, to
presuppose psychology, even if it is rational psychology, psychology
seems to devour everything. Indeed it seems to be obvious enough. Is,
then, consciousness something other than something psychic, and is
psychology something other than a science of the psychic? Can it be a
matter of something other than scholastic subtlety if one still wanted
to distinguish between the science of consciousness and psychology?

One also overlooks the fact that the thoughts immediately press on.
As rational psychology seems to devour all rational disciplines, so, in
connection therewith, does empirical psychology seem to devour all
the empirical ones. Does not phenomenology in its ideal con-
templation resolve the essence of all objectivities into unities of
consciousness-manifolds; does not, therefore, the application to the
empirically given imply that all factual existence of every sort reduces
itself to interconnections of consciousness, factual interconnections,
and, by annexation to the fact according to rules of eidetic law and
empirical rules, ordered possibilities of interconnections of conscious-
ness according to coexistence and succession? But consciousness,
lived-process, is something psychic of course. Therefore we have the
most beautiful ‘“‘psycho-monism.”’ Psychology embraces all sciences.

Reserving this last psycho-monistic question for later expositions,
we want to bring the remaining ones to a solution while staying in our
own context. First of all, it is of the greatest importance to be freed
from the prejudice that lived-process, consciousness, is in itself
something psychic, eo ipso a matter of psychology, whether it be of
the empirical or the rational, eidetic (if one concedes such) psy-
chology. Of course one must not quarrel over words, and since
everyone is accustomed to be enamoured of his own terminology even
when it deviates from the historical usage, the antipathy toward
another word usage can quite easily be obstructive in seeing the
distinctions of the matters themselves. Convinced that we are getting
at the actually prevailing sense of psychology and the psychic, we
shall continue to understand by the term ‘‘psychic”’ the psychic in the
sense clarified by us — and this must be vigorously heeded. Then, a
lived-process is something psychic as state of the psyche, i.e., of a
human or animate Ego, of this reality founded in physical nature.

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Whoever cannot free himself from this particular apperception,
whoever cannot perform the phenomenological reductions and grasp
the pure, absolutely posited lived-process, the pure consciousness as
idea, to him is denied not only the penetration into transcendental
phenomenology but also that into philosophy in general. The
material thing, the animate organism, the psyche — these are quite
determinate and particular transcendencies constituting themselves
in their manner and fully understandably in the pure consciousness
for the pure Ego, and only by reduction thereto is the ‘‘absolute”’ to
be attained, which represents the absolute relational member for all
realities whose being is entirely relative being. Pure consciousness has
absolute priority in relation to which all being 1s the aposteriori, and
this relation between apriori and aposteriori already belongs in the
sphere of essence. Accordingly, it is a fundamental necessity, and of
cardinal importance for philosophy, to lift oneself to the recognition
that one must differentiate between the eidetics of states of conscious-
ness, which is a piece of the rational ontology of the psyche, and the
eidetics of the transcendentally purified consciousness (or of being lived-
process), that the latter, the genuine and pure phenomenology, is Just
as little rational psychology as rational natural theory. Only one
thing justifies characterizing — as we also did above — the eidetics of
the psychic states of consciousness as phenomenology: namely, the
circumstance already touched upon that the pure lived-process with
its entire essence enters into the psychic state and experiences only an
apperception that does not change the lived-process itself but rather
apprehends it appurtenantly. It makes of the apriori an aposteriori
and itself in turn presupposes the apriori. For it itself belongs to a pure
Ego as its pure lived-process, to which, as to everything, belongs the
eidetic possibility of being empirically apperceived and so in infinitum.
These are connections which, when one has once understood them,
possess nothing wonderful. The wonder of all wonders is pure Ego
and pure consciousness: and precisely this wonder disappears as soon
as the light of phenomenology falls upon it and subjects it to eidetic
analysis. The wonder disappears by changing into an entire science
with a plethora of difficult scientific problems. Wonder is something
inconceivable; the problematical in the form of scientific problems is
something conccivablc, it is the unconceived that in the solution. of
problems turns out to be conceivable and conceived for reason.

CHAPTER THREE

THE RELATIONSHIP OF PHENOMENOLOGY
AND ONTOLOGY

§13. THE FIELD OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH.

Let us now turn to the general investigation of the relationship of
phenomenology and ontology. We place ourselves on the ground of
transcendental phenomenology. In transcendental experiencing, all
‘‘transcendent being,”’ understood in the normal sense as true being,
is suspended, “‘parenthesized.”” What is solely and alone to remain is
‘consciousness itself” in its own essence, and in place of transcendent
being, the “‘being meant” of something transcendent and con-
sequently all sorts of correlates, what is meant, the noemata. This was
related in particular to the sphere of intentional lived-processes that
also interests us again now in a preeminent manner. We therefore
retain perception and the perceived as such (to the extent, namely,
that after suspension of the actual being of the perceived we can assert
as evidently true that according to its essence perception is precisely
perception of this or that objective something, that it intends the
latter, is consciousness of the latter), we retain memorv and what is re-
membered as such, thinking and what is thought as such, in short,
noesis and noema and on the latter side many fundamentally essential
distinctions. We also remember that the suspending epoché can have
two directions: a transcendent something (that is to say everything
that is not itself lived-process or correlate of lived-process) can be
Posited and then the positing of any kind of position-taking can be
parenthesized; but also the reflection can direct itself toward the
lived-process itself and the Ego undergoing lived-process, and in this
regard find psychic states and psychic subject and psyche: of course
here also the reduction is performed. And all of this in eidetic
attitude. Then, as we expressly required, all ontologies become
subject to reduction.

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814. INCLUSION OF THE ONTOLOGIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY.

However, pure phenomenology seemed to contain within itself all
ontologies, the pure phenomenology as well as the one given a
psychologucal turn; more definitely stated in the following manner:
the roots of all ontologies are their basic concepts and axioms. These
seem to belong in phenomenology; they can be reinterpreted into
certain eidetic interconnections of pure lived-processes. If that is so,
however, then the consequence seems inevitable that the same must
also hold for the corollaries, therefore for each discipline as a whole,
since, of course, these establish only in mediate cognitive-connection
with axioms what belongs to one and the same essential province, the
same one which is defined by basic concepts and axioms. Once we
have turned our particular attention to the difficult state of affairs
with regard to the axioms of the apriori disciplines, we can answer as
follows: it is imperative to carry out the distinction between science of
transcendental consciousness in general and the /nturtwve erdetic doctrine of
this consciousness. With regard to the former, the boundaries stretch
very far. First of all can be meant the total stock of eidetic cognitions
which, no matter how mediately, and even if never apprehensible by
direct Intuition, result for lived-processes in general, yet apprehended
in transcendental purity. The transcendental interpretations of all
ontologies would also belong there; the apprehension — to be carried
out by phenomenological method — of every ontological theorem as
an index for quite definite connections of transcendental conscious-
ness that are to be coordinated with it by the method of scientific
insight. On the other hand, it becomes apparent (and the reflective
reader has surely already said this to himself) that every empirical
truth, every proposition of the experiential sciences of every sort, by
virtue of the doctrine of the constitution of experienceable realities in
the nexus of possible experience and thought, as well as every really
existent thing itself that is the “object about which”’ in the cognitions
of experiential science, becomes an index for transcendental in-
terconnections; that, therefore, a manner of research must be possible
which makes the total realm of factual consciousness, the total stock of
absolute monads with their factual make-up of lived-processes, the
object of scientific consideration, even if at first only through
backward-pointing interpretation of the factual sciences into the
monads’ constituent interconnections of consciousness. Everything
that thesciencesof the onta, the rational and empirical sciences, offer
us (in the enlarged sense they can all be called “ontologies,” insofar as

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY 67

it becomes apparent that they are concerned with unities of the
“‘constitution’’), “resolves itself into something phenomenological”
— a figurative locution that must not be misunderstood, and whose
more precise sense is still to be established. What must be accom-
plished here (and nothing that is ever to be accomplished in the
ontological sciences, e.g., in some natural sciences or other, can be
compared as to overwhelming importance for human cognition with
that which we have in view here under the title ‘“‘regression to the
constitutive absolute consciousness’) presupposes a transcendental
phenomenology in a definite sense, and one already delimited by us, a
science which, through the “reductions” described by us, approp-
riates for itself the field of the transcendental consciousness, ap-
prehends what is given of it in immediate Intuition, practices pure
eidetic description and pure description, analyzing and in freedom
producing ever new shapings, practicing new apprehensions and
determinations of essences, but always remaining within the bound-
aries of direct Intuition. With description are combined the apodictic
and always immediately evident cognitions relating to possible,
impossible, necessary interconnections. Phenomenology, in this for-
mulation of it as a science of the transcendental consciousness within
the frame of immediate eidetic Intuition, is the great organon of
transcendental cognition in general — I mean of every cognition in
general that expresses truths for the transcendental consciousness
beyond what is immediately seeable or “‘resolves” dogmatic contents
of science or whole sciences, such as physical natural sciences and
psychology, into factual and essentially necessary regularities of the
transcendental consciousness, however far the like may reach and
what this may, in its ultimate sense, imply.

815. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ONTOLOGICAL FINDINGS FOR
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE DIFFERENCE OF ATTITUDE IN
THE TWO SCIENCES.

There now remains, however, the real theme of the chapter. It
concerns the positings of essences and essential interconnections that
are expressed in the ontologies by the fundamental concepts and
fundamental principles. According to our findings fundamental ontic
concepts that function as fundamental concepts in the ontologies
correspond to the fundamental forms of (material and formal)
constitution of objectivities in consciousness. They seem therefore
from the outset to belong in phenomenology also.

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Indeed, have we not regarded it as a fundamental task of
phenomenology, and is it not evident that it is such a task, to explore
as to its modes of givenness the reality “‘material thing” corresponding
to the fundamental type of experience that we designated as material
experience, and to make clear in which phenomenological con-
nections this sort of reality is constituted as a unity? The same
obviously holds for the idea of geometric bodies which is constituted
already by phantoms or sensuous schemata; it holds for the idea of
animate organism, the idea of psychic unity, the idea of animate
essence, in short, for all regional categories of possible realities. And
even if not in the same manner, it nevertheless holds also mutatis
mutandis for the other conceivable ontologies, but in particular for
formal logic as a science of the significations of thinking in formal
universality and of the objects in general corresponding to them that
are signified in formal universality. Basically, all such concepts form
from the outset guiding concepts for whole phenomenological pro-
vinces of investigation. But here belong also the most primitive
axioms. This of course comes clearly to light in our investigations,
however slightly it was expressly stated. One already has the idea of a
physical thing as a possible reality, just as the ontologist does. Like the
latter, one explicates for himself that which belongs to this idea: what
is essential, one asks, for an extensive thing? It has extension and
position in space, is freely movable in space, is, according to ideal
possibility, deformable in the sense that a geometric formation is; it
has material properties which in their manner have extension, etc.
One brings this to full Intuition and pursues the essential inter-
connections in the datum, pursues the constitutive schemata, the
visual things of this or that level, etc. Naturally, all primitive axioms,
the primal axioms in the most pregnant sense, are precisely those that
“explicate” the essence of the regional concept. Therefore, the same
propositions that function as axioms of ontology find in phenome-
nology itself a place with all fundamental concepts, or their
Intuitively apprehensible material essences.

The main thing now is to understand how “the same thing”’
functions as to concepts and propositions in ontological and pheno-
menological research; whether, disregarding the further nexus into
which it enters in the phenomenological sphere, it actually is the
same; whether, that is to say, the mutually consonant statements have
the same sense, whether on both sides judging is done in the same
manner and attitude. In this regard the following must be stated:

In the eidetics of space, or material nature, of mind, etc., we
engage in dogmatic science under the title ‘‘ontology.’” We judge about

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY 69

spatial formations as such, psyches and psychic properties as such,
about human beings as such.

We judge about what belongs to objectivities like these “‘as such”’ in
truth, and that implies here: belongs to them in unconditioned
necessity and universality. Phenomenology in our sense is the science
of “origins,” of the ““mothers’”’ of all cognition; and it is the maternal-
ground of all philosophical method: to this ground and to the work in
it, everything leads back. When philosophers again and again stated,
or were tactitly guided by, the fact that the natural cognition of the
practical life and of the dogmatic sciences did not suffice, that it was
burdened with obscurities, that the fundamental concepts of all
sciences (sc. of the dogmatic ones) were in need of a “‘clarification,”’ a
reduction to their origins, then what is here felt as a deficiency finds
everywhere its ultimate fulfillment in phenomenology, and the said
clarification of concepts is only a step toward the phenomenological
clarification and the phenomenologically ongoing eidetic investi-
gation in the framework of the problems of phenomenological
constitution. The expression “phenomenological” thereby takes on
by itself a very extended significance that is harntless if one has seen
through the whole situation, as must, however, be expressly stressed.
Any investigation and any stock of cognitions, any cognitive result
that belongs to phenomenology in our specific sense, can be called
phenomenological. In this sense, therefore a clarification of the
fundamental geometric concepts would be phenomenological only if
it occurred in the framework of the phenomenological problematics.
Here already one can distinguish what phenomenology on its own, in
its research context, ascertains in systematic analysis of consciousness
and correlates of consciousness, and what is a matter of the appli-
cation of the acquired results to the geometry at hand as a dogmatic
science and especially to its fundamentals: namely, to interpret and to
‘elucidate’ them ‘‘phenomenologically.’’ All the more so if, on the
ground of phenomenology one “‘interprets back’’ into the constituting
nexus of consciousness the mediate geometric states of affairs, as they
are expressed in the theorems, and thus makes understandable its
mode of being in the deepest ground by fitting it into the essential
nexus into which it is necessarily interwoven. That is the application
of phenomenology, not phenomenology itself. The predicate ‘‘pheno-
menological’’ is naturally carried over to the applications. Further,
since phenomenology is an eidetic doctrine of the transcendentally
purified consciousness, its objects of investigation, the purified lived-
Processes and all occurrences essentially belonging to them, are also
called phenomenological, and then it happens of itself that not only

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those interconnections of factual or eidetic occurrences of the absolute
sphere of consciousness that are ascertainable in immediate seeing,
but also those ascertainable in the mediate interpretation of
dogmatic cognition are characterized as phenomenological. These
extensions are therefore to be kept in mind; on the other hand, it can
be ascertained as a necessity that before all other transcendental and,
as we can say, philosophical work there stands the work of pure
seeing, and that in this sphere, as has emerged evidently from all our
presentations, there stand not incoherent and accidently colliding
data, but rather it is the case that by virtue of the freedom in the
governance of the phantasy — with its freedom of combinatory
production of possible complexes of consciousness and single acts of
consciousness, of comparisons, analyzing differentiations, apprehen-
sions according to thought; with its freedom, in particular, of
pursuing the “‘intentions’’ lying in the performed apprehensions, of
producing fulfilling or conflicting series of intuitions, and of exercising
eidetic seeing and insight according to eidetic law in all directions —
the possibility exists of unveiling systematically the fundamental com-
position lying in consciousness in general. Phenomenology in our
sense is therefore, despite the restriction to the sphere of mere
intuition and eidetic insight, a systematic science and must also be
carried through within this limitation.

In all this it must be kept in mind: in geometry we posit spatial
formations in general — and that means positing spatial formations as
such — as truly existent, but existent in eidetic truth and not existent
in the world of experience. A geometric judgment ts valid only if the
idea, the essence, ts space and spatial formation, or, speaking in terms
of extension, if a spatial formation zs posstble. The most general
possibility, factual existence of space and spatial formation as idea,
guarantees the direct eidetic Intuition; it brings to givenness in the
example of some shape or other the universal idea of shape, and now
the positing that the geometer constantly needs and practices
becomes possible, that of a shape (or a particular of the essence in
unconditioned universality). For every particular shape, insofar as it
is not, like the fundamental shapes straight line, angle, and the like,
taken from the direct Intuition, but rather is produced only by the
connection of already formed and valid concepts of shape, the “‘proof
of existence”’ is carried out on the ground of the axioms, i.e., it is
mediately shown that there truly is in space according to its essence a
geometric essence corresponding to this shape-concept (a freely formed
logical signification). So long as the proof of existence is not carried
out, no geometric judgment as to nature (e.g., about the nature of

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY 71

regular bodies of ten surfaces) can be made. Every valid geometric
judgment posits eidetic particulars (which is equivalent to a positing
of corresponding essences as objects) that altogether make up the
province of ontology circumscribed by the validly posited regional
idea. There can be positing thetically, but then also hypotheti-
cally, other things can be posited in necessary consequence on the
hypothesis, etc. So it is in general. In arithmetic we ask: what is valid
for numbers as such, and of course for ‘‘possible”’ numbers as such; in
the rational ontology of physical thinghood we ask: what is valid for
possible things in general, and so on. Possibility is everywhere eidetic
possibility, and this must finally legitimate itself in immediate
Intuition, namely in fundamental concepts and axioms. From this
primal source of eidetic validity all derivative concepts and laws draw
their validity; all concepts that occur in theorems, excluding only the
negative existential propositions bring with them a positing, namely
as being valid, a positing as such, for which the proof of existence
must be carried out. Negative existential propositions have the
function of separating out the invalid concepts, the expressions
corresponding to no essence. The propositions of eidetic universality
thus obtained then find application in the empirical spheres of
cognition; we then know beforehand (“‘apriori’’) that nothing can
occur in the sphere of factual existence which is excluded according to
essence by the essences that are singularized in it, and that, on the
other hand, everything that occurs must occur in the way they, as a
necessarily decided consequence in them, require it.

With this, we have full clarity about which goals the ontologies set
for themselves with regard to essences and eidetic relationships, about
the manner in which they judge about them. They make judgments
with respect to being (etdetic existential judgments), positively and
negatively, thetically and hypothetically, etc., concerning them
and the eidetic particulars corresponding to them. In other words, the
spheres of essences and eidetic particulars designated by the regions
are their province: all of science is concerned with what is existent,
cognizing it, and making true statements about it. Only the existent to
which it is in this sense directed, positing and determining it, is
precisely its province. Thereby it is also obvious to what extent it
judges concerning concepts and concerning noemata in general:
occasionally reflecting on them, it has to ascertain the noematic
interest: these and those concepts, judgments, theorems are invalid,
those are valid.

Let us now consider phenomenology on the other side, and let us
look at what it has to do with “the same” essences and eidetic

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relationships (sc. the axiomatic ones of the ontologies). Its province is
not the spatial shapes, the physical things, the psyches, and so forth as
such in eidetic universality, but rather the transcendental conscious-
ness with all its transcendental occurrences that are to be explored in
immediate Intuition and in eidetic universality. In its province
therefore, falls also, among other things, the intuition of spatial
shapes, thinking and the thinking cognition of spatial shapes, the
experiencing of physical things, consciousness as in experiential
science, etc. Here also occur, therefore, ‘‘spatial shape,” ‘‘physical
thing,” and whatever other such ontological concepts and essences of
the same sort there are. But we already see that it occurs here in a
quite different manner, as is already expressed in a certain manner in
the fact that it does not designate the province. In the phenomenology
of the consciousness of physical thing the question is not how physical
things in general are, or what in truth belongs to them as such; but
rather how the consciousness of physical things is qualitied, what sorts
of consciousness of physical thing are to be distinguished, in what
manner and with what correlates a physical thing as such presents
and manifests itself in the manner peculiar to consciousness. But also
how consciousness proceeding from itself can be cognition of the
factual existence and non-being, the possibility and impossibility of a
physical thing, and what, according to its essence, this is: a factual
existence’s “‘legitimating”’ itself; grounding of a law of natural science,
etc. As we know, there come continually into consideration in the
phenomenological exploration of the acts both consciousness itself
and the correlate of consciousness, noesis and noema. To describe and
determine according to essence the phenomenon of intuition of a
physical thing, vague phantasying of a physical thing, memory of a
physical thing, and the like, that is at the same time also to keep in
mind that the act in itself is the ““meaning”’ of something and that
what is meant as such is “physical thing.’’ But to substantiate this,
indeed, to make what is meant as physical thing as such, namely as
correlate (something perceived as such with regard to the perception,
something named as such with regard to the naming), the object of
research, to make assertions about what belongs eidetically to these
sorts of physical-thing-intentions as such — that is not to explore
physical things, physical things as such. A “physical thing’’ as
correlate is not a physical thing; therefore the quotation marks. The
theme is therefore a totally different one, even if there are eidetic
relations running back and forth.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY 73

§16. NOEMA AND ESSENCE.

One must not confuse noema (correlate) and essence. Even the
noema of a clear intuition of a physical thing or of a continuing
harmonious intuition-nexus that is directed at one and the same
physical thing is not, nor does it contain, the essence of the physical
thing. The grasping of the one is not the grasping of the other,
although here in accordance with essence an alteration of the attitude
and of the direction of grasping is possible, by means of which the
grasping of the noema in any particular case can pass over into the
grasping of the corresponding ontic essence. In the latter case,
however, we have a different sort of intuition than in the former case.
If we speak of viewing only in the case of intuitive grasping of
essences, then we need another term precisely for the intuition of the
noema.

It is good here to make clear to oneself first of all that to posit a
noema as existing does not imply positing the objectivity ‘‘cor-
responding” to the noema, although it is the signified objectivity in
the noema. This can easily be made clear in the case of the
significations of thinking, the specifically logical ones. It must be kept
in mind in all this that this objectivity in the noema occurs as a unity-
moment that different noemata can have as “‘identical,’’ but of course
in such a manner that the unity or objectivity is in quotation marks, as
we have just with good reason put ¢dentical in quotation marks. In the
case of logical significations, we see now that what is thought as such
(logical signification in the noematic sense) can be ‘“‘countersensical.”’
that it — which, after all, ‘exists’ within the category of being
“logical signification,” and more generally, ‘‘noema’’? — has its
actual being, as for example, the thought signification “round
rectangle.” It is also understandable of itself that, just as what is
signified taken simply (which only is if the signification is a valid one)
is something other than the signification, so the essence of what is
signified is also something other than the signification. There is no
essence “round rectangle’’; but in order to be able to judge this, it is
presupposed that “round rectangle” is a signification existing in this
unitariness. It is clear now, further, that in the sphere of intuition it
cannot be otherwise than in the sphere of thinking, except that here
an important eidetic relationship exists between noema of intuition
and essence of what is intuited, that where the noema of intuition and
essence of what is intuited, that where the former can be grasped the
latter can also, and conversely. This holds generally, even if the

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intuition is an imperfect one, namely a merely one-sided one, afflicted
with indeterminate determinabilities, as, necessarily, in the case of the
intuition of a physical thing. But then precisely the intuition of the
essence is also, in an exactly corresponding way, inadequate; one
must never overlook the fact that eidetic intuition in no way implies
adequate intuition. (But how, for all that, fully valid eidetic cognition
is nevertheless possible in axioms and, in a certain manner, a fully
sufficient grasping of essence is possible, even if not on the ground of
an isolated physical thing-intuition — this we shall work out in more
detail in the ‘Theory of Ideas’).

If we are clear about these relationships, it becomes evident that,
despite those phenomenologically ascertainable eidetic relationships
between Intuitive grasping of noema and Intuitive grasping of ontic
essences, it is nevertheless in the case of any intuition of the onta an
essential alteration of the judgmental position if we judge ontologi-
cally about the essences and eidetic particulars as such instead of
judging phenomenologically about the noema. On the other hand, it
is understood that in the stage of the phenomenological constitution,
e.g., of the physical thing, there is not judgment about things as such,
but the preconditions are fulfilled for being able to grasp the essence
‘‘physical thing” harmoniously in the greatest conceivable perfection
and to reject dissonant accounts of essence and thereby for being able
eo ipso to obtain also the most perfect evidentness of the axioms
according to their pure and solely valid sense and to reject false
axiomatic accounts as countersensical. As soon as we carry out the
alteration of the judgmental direction required for this performance,
we have stepped beyond the province of phenomenology and entered
that of ontology.

With this the following objection is also met: if in the description of
some act or other we assert that it is the consciousness of a house, a
human being, a work of art, etc., then the validity of the description
must, of course, depend upon whether the concept house, etc.,
actually fits that which is meant in the act. But how can one know
that, if one does not even know what these words “‘really signify,”’ and
that is, of course, what they signify in the essence. Only in the clarifying
intuition can it become apparent to us, through a purely expressive
fitting of the word-signification, the logical one, to the essence given
in the intuition, whether the expression with its sense actually fits onto
that which is unclearly meant. To this, on the other hand, one will
object that, e.g., counter-sensical judgments, such as a proof for the
squaring of the circle, are made after all, and that in these cases a
corresponding essence cannot exist. But to this the reply could still be

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY 75

tried that what covered us above cannot cover us here. How could we
know what squaring of the circle really signifies if we were not able to
make it clear to ourselves? Of course, there is no harmonious essence
here. But we do, after all, see the dissonant unity of the intended
essences in the counter-sensical judgment, the incompatibility; in this
discerned incompatibility we grasp instead of the essence pure and
simple (the harmonious one) the non-essence, so to speak. No matter
whether there is something true in this attempted equation of essence
and non-essence, the exposition would not for that reason be
anywhere near correct. Rather, it must be said: of course only the
“intuition” is convincing as to whether the application of the words
with their word-concepts (the mere significations of thinking) of what
is meant on the ground of mere obscure acts (obscure phantasies,
obscure affective stirrings, etc.) is fitting; the obscure acts must be
brought into a union of coincidence with corresponding clear ones in
which what is meant is an object of consciousness as precisely the
same, but “‘clear.”” However, the viewing that accomplishes this must
of course be something essentially different from the insight that posits
the corresponding essence as truly existing, or the insight into the
incompatibility that rejects the essence as not existing. Insights of this
kind are ontological. They are necessary not merely to clarify the
ontological concepts, but to ground the validity of these concepts, the
being of the essences and the validity of the eidetic judgments (the
being-true of the eidetic relationships). That the one and the other
must be separated emerges already from the fact that the clarifying of
a concept with geometric sense, such as the squaring of the circle and,
what is here of equal value, the demonstration that the thought-
concept lying in these words could serve as descriptive for what is
meant in an obscure act, still does not require that we carry out the
geometric proof of the impossibility of such a conceptual object: of
that we would perhaps not even be capable. Here one would surely
not rightly reply that actual clarity and perfect insight go parallel
with the proof, that full clarity is equivalent in signification to insight.
But without entering here into a more detailed discussion, we can say
in advance: going parallel and being of equal value would already be
a sufficient concession, would be an expression of a distinction that we
must not overlook. And where parallelism actually takes place, in
clarification, in looking to see whether the descriptive concept
actually fits, we have an entirely different attitude from that of
insight, in which we posit the validity of the essences, or the non-
validity.

In the one case the signification of thinking is fitted to the noema of

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the underlying act and, in the effecting of the act of clarification, to
the noema of the clarifying intuition, which noema identifies itself
with the act. Answering in reflection the question about the fitting,
we posit nothing but noemata and assert their being in accord (or not
being in accord). On the other hand, the noemata also coincide in the
ontological attitude, to be sure, but in grasping, we are directed
toward the essence. We have posited it from the outset in the
ontological judgment; the signification of thinking is content of an
actually occurring belief. Likewise, in the transition to the giving
intuition, not only do we have what is intuited as noema, but also
there takes place a grasping of the essence; i.e., the intuition is intuitive
positing and, indeed, actually occurring positing of essence. As
phenomenologists we also execute positings, actual theoretical
position-takings, but they are exclusively directed toward lived-
processes and lived-process correlates. In ontology, on the other hand,
we perform actual positings that are directed toward the objects pure
and simple, instead of toward the correlates and objects in quotation
marks. In short, it is a matter of the distinction stressed above: to posit
physical things as actually present is not to posit something meant as a
physical thing, is not to posit something posited as a physical thing as
such. Likewise: to posit essence as actually present is not to posit
something meant as essence as such, etc. These are cardinal distinc-
tions that are only universalizations of the simple distinction that to
posit significations and to posit objects are two different things: the
noema in general is, however, nothing further than the universaliz-
ation of the idea of signification to the total province of the acts.
For all of that, it is not excluded that ontological axioms can serve
as criteria for whether a phenomenological description legitimately
applies the descriptive concepts.!* The manner of consideration is
then of course no longer a purely phenomenological one, but rather a
mixed phenomenological-ontological one; but it still yields valid
results. But since there is such a great interest connected with
performing the reductions purely and keeping to them in the
investigation, we will discuss this state of affairs not in the frame-
work of phenomenology but of psychology and will note only
that as soon as full assurance in the command of phenomenological
method is attained and the sense is made clear of every going out
beyond the proper phenomenological sphere and of going back into
it, methodologically allowed transgressions also come to the fore,
which for their part are justified of course from a higher vantage point

Cf. p. 77.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY 77

within a fittingly enlarged phenomenological immanence. As pheno-
menology encompasses everything non-phenomenological in the form
of “‘parenthesizing,’’ so also does it encompass that which is in a given
case is called transgression of a phenomenological consideration: all
justifications, however, belong according to sense and possible va-
lidity in phenomenology, therefore also those of the sorts of trans-
gressions in question.

§17. SIGNIFICANCE OF ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPTS FOR PSYCHOLOGY.

But let us pass over into psychology. It is of great interest in itself to
note that what we have here worked out in the contrasting of
phenomenology and ontology must obviously extend to the re-
lationship of psychology and ontology. Every phenomenological
description, of course, passes over into a psychological one with
regard to the lived-processes of a psyche undergoing them through
psychological apperception, as, conversely, every description of
psychic lived-processes passes over into a purely phenomenological
one through the ideally possible reduction (eidetic and purifying of
reification). If, therefore, the point is to settle within psychological
research the not infrequent dispute as to whether ostensible de-
scriptions concerning perceptions of physical things, of space and
spatial formations, of movement and the like are correct, and to be
sure, whether it can correctly be said whether the designation of them
as perceptions precisely of physical things, of space, of movement is valid
(which of course implies something for the essence of the psychic
lived-processes), then the interest is obviously not an ontological one,
not directed at the essence of physical thing, space, etc. Here it is not
in psychology as it is in physical natural science where physical things
are the themes of judgment and eidetic insights concerning physical
things in general are obviously to be introduced in the judging of the
particular physical things experienced in any given case. These
eidetic insights themselves belong to the theme. Psychology, however,
is not interested in physical things, but in perception of physical
things. And, to the extent that perception means something physical,
that which is meant as such, the noema, belongs in perception’s
sphere of description. Now, we said above!’ that ontological axioms
could nevertheless serve as criteria for the correctness of the noematic
descriptions. Let us cite something well-known: let it be a question (as

Cf p. 76.

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78 PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

generally with the structures in question) of unqualified intuitions of
transcendent objectivities. These necessarily contain empty, but
fulfillable intentions; to them belongs the eidetic possibility of being
able to pass over into series of intuitions in which their empty
intentions are fulfilled and what is intuited as such holds har-
moniously. Discordancies are only possible in the case of conceptual
apprehensions by virtue of the fact that discordant concepts find
application or by virtue of synthetic accounts, as if something
grasped as red were at the same time to be posited as green through a
synthetic account. If we exclude such things, therefore, if we remain
with really unqualified intuitions, then in any given case through a
fitting direction of regard, and Intuitively, an essence can be derived
from them, namely, from what is intuited, just as it is intuitively
meant there. Just as the intuition must in principle be perfected
within its categorial type, so must the essence be perfected in its
categorial type; and finally every intuition in principle guarantees by
itself the possibility of getting so far through its formation in
harmonious sense that the categorial essence, e.g., ‘physical thing”’
(even if it be as “‘idea’’) is grasped in perfection, and therefore also the
axioms explicating it are carried out in all evidentness. Accordingly,
we can also assert the apriori valid law: every unqualified intuition
‘‘contains in itself’ the essence of the region corresponding to it and of
the regional categories belonging to it, which receive their eidetic
positing in the corresponding ontology, and it further contains in itself
all axioms of the ontology in question. Conversely, it is evident that
the concept of the region and every concept that is itself a determin-
ing one of the region as such, and finally every concept that includes
the regional concept as particularization, and to the extent that it
does this, is validly applicable as a phenomenologically descriptive
concept for the intuition in question with regard to what is intuited as
such. Likewise it is clear that every descriptive concept is to be
rejected that is encumbered with what is excluded by the regional
concepts belonging to the intuition, and therefore by the regional
axioms also. As soon as we accordingly recognize, through con-
sideration of that which lies in the descriptive concept (by regression,
say, to the intuition that requires its possible objective application),
that there belongs to this concept as such something which conflicts
with those ontological axioms, we know that the concept in the des-
cription is falsely applied, that it cannot function as descriptive. In this
manner ontological truths (perhaps even mediately) can therefore
serve to provide a norm for descriptive concepts. That a natural-
scientific description can only be valid if it accords with the

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY 79

ontological laws of nature is understood of itself and requires no
special discussion, because precisely what is described itself stands
among the valid ontological concepts. Obviously, therefore, no
discordant geometric concept, e.g., can function as a descriptive one.
But here it becomes apparent that even a psychological description of
intuitions of a physical thing (and so of intuitions of some reality or
other) can only be valid if the descriptive concepts have the
designated relation to the ontology of the region of reality in which
what is intuited as such would belong. Apparently even that is a
triviality, but one of the trivialities that present such great difficulties
to the inner understanding. Psychology, to be sure, has its pre-given
world in which its explanations move. But as pre-given it can not deal
with the objects to which its predictates are related, and if it describes
intuitions psychologically, then it describes along with them what is
intuited ‘‘as such,”’ the noema, but no more. Herein, therefore, lies
the particular function of the descriptive concepts that in psychology
are inversions of the ontological ones, not these themselves, and
exercise a quite different function from that in ontology. The rules of
their validity are an important psychological-methodological prob-
lem, and this problem finds its solution in our expositions. (There is
probably no need for entering into universalizations that suggest
themselves. )

One thing, however, must still be added in a word or two. Since
ontological laws, to be sure, occur with the claim to absolute validity,
or with the claim to being drawn from fully sufficient Intuition,
whereas this claim, as is known, often fares very badly, the methodol-
ogical regression to ontological laws is also not, as a rule, a reliable
method. It is not for that reason to be completely rejected. The
appeal to ontological truisms gives a definite direction to the paths of
Intuitive research; but only Intuition is the court of last resort that
actually decides. But then one also sees that, in the sense of the
foregoing general expositions, for psychology as for phenomenology,
it is not ontological Intuition, but rather, phenomenological Intuition
that here has to make the final decision. Ontology itself, with all its
ontic positings, is really something irrelevant for precisely such
performances; they stand only as indices for noematic connections
with which they are, of course, connected by eidetic law.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE METHOD OF CLARIFICATION

The investigation just carried out served to clarify the relationship
between phenomenology and ontology. We also recognize, however,
its significance for the clarification of phenomenological (and likewise
psychological) method in a definite direction: with this, difficult and
important problems are cleared up — problems of sense and of the
relevant testing of the connected phenomenological (or psychologi-
cal) descriptions by norms. It lies in the nature of phenomenology
and of the unique functions which devolve upon it for the whole of
our knowledge, that it be continually applied to itself reflectively, that
out of phenomenological sources it must bring to fullest clarity the
method itself which it practices. There is no science behind it on
which it can fob off any work. Any obscurity that remains for it
provides a fertile ground for all kinds of confusions and surreptitious
intrusions, for corruption of phenomenological results, and also for
misinterpretations of the entire phenomenological method, with
which then mishandling of the method is connected. Radical science
demands the most thorough-going rigor, which for its part demands
the most complete illumination in the method of clarification. With this
remark we have dropped the word that is to form the theme of the
following investigations. For what has just been presented has
prepared us for it best. We have mentioned in the theory of the
reductions also the reduction to the greatest possible clarity, which
was spoken of as a special case of a universally important method of
clarification in every scientific sphere. It is due to the peculiar
position of phenomenology in relation to all other sciences that
clarification in general, no matter what it is applied to, and
phenomenological clarification stand in a close relationship. That is
why, even in the case of one who has already come to know genuine
phenomenology but has not reflectively given himself enough of an
account of its pure essence and bounds of sense, the concept of
phenomenology and phenomenological method easily gets shifted

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occur, can still cause confusion.

METHOD OF CLARIFICATION 81

§18. THE DOGMATIC SCIENCES’ NEED FOR CLARIFICATION.

All sciences are subject to the obvious requirement of a foundation for
their stock of propositions and concepts. Their statements are
supposed to be valid, and they can be valid only if the concepts are
valid in their own way. It could be said that it is an ideal of science to
gain in its respective region a valid system of propositions (and thus
also of concepts) that in the material of thinking (that is, word-
significations) determine unequivocally all events of the field, every-
thing that is there, as regards qualities, relations, contexts. What is
required is that this performance, in however narrow a sphere it is
considered to have been accomplished, be able to legitimate itself
through rational grounding and do so at any time. Being convinced of
the truth of a theory and of its practically useful application
presupposes in no way the ability to ground it rationally or, what is
the same thing, to have fundamental insight into it. Strange to say,
however, not even the formation of theories or of sciences, as methodic
arrangements for obtaining correct theories, presupposes insight and
comprehensibility. A remarkable teleology prevails in the develop-
ment of human culture in general and thus also in scientific culture,
in that valuable results can arise without insight or through a mixture
of insight and instinct in the exercise of psychic powers. That the
results are valuable is proved naturally by reasons subsequently
produced that establish the claims to validity within the compass of
perfect insight. All sciences, even the most highly developed exact
sciences, are Cultural values of this kind. No matter how ridiculous it
would be to maintain that their formation and development are not,
or not to a great extent, grounded in insight, sciences are all far
removed from a sufficient, perfect grounding in insight. And that is
already true of the conception of the concepts that enter into their
predications.

Drawn by the first creators of the sciences in part from the very
incomplete naive empiricism of everyday men, in part only one-
sidedly and incompletely clarified in the new formation, these
concepts enter into the work of science with a stock of confusion,
without generally gaining in depth of clarity in the course of this
work. Here the reverse process indeed takes place, in which nothing is
changed by the occasional reversion of original thinkers to basic
concepts, in order to remove painfully felt confusions and mistakes,
and by the occasional increase of clarity that goes with the reversion.
The more highly developed a science becomes, i.e., the richer its

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82 METHOD OF CLARIFICATION

‘‘methodics’’ becomes. the more its main work shifts into the symbolic
sphere of thought; the concepts originally oriented toward Intuition
are used merely symbolically, as counters with which one oper-
ates, without recourse to intuition, in the style of the essentially
symbolic method that has been developed. The art of continually
inventing new symbolic procedures is practiced more and more
perfectly and its rationality is essentially one that depends merely on
the symbolism and from the outset presupposes, without insight, the
value of the symbols. What was relatively a matter of insight on a
lower level is symbolized anew on a higher level and robbed of
evidentness (as a superfluous burden on thought), and so the sciences
become what we know them as: factories turning out very valuable
and practically useful propositions — factories in which one can work
as laborer and inventive technician, factories from which, as a practi-
cal man, one can without inner understanding derive products and at
best comprehend the technical efficiency. The “‘experts,’’ i.e., the
engineers of the art of science, might in this situation be completely
satisfied in the awareness of their greatness and in the organized
cooperation of scientific big business in infinitely fruitful achieve-
ments. And likewise, the technicians in the usual sense, whose goal 1s
the practical control of reality, might be satisfied. Knowledge is for
them from the beginning nothing but an artful invention of thinking
for purposes of artful achievements in the practice of controlling
nature and man. However much this conception of knowledge
seemed to have asserted itself in the “‘century of technology,’’ there
was no lack of reactions, which in the last decade have increased
mightily in power and inaugurated a great revolution. The advances
of science have not enriched us in treasures of insight. The world ts
not in the least more intelligible because of them; it has only become
more useful for us. Treasures of knowledge may lie in the sciences,
indeed, they must lie in them, since we cannot doubt that the claim of
their statements to validity is a good one, even though within limits
still to be defined. But these treasures of knowledge we do not have;
we must first obtain them. For knowledge is insight, is truth drawn
from Intuition and thereby completely understood. Only through a
work of elucidation and making evident, carried out anew on the
given sciences, do we bring out the intrinsic values that are hidden in
them. True statements are not, without something further, intrinsic
values, and no more so are methods for the production of such
statements. Only indirectly, and primarily as means to insight, do
they have value, for “insights” are intrinsic values;!4 and then

'*“*Tnsight”’ means in this case more than the fleeting act of seeing into something. Only truths
that are gained from primal instituting in insight and continue to be valid henceforth in the

METHOD OF CLARIFICATION 83

secondarily as means to founded values, e.g., to activities of val-
uational and practical reason. /ntuttiontsm, therefore, reacted with
complete justification against the one-sided surrender of mankind to
the expansion of the sciences as techniques of thought. What matters
is to put an end to the plight, grown intolerable, of reason, which
amidst all the riches of its theoretical possessions sees its proper aim,
world understanding, insight into truth, recede ever farther in the
distance. But, of course, Intuitionism must not degenerate into
mysticism instead of approaching sober tasks that are forthcoming
from the situation described. The point is to lead the sciences back to
their origin, which demands insight and rigorous validity, and to
transform them into systems of cognition based on insight by work
that clarifies, makes distinct, and grounds ultimately, and to trace the
concepts and statements back to conceptual essences, themselves
apprehensible in Intuition, and the objective data themselves, to
which they give appropriate expression insofar as they are actually
true. Then it must also come out whether and to what extent the
sciences are one-sided, giving theoretical formulation only to certain
sides of actual reality, and how from the primal ground of Intuitive
givenness the goal of an all-round and complete knowledge that solves
all reasonably posed problems can be attained.

§19. CLARIFICATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL MATERIAL.

The first work to be undertaken is obviously concerned with the
conceptual material with which science operates, and first of all, the
primitive concepts. It is by means of concepts that science is related to
the objects of its region. Its method, in spite of the deficiencies
complained of, is, of course, not altogether a stranger to intuition. The
concepts are again and again related to what is intuited, in the expe-
riential sciences they are related to what is experienced, and,
conversely, under the guidance of intuition and its data, concepts are
formed again and again (diagrams, models, observations, experi-

consciousness of this acquisition and can be reinstated at any time in the original condition of
actual insight, have the value of wisdom, i.e., genuinely personal value. And only they have
thereby an objective proof of their truth and can really be claimed as truths. Through
grounding in insight it can come about that we subsequently recognize that convictions that we
previously had as blind convictions were truths. Insightless judgments also (insightless, insofar
as they are not explicitly discerned) can be approved and adopted in the manner of a
premonition, of an evidence in its way anticipatory; and they can gain their confirmation in
further practice, without genuine and logically compelling insight having been developed.

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84 METHOD OF CLARIFICATION

ments). The concepts, nevertheless, are lacking in that clarity which
is necessary for the cognitive validity. The given toward which they
orient themselves, e.g., the thing experienced in any particular
instance, is of course given, but incompletely given; thus even
concepts oriented directly toward the given, immediately describing
it, are incomplete. The question is, how to proceed here, and what
more precise sense the desired perfection has. To begin with, this
much is clear: that the concepts of any science concerned with
individual being must be of three types:

a) Logwal-formal concepts.

— which are the common property of all sciences in general, concepts
such as “object,” “‘property,” “‘fact,” “relation,” “‘number,” etc.,
and concepts that express forms of signification, categories of signifi-
cation, such as “‘concept,” “‘proposition in general.” They “‘lie” ina
certain manner as “forms’’ in all particular concepts, such as
“categorical proposition,” “‘particular proposition,’’ etc.

b) Regtonal concepts.

— concepts that express the region itself, e.g., “physical thing’’ and
the logical derivations of the region, such as “‘thing-property,”
“‘thing-relation,” etc. In a certain way these concepts, too, have
forrr +! character; they permeate all sciences of a region and underlie
all , articular concepts (thus, for example, in all natural-scientific
concepts there lies the formal component of physicalness, in the
psychological that of psychic reality, etc.).

¢) Matertal particularizations.

— of the regional concepts themselves, with which all materially
definite statements supply precisely their relations to the materially
determinate things according to their material content. Mere modes
of number belong to arithmetic, mere modes of the idea of signifi-
cation belong to the logic of signification, mere modes of spatiality to
geometry. These are all formal modes. Of a quite different character
are concepts such as color, tone, kinds of sensory feelings, drives,
and the like. They contribute the material content to all determi-
nations.

It is evident from the start that, for the elucidation of every science,
the elucidation of the concepts of all these groups is necessary and that

METHOD OF CLARIFICATION 85

the sequence of the groups prescribes an order of precedence. In itself,
the elucidation of the logical-formal concepts would have to take
place first; it is a common concern of all sciences. Then the regional-
formal concepts would have to be cleared up, and finally the
particular concepts, which are the peculiar property of the particular
sciences.

If all possible theories of essence, all eidetic disciplines, were
historically as well developed as the natural sciences, but were also
afflicted with deficiencies similar to theirs, then we would obviously
have to say that the elucidation of the ontology must precede that of
the empirical sciences. With reference to the clarification of concepts
it is indeed to be observed that the whole work, which is demanded
for all sciences, would already be accomplished by clarifying the
concepts of the ontological disciplines. For, any given concept has its
conceptual essence, which fits itself ideally into a genus of essence
that could function as a region for a theory of essence. In the totality
of ontologies in the widest sense (not merely the formal ones),
therefore, all essences would be included. The elucidation of the
primitive concepts by going back to primitive essences would thus
already have been achieved. In truth, however, only a very few
ontologies have been constituted, and that is, as one can well say,
because their efficient development as sciences demands from the
start a perfection of Intuition, which only exceptionally, only with
essences of certain classes, is to be achieved with relative ease. Indeed,
connected with this is the fact that already very early a geometry and
a part of formal logic and mathematics begin to develop; whereas,
even up until today, an ontology of material nature and a rational
psychology have been lacking (up to the psychological phenomenology just
beginning to appear). In these regional spheres the obtaining of
adequate, sufficiently deeply penetrating and unconfused Intuitions
is attended with that sort of difficulty, difficulties which, however, are
thoroughly surmountable after the ground of phenomenology is won.
One can say that the idea of a complete realm of ideas, a complete system
of all Intuitively conceivable essences or of a complete system of all
eidetic disciplines (or theories of essence), in itself includes the idea of
an all-encompassing system of all possible concepts obtained with
pure clarity, adequately oriented toward it. Indeed, one could even
Say that the two are equivalent, since with clear concepts clear axioms
and all further consequences are also given. Accordingly, the demand
to carry out the task of clarifying the concepts of all given sciences, if
we give ourselves to this ideal and set the task at once for all future
and possible sciences, leads to the ideal requirement of grounding an

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86 METHOD OF CLARIFICATION

all-encompassing system of ontologies in pure Intuitive sources. If we
may say that the stock of primitive concepts, with which we not only
have done scientific work until now but also shall perform it in the
future and at any time, is though limited, still a fixed one, then we
come to an empirically limited idea of a system of eidetic disciplines,
into which all eidetic essences that we can attain arrange themselves.
That, however, is no longer an ideal alien to the world, but a
practical ideal (which is, even on other grounds, highly important):
an ideal encompassing phenomenology, which for its part encom-
passes in a certain way all other eidetic disciplines.

In order now to make clear to ourselves the essence of this
clarification itself, which serves the noetic perfection of all sciences, let
us consider in an example the sense of the required achievements: it is
a matter of making clear, e.g., the concept of material body, what
that “‘really signifies’: of “physical thing,”’ how it looks. We proceed
from examples that represent unquestionable applications of the word
““thing,”’ e.g., stones, houses, and the like, but are not content with
merely snatching these up, so to speak, through the name, that is,
with “‘thinking’”’ by mere word-significations. Rather, we proceed to
intuition, to the perception of such details or to lively fantasy, which
here plays the role of a “phantasizing oneself into the perceptual
givenness of such facts.’’ If we were to make comparisons between the
various objects presenting themselves as examples in givenness or
quasi-givenness, then we would find differences and common elements.
It is, however, not a question of inductively proceeding to find that
which is common everywhere. We look rather to that which in the
intuitively given is, so to speak, brought out, covered, conceptually
meant by the word-concept, and what is not, what the “‘so-called”’
therein really is, that is to say, which essential moments there are of
the intuitively given, for whose sake the fact is precisely so “‘called.”
For all that, in substance the Socratic procedure. Naturally, it 1s not
a question of fixing a linguistic usage, but rather, in such coinciding, it
is one of making a noematic essence stand out in what is intuitively
given, and of fixing it as that which is meant by the mere word-
signification. Precisely in that way does the word-signification, the
concept, show itself to be valid; and essence now corresponds to the
concept.

§20. MAKING DISTINCT AND MAKING CLEAR.

The following distinction still has to be made: if the concept is

METHOD OF CLARIFICATION 87

complex, then making distinct and making clear are to be kept apart.
Making a concept, what is meant by a word as such, distinct is a
procedure that occurs within the mere sphere of thought. Before the
least step toward clarification is taken and while no intuition or an
entirely unsuitable and indirect intuition is one with the word, what
lies in the meaning can be considered: e.g., in the “decahedron,” a
body, a regular polyhedron with ten congruent lateral surfaces. The
like can be successively obtained and connected in forms belonging to
the sphere of thought: “a geometrical body that is completely
bounded by ten congruent plane surfaces.”” In this procedure the
logical form, the “‘synthesis,’’ in which the material of thought 1s
formed may be a different one. There are many “equivalent”
expressions for this same state of affairs. We have, therefore, to
distinguish the unanalyzed concept that has not been made distinct
and the concept that has been made distinct analytically and the
‘analytic judgements,” in the sense that Kant probably had pri-
marily in view, which represent the noematic object of the former and
the latter as the same, identifying them. More exactly, however, it
would mean that the unanalyzed concept and another concept that
functions in relation to it as its distinct explicate, as the explication of
its contents, are to be opposed to one another. For the concept that
has been ‘‘made distinct’ is, as concept, as signification, a different
one. With clarification, we go beyond the sphere of mere word-
significations and signifying thinking; we bring the significations into
congruity with the noematic side of intuition, the noematic object of
the former with that of the latter. The congruence must be so perfect
that to every partial concept derived by making distinct there
corresponds an explicit moment of the intuitive noema. Obviously the
explication of that which is meant in an intuition is other than the
explication of that which is meant in thought, is signified in thought.
It very often happens that a conflict is produced by a measurement
against corresponding intuition, which is characterized as cor-
responding by the fact that at least a partial signification comes to
congruence with an intuitive moment, finding in this intuitive
moment its plentitude: different explicates of signification demand
intuition-correlates which are ‘‘not compatible” in the unity of an
intuition, i.e., which do not achieve unity in the normal sense, a unity
of univocal intuition, but rather achieve a conjoining of two intuitions
in the form of conflict with reference to the moments in question. It is
further to be noted that not merely the relationship between
signification and the intuited as such (noema of thinking and noema
of intuition) is to be attended to, but also the relationship of the word

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88 METHOD OF CLARIFICATION

itself with its word-sound and with the word-tendency clinging to it
and with the noemata. The word “means”’ something, which is to say,
its signification demands a suitable essence fulfilling it. It can also be
said, however, that the word with the tendency clinging to its word-
sound demands a signification and is one with this signification as
word. But the word can be equivocal and as word demand various
significations, and it can demand now incoherent, now closely
related, now wider, now narrower, now more general, now less
general significations. Thereby much confusion and error came into
science, as it well known. Now, clarification also has the function of
giving old words a newly constituted sense. Of the word-tendencies
clinging to it, certain ones are, so to speak, stricken, and a single
tendency clarified in the intuited is underlined as the one that 1s valid
once and for all and impressed on the memory.

Up to now we have observed the relationships which play between
word, word-signification, and intuition. But we have not yet discussed
the main work of clarification, which lies on the side of intuition. The
making-distinct of a word (verbal sense-analysis) has a propaedeutic
function for the Intuitive making-distinct, which really has to be
done.

The goal of clarification can also be understood in the sense already
explained as that of producing anew, as it were, the concept already
given, nourishing it from the primal source of conceptual validity,
l.e., Intuition, and giving it within the intuition the partial concepts
that belong to its originary essence. Therefore, if a “matching’”’
intuition, a corresponding noema of intuition, is found for the already
given concept that is to be newly grounded but first to be verified,
then it must be fixed in the latter (by means of definition of a concept-
content, that is, by analysis of the whole noema) what the essence
belonging to the concept is supposed to be exactly and permanently:
the “‘expression’”’ is created for the seen essence, and the related word-
tendency is underscored. This distinctive essence is analyzed; cor-
responding significations are assigned as expressions to the analytic
moments, down to the primitive ones or as far as interest requires.

The goal is perfect clarity, and, particularly with all concepts
originating out of the sphere of reality, that requires very complicated
processes, which we already know and which we can call characteris-
tic on the basis of our analyses. Clarification must follow precisely the stages
of the constitution of the exemplary object of intuition in question. A thing is
not given, a thing-concept is not brought to actual clarity, ifa thing is
merely seen. A phantom is also seen; a mere seeing also yields no more
than what corresponds to the phantom, namely as the sensory

METHOD OF CLARIFICATION 89

schema. If it is a matter of making clear what ‘‘thing”’ or “‘real thing-
property” means with its essential relation to real circumstances, then
the clarifying intuition must follow out the manifolds of sensory
schemata in relation to the manifold of schematized circumstances,
and it must bring to fulfillment the intuitive components that give to
the sensory schemata the value of thing-intuitions. The process of
clarification, therefore, means two things: making a concept clear by
recourse to fulfilling intuition, and, second, a process of clarification
executed in the sphere of intuition itself: the meant object (the
intuition “means,” too, it also has a noema which is the possible
member of noematic manifolds in which the noematic object stands
out more and more perfectly) must be brought to ever greater clarity,
must be brought ever nearer, must be brought in the process of
clarification to perfect self-givenness. Now there is not, to be sure, for
objects of every kind (and thus also not for concepts of every kind) such
a thing as constitution as a unity of manifolds, e.g., not for sensible
contents or acts, which themselves become objects in reflection. But,
on the other hand, there is for all objects an intuitive nearness and an
intuitive distance, a cropping up into the bright light, which permits
analysis of an inner wealth of definite moments, and a sinking back
into darkness, in which all becomes indistinct. Those are, of course,
images and images with double meanings. For, the bringing nearer,
in which empty places of the conception fill themselves, in which
intuitions, “‘clear intuitions,” must go over into series of intuition, in
order to bring the object (which they “‘mean’’) representing itself one-
sidedly, incompletely and indefinitely in them to progressive “‘self-
givenness” — the bringing nearer is from a totally different direction
than that which, e.g., any such intuition admits to the extent that it is
not a sufficiently bright, not a sufficiently satiated intuition (for
example, an incompletely ‘‘lively” phantasy). Therefore, the concepts
“clarity” and ‘“‘clarification’’ are ambiguous. But each sense comes into
question here: greatest possible “‘liveliness,” ‘‘satiation,”’ on one side
and greatest possible fulfilling of those apperceptive, representing,
manifesting intentions, which belong to the stock of intuition. Again,
one sees from here in complete clarity the general task and the most
all-encompassing ideal, although it lies in the infinite: to embrace the
world of ideas in systematic completeness, to embrace in intuition and
in the most complete clarity the world of possible essence-types, of
possible objectivities in general; and, on the basis of the noemata lying
in intuition, to obtain all the possible conceptual essences in general
and to coordinate with them the word-significations and words
themselves expressing them purely, which would make up a whole of

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90 METHOD OF CLARIFICATION

perfectly clarified concepts as well as terms. From there one comes
again to the infinite zdeal of a system of all ontologies and eidetic
disciplines in general. With the explication of the essences in self-
givenness and with the consideration of the interconnections of
essence, there is regulation of necessities, possibilities, and impossibi-
lities of connection, of manifold relations according to essence, which,
expressed in true concepts, become further basic truths of ontology.
All such investigation has now, however, in the sense already
explicated, close relation to phenomenology. It is itself an eidetic
discipline. An all-encompassing system of eidetic disciplines includes
it, too. But all clarifying ontological insight executed in the frame-
work of axiomatic clarity that is not directly phenomenological
becomes such by a mere shift of vtew, as conversely in the whole of
phenomenological insights there must be those which become on-
tological through a mere shift of view.5

One may say that all eidetic axioms are found in the context of
phenomenology through mere execution of shift of view and of the
corresponding positing, and that therefore — and this is surely very
significant — they embrace within themselves the maternal ground
from which all ontological insights grow. However, it is significant on
principle that it owes nothing to the other ontologies and cannot owe
them anything, just as little as it can own anything to any other
dogmatic science, and that it is nothing so little as it is a kind of
continuation of the ontologies, as a uniform ground, on which
ontological axioms and other insights of essence grow alongside one
another. However, it can and must be said that it is only through the
thoroughly reflective work of phenomenology, which analyzes sys-
tematically what is necessarily executed on the other side, which fixes
all the motives that lie in the phenomena and asks about their
motivations, that only by this means can the ontologically founded
investigation unfold its full power and only thereby does it receive its
full certainty. Only the phenomenologist will be competent to
perform the deepest clarifications with regard to the essences building
themselves up in systematically constituted layers and thus to prepare
the grounding of the ontologies of which we have so great a lack.

'*When I clarify a concept, “psyche” for example, I make clear to myself the word-
signification and look for the “‘proper” signification, i.e., I look again for a signification but for
the “fulfilling” signification, the noema which belongs to the fulfilling intuition. Here I have no
ontic attitude; I do not want to transform the noematic object into the object itself, which I
posit, which act is a modification of the judgment-attitude. Insofar as noemata and their
noematic unities (‘objects in quotation marks) belong to phenomenology, all clarification
belongs to phenomenology, as also the axioms of the theory of signification belong to it as the
theory of forms of significations.

SUPPLEMENTS

TEXT-CRITICAL NOTES ON THE
SUPPLEMENTS

SUPPLEMENT I
This supplementary text was the first part of the original 1912 manuscript of /deen //. Parts of it

were omitted from the final version of the work. Where large parts of the text are used in /deen I/
they are omitted from this Supplement, as indicated by notes in the text.

SUPPLEMENT II
The text of this Supplement is bracketed in the manuscript and in the copies of it, indicating the

author's reservations concerning it. Thus, the editors included it as a Supplement rather than as
part of the main text. Refer to the end of the first paragraph of §3 of Chapter One of /deen III.

SUPPLEMENT III

This Supplement reproduces the original text of a passage that was abbreviated in the final
version of /deen [1]. Refer to the fifth paragraph from the end of §3 of Chapter One of Ideen III.

SUPPLEMENT IV

This text reproduces a typescript included in the revision of /deen [1] by Ludwig Landgrebe. See
§7.

Note: These remarks are based on the text-critical notes of the editor of Husserliana V,
Marly Biemel.

109)

SUPPLEMENT I:
TRANSITION FROM BOOK II TO BOOK III*

§1. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PSYCHE. (EMPATHY.)

Let us now look again at the difficult question of the “‘constitution”’ of
the psyche and of the psychic Ego that is united with it. We see brutes,
human beings, as animated beings, and this happens because of the
fact that certain physical things are apprehended as animate or-
ganisms, 1.e., that sequences of events of consciousness and, with
these, constitutive unities are ascribed to them. The animate or-
ganism must be apprehended as a real unity (even if in no way
already as “‘Objective’’ material physical thing through intersubjec-
tive constitution, which, of course, for its part, already presupposes a
relation to a multiplicity of human beings), in order to be able to
function as carrier of something psychic (that 1s, it 1s given to the pure
Ego as a unity of possible schematic multiplicities, recognizable as this
unity, that is to say, indentifiable in its own and in separate series of
experience). In ‘“‘empathy” or interpretation [Eindeutung | it is understood
as animate organism, at first simply as carrier of something psychic
and therewith not merely as carrier of sensations, but also as carrier of
‘acts,’ of intentional lived-processes. With that, precisely, there
belongs to the inventory of the interpretation [Eindeutung] a pure subject
as subject of any interpreted [eingedeuteten] cogito. This pure Ego
has its surrounding world, has its Here and Now in relation to which its
physicalness is oriented, and this Here and Now is related to a
physical thing appearing in a distinctive manner to the pure Ego, i.e.,
its animate organism, in a way similar to that in which my Here and
Now is related to my animate organism. If I could “remove from
myself’ my animate organism, which in actual fact continually has
my center of orientation in it, that is to say, continually accompanies
my pure Ego and appears to it, then it would present all the series of
appearances that other physical things present; it is in itself a physical
thing like any other, except that it cannot be removed and can

*First draft of Book II of 1912. Transl.

SUPPLEMENT I 95

therefore appear only in limited groups of appearances. Thus the Ego
interpreted into [eingedeutet] the external physical thing: “‘animate
organism of another,” has its non-removable physical thing, its ‘‘own
animate organism,” and this is, in the sense of empathy, precisely the
same thing that appears as carrer of the empathy or interpretation
[Eindeutung]. With this is given simultaneously the fact that the
surrounding world of the alten pure Ego 1s the same one as that of my pure
Ego; and this means: the physical things of the surrounding world are
unities of a higher level, constituted by way of interpretation [Eindeutung].
Where two persons enter into intercourse with one another the
multiplicity of appearances (in all its levels) that constitutes a real
physical thing for I,* and the multiplicity of appearances that
constitutes the “‘same”’ real thing for I, are different; the one belongs,
as an infinite but determinate sum of possible appearances, to the one
flow of consciousness, namely that of I,; the other belongs to the other
one, to that of I,. In the interpretation [Eindeutung] there takes place,
according to its “‘sense,”’ an apprehension, a coordinating of these two
multiplicities of appearances, by virtue of which the “Objective”
thing is constituted as “‘the same.” Every new pure Ego, I, posited by
interpretation [Eindeutung] multiplies the number of closed groups of
multiplicities of appearances, and thus the Objective thing is the
unity of an unlimited multiplicity of groups of multiplicities of
appearances, and the interpretation [Ezndeutung] or empathy is one of
the basic forms of experience even for external physicalness. We can
express precisely this Objectivation in another manner also. We can
say, namely: if any physical thing, D,,** is originally thought of as
constituted only for an individual I,, then it becomes now as this untty
a member of a multiplicity in whose manifold members one and the
same Objective unity D is constituted. In other words: what was already a
real physical thing, but for one pure Ego that has not yet performed any
empathy, that now becomes mere “‘appearance”’; the manifolds of
appearance are now the real unities D,, D,, D, ... that correspond
to the Egos I,, Ip, I3, .... and which in the empathy undergo the
apprehension: “‘the same Objective D’’; the D is something that only
appears in the D,, but for all that also only is as possibly appearing in
such appearances, therefore able to be legitimated as Objective truth
only through empathy.

This Objectivation is therefore also undergone by the animate
organism, inasmuch as it is a material thing. For every pure Ego I™

**I"* from the German “/ch"* — Transl.
*¢“DP" from the German “Ding” — Transl.

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96 SUPPLEMENT I

that wants to interpretively [ezndeutend] grasp another pure Ego I"
with its pure consciousness, the apprehension of the animate organism
L"* of I", as this is given to I™ (as L'?)), suffices for the purpose of
interpretation [Ezndeutung]. But through interpretation [Ezndeutung] it
is identified with the L™ and then further with the corresponding
unities that other Egos have of the ‘‘same”’ animate-thing [Lezbaing]
as appearances, the symbolically indicated form L'?’. But of course the
sense of the interpreting [ezndeutenden] apprehension, precisely as
animate organism of the other Ego I”, is this: that this I" experiences
its L®) in a particular manner and that the animate organism is its
animate organism, “‘connected’’ with its consciousness, only for ¢hzs
I". The question will then be what this connection implies, namely for
the experiencing pure Ego I‘?), how it (the connection) is constituted
as “‘connection’”’ of the Objectively apprehended body L” with a
consciousness, or rather (as we must hasten to add): with a real,
Objective psychic being and psychic Ego. For, to me, the experienc-
ing one, the Objective L, stands there as connected, not with a bare
pure consciousness (to which I can at any time go back), just as not
thing-schemata or even adumbrations, sensations face me, the ex-
periencing one, but rather, physical things, and even Objective
physical things; except that I can apriori go back precisely to the
hierarchical objectivities in accordance with the hierarchical formation
of experience. When we pose this question, it is clear that as the L, is
constituted in the L}, L§, . . . as manifolds, the S*,** the psychically real,
is constituted in corresponding manifolds Sf, S§, . . . ; further, one sees
that in all this the combinations (Li Sf), (Li S§), ... are already
constituted. Now, what are the Sk, the appearances of the Objective
real psyche, as it were? They are, so goes the reply, themselves already
constituted unities, like the L,. The latter are constituted through
regulated series of schemata, motivated in a certain manner, and,
with that, related in a certain manner to circumstances, as we have
already described in certain respects. In the case of the Sk, we don’t
speak of such a schematization. Nevertheless, they are unities of the
constitutive manifestation. If /, as the experiencing pure Ego= If
apprehend an appearing physical thing, given in my orientational
space, as an animate organism (the L*, not the Objective L itself),
then for the constitution of a human being, M‘,** the lowest
apprehension level is this: that I interpret [eindeute] a flow of

*E” from the German ‘Leib’? — Transl.
**“S" from the German "'Seclen-"" — Transl.
*#*M{" from the German “Mensch” — Transl.

SUPPLEMENT | 97

consciousness into the human being that is as little something already
real as is the schema “something physically real.”’ This consciousness
is pure consciousness (or, able to be found as pure subsequently in the
transition from the full apprehension of psyche and of human being to
the Objectivating levels). This pure consciousness has, in the lower
level in question here, an originary connection with L*, the animate
organism of another that appears to me, a connection that requires a
separate description that will be given later. For the present, let us say
that the animate organism of another that appears to me is, as
animate organism, of a peculiar character: as carrier of sensory
perceptions, of sensory feelings and drives, as carrier for all the
“‘materials” that are further interwoven with act-characters as noetic
forms and the like, so that an entire flow of consciousness is produced,
also including in itself acts of the specific form of the cogito and a pure
Ego. Therefore, the L‘ the animate organism of K that appears to me,
that enters into this combination, is constituted as a real thing of its
level and as something real in the appearing space R,* of my
experiencing Ego I,, of my world W,.** This animate thing has its
relation to real circumstances U,*** and is therefore a member of the
world W,, my world of appearances. Now, in the experience of this
same Ego, the alien consciousness (the B‘)**** that appears con-
nected with the Lf is to be found in precisely this way in a regulated
dependence of circumstances within the world W, and undergoes
accordingly a realizing apprehension as S‘. Therefore, with relation
to the dependence in which the empathied alien consciousness is
experienceable and is apprehended in this experienceability partly by
the appearing animate organism, partly by the remaining surround-
ing world, something psychically real united with the appearing
animate organism appears to me, and it is related to the total
empathied and to-be-empathied consciousness, which now has the
character of the psychic ‘“‘state”’ (total state) or of a psychic “‘be-
haviour,” in which the psyche manifests itself.

With that, however, we do not yet have the Objectivity of the
psyche and the Objectivity of the real connection psyche and animate
organism, i.e., full human being; rather, it is the — for my experiencing
pure Ego I, — primary intuitive experiential unity: ‘‘alien human
being for me,” mere ‘“‘appearance,”’ S° (an of course easily misunder-

**“R* from the German “Raum” — Transl.
*e°W" from the German ‘Welt — Transl.
#¢¢°U" from the German ‘‘Umstande” — Transl.

¢e¢0B" from the German “Bewusstsein” — Transl.

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98 SUPPLEMENT I

stood expression); any other Ego I“ as a purely experiencing one has an
S* of “‘the same” S. But what else does this say than thay by virtue of a
possible mutual understanding this identification is possible, that only
with it is constituted the Objective psyche (Objectively united with the
Objective animate organism) and therewith the Objective human
being (that is, no longer L¥, and L*, SE, and also not L* S‘, but rather
L* S* and MK without a lower index). We understand with this the
phenomenological construction of the apperception of the psyche and
the human being according to noesis and noema, to the extent that
constitution is in general in question. The psyche does not appear in
the sense that it adumbrates itself; but the psyche becomes objective
in every pure consciousness (or for every pure Ego) in a bare
(noematic) “‘objectivational” appearance. Apprehended as Objective
being it 1s the unity that legitimates itself in the mutual understanding
and that manifests itself in all these objectivations of the psyche (and
every Ego that has experience of the same psyche possesses such an
objectivation: the S,). In the sense of this apperception lies this sort of
legitimation (i.e., of the legitimizing experience), and to demand
that the psyche itself were given — and given adequately — or that it
were given in the same manner as a lived-process or stream of lived-
processes, is counter-sensical. Does everyone, therefore, have a more
direct experience of his own psyche than of that of another? Every
pure Ego has immediate — and that means here: not based on
empathy — experience of his consciousness, his pure consciousness.
But disregarding the fact that the apperception of one’s own animate
organism is in many respects more incomplete than of the alien
animate organism (however much advantage it may have because of
the original grasping of organismal sensations) and the fact that it is
the presupposition for grasping alien animate organisms (and dis-
regarding likewise how the grasping of one’s own psyche in the
subjective level would remain quite rudimentary without the grasp-
ing of the alien one), I say disregarding all that, it is all the more clear
that the Objectivity of one’s own psyche presupposes mutual under-
standing. One’s own psyche, as it is supposed to have Objective
factual existence in the Objective world. is the constituted unity of a
manifold of “appearances,” of “‘objectivation,”’ which, to be sure, are
already “‘realities” from the standpoint of the individual Ego, but not
Objective realities, not ‘‘substances.”” They are mere “‘appearances,”
or whatever one wants to name them.

SUPPLEMENT I 99

§2. REALIZING APPREHENSION OF THE PURE EGO.

Let us go one step further. Let us consider the pure Ego; not as
experiencing, but rather as being understood to be in the appearing
and Objectivated animate organism in the interpretation [Eindeutung].
It is subject of the empathied cogitations, subject of the surrounding
world facing it in consciousness through these cogitations, which is not
only the surrounding world of mere things but also the surrounding
world of values and the practical surrounding world. The pure Ego is
identical unity, but not unity presenting, manifesting itself in some sense
or other; rather, simply a cogitating unity, and how this is to be under-
stood can only, and can adequately, be derived from every cogito.
This Ego is therefore something totally different from all the unities
that we have come to know, including the psychic unity, although it,
by the way, can, like all of these unities, undergo an intersubjective
identification and QObjectivation. In the interpreting [eindeutend]
experience of an alien Ego we can, abstracting from everything that
goes beyond its pure consciousness, grasp the identical pure Ego in
the interpreted [eingedeutet] cogitations, and another can grasp pre-
cisely the same, he can come to an understanding with us; we can thus
in common ascertain a plurality of absolute monads and of appur-
tenant pure Egos. But this Objectivation too is of course not a
realization. The pure Egos acquire therewith nothing, that is, they do
not thereby enter into new apprehensions that are constitutive for
new realities. On the other hand, we are not saying that pure Egos
Cannot accept new apprehensions and thereby transform themselves
as it were into real Egos in the sense of these apprehensions. At first, of
course, every cogito undergoes a realizing apprehension with the
whole stream of consciousness to whose stock it belongs, to the extent
that this stream is apprehensible as dependent on the animate
organism and through it dependent on the really constituted and
posited material world. If I drink a cup of coffee in order to have good
theoretical inspirations, the theoretical acts of judgment, deduction,
etc. that occur afterward are there as conditioned by this organismal
influence. This holds in manifold ways for all cogitations, and, in
accordance with the sense of this apprehension, it is a matter for
empirical investigation to determine the extent and the particularity
of these dependencies; they are only branches of those dependencies
that belong to the total stock of the apprehension of the psyche as
“reality,” and especially as organismally dependent. What is said of
the organismal dependencies would no less have to be said of the

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100 SUPPLEMENT I

idiopsychic ones into which the Ego-acts, like all psychic lived-
processes, are interwoven. That, e.g., the performance of a proof
proceeds “‘more easily”’ with “‘repetition,” that a newly acquired
insight cancels out the corresponding earlier errors, or tends to
experience the recurring ones in the character of cancelling out, that
accordingly such acts are there as dependent on earlier ones — these
are known facts. But if we now look at the pure subject of the
cogitations and if we consider that it is an identical-unitary
something in their many-formed interchange, then we see that it must
necessarily undergo with them, precisely as their identical subject, a
corresponding realizing apprehension. The Ego which is thinking
there is no longer thinking this way one time and differently the next,
but rather is real Ego, which — belonging to this animate organism,
enlivening it and depending on it — comports itself with relation to
an interchange of real circumstances in an appropriate manner. The
pure Ego has now entered into an apprehenston, has undergone an
apprehension through which an “empirical’’ Ego is constituted, an Ego
that is now no longer to be derived from every cogito as that which it
is, and is no longer adequately given in the derivation, but rather, an
Ego that one must first get to know, and with the cognizance of which
one never comes to an end, because it is expertence which has to give us
this cognizance (experience of the type of apprehension that is
constitutive precisely for this Ego) and which, like all experience (as
related to the real), leads us into the endless possibilities of ever new
circumstances, among which the real shows what it 1s, in the manner
of its dependencies.

The pure Ego already receives an experiential relation when it is
apprehended as that of an experienced human being; as when I (1,)
posit the human being M<é as understanding, interpret [eindeute] into
him a psyche S, and with it a pure Ego I*. But over against this extra-
essential experiential relation of the Ego stands the experiential
apprehension that realizes the Ik, apprehends it itself as dependent on
real circumstances. As every realization that at first has constituted
something real for my world of surroundings is accessible to an
Objectivation through entrance into the intersubjective nexus, so also
is the realization of the psychic Ego. It becomes the Objective real
Ego in the intersubjective exchange of experience. In accordance
with this everyone will then also be able to apprehend himself.

I grasp myself no longer as pure Ego of my pure cogitations, but
rather I grasp myself as an Objective human being in the Objective
world, with an Objective psyche, thus also as Objective real Ego having
the known character (at least I think I know it). For this Ego,

SUPPLEMENT I 101

experience has to legitimate how things stand with regard to its
dispositions, character traits, etc.; every Ego apprehends itself in a
more or less determinate and complete manner as subject of such real
properties. /, as pure Ego (namely, in a cogito and nexus of cogitations)
apprehend myself empirically, namely, I regard myself as existing in the
world and as dependent, caused therein; just as I do every one else.

We just said: in the Objective world. For, through the realizing
apperception that the pure Ego experiences, it indeed receives (as
psyche and real psyche-subject) Objective spattalzty and temporality. To
speak of such things in the case of the pure Ego in itself would make
no sense. The empirical Ego, however, is from the outset constituted
as a member of an Objective world. It belongs in the latter through its
(Ego’s) founding in the animate organism. For, with the constitution
of the material world, Objective space and Objective time are
constituted (and that is the original constitution of this Objectivity).
Accordingly, the animate organism, too, is in the Objective spa-
tiotemporal being as matter. The kind of Objectivation of sensations
in the form of “localization” then, with the realization of the
‘‘animate organism of the senses’”” — the animate organism endowed
with sensibilities — also yields the firm integration of the sensations
into the space- and time-world. This happens according to the
principle: that which is localized is Objectively simultaneous with the
extensiveness that offers the locality. Through interweaving of sen-
sations and the specifically psychic, this and the psychic-real then also
acquires its Objective integration. Jmmanent time then becomes a
manifesting of Objective time, the immanent “‘simultaneous”’ becomes a
manifesting of the Objective “simultaneous.” Thus the world of the
realities becomes a single world, encompassed at first by the Objective
time-form as reality-form in general. It is impossible to see how
Objective temporality of the psychic could legitimate itself otherwise
than by relation to the animate organism. Every psychic process has, of
course, its immanent time and, in its manner, likewise the psychic Ego.
There is, naturally, also in the immanent consciousness a consciousness
of the “simultaneous” and the ‘“‘one after another.’? But Objective
temporality is intersubjectively graspable and determinable, and
there it is apriori clear that such (temporality) can only be grasped
and determined — with regard to the psychic as with regard to
everything — through the only possible medium of mutual under-
standing, through animate organicity. Only by the fact that I take the
animate organism as a Now and take what is interpreted [das
Eingedeutete] into it as simultaneous with the animate organism, do I
also grasp the simultaneity and the temporal order of alien conscious-

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102 SUPPLEMENT I

ness with my own, and likewise conversely. Every time-determination
performable in physical nature, which time-determination leads back
to intersubjectively graspable periodic processes and _ space-
measurements intersubjectively relatable thereto, can also serve to
determine something psychic according to its time, precisely on the
basis of the relations mentioned.

§3. FIrsT INDICATION OF THE NECESSARY DISTINCTION OF
NATURAL-SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL-SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE.!

The essential possibility of the apprehension of the pure Ego as
empirical, of which possibility we speak, may also become clear in an
analogous example. A tone, considered purely in itself, has in its
duration, the temporal continuity of its phases, a unity; it is the
identical tone, unchanged in its quality, say, but variable in its
intensity and tone-coloring. But now I apprehend it as a tone coming
JSrom the violin, changing when the violin is stroked harder, becoming
weaker when it is stroked more lightly, changing according to
whether the violin is closer or farther away, according to whether the
mute is placed on it or taken off, etc. Now the tone-unity is
apprehended in dependence on “real’’ circumstances and is itself
something real, a real tone (according to our concept of reality) that
has its real properties manifesting themselves in its changing “‘states.”’
What is identical about the tone in and of itself becomes, through
relation to the circumstances, the dependent something identical and
is realized. Likewise with the schema and the schematic manifold and
analogously also with the pure Ego. But of course the essential
difference in this springs forth. The pure Ego is a unity in a totally
different sense than the unity of a continuity of phases that can be in
these phases now changed, now unchanged. Even the continuously
temporal unity of a cogito is of a totally different character, for here
there is nothing identical that could be there changed or unchanged,
as identical in the cogito as phenomenon. Moreover the unity of the
pure Ego of the cogito is a temporal existent in a totally different
manner than the cogito. Properly speaking, the pure Ego does not extend
ttself and does not last; it is the indivisible and non-extendable One for
the cogito and identical in every other cogito. But as identical
subject of all these acts it undergoes realization as does the tone-unity

"The beginning of this § is included in the second Section of /deen I/ as §34 (p. 139, lines 22ff)
and is here omitted.

SUPPLEMENT I 103

and enters in its manner into what is realized. Thus the pure Ego also
enters into the realized consciousness as psyche and assumes the
empirically real character of the psychic state.

According to all of this we therefore distinguish the real psyche from the
real psychic subject. The animate organism is carrier of the psychic life as
the stream of real psychic states, and in this stream there now prevails,
with constant relating to real circumstances (which experience
always has to produce) the real Ego-subject as a real unity lying in the
psychic ground, as its own standing out from it, but not independent.
While the psyche cannot be lacking as substratum, the psyche can
lack the real subject; the psyche is then a psyche of lower level, a
subjectless psyche. Subjectless to the extent that to it there belongs no
real psychic Ego-subject. In the Objective world there is no relation
to causal circumstances which could awaken the psyche out of its
stupor and turn on for it the light of an “I think.” The human being,
however, has a psychic subject, although he may have periods where the
real circumstances have no states of the sort “I think’ as real
consequence. Then the real Ego sleeps, i.e. precisely: in the world
there are real —but unrealized possibilities for ‘‘awaking.’’ With
relation to this, the human being, although he does not at the
moment carry out any “I think,”’ is apprehended as disposed to an “‘I
think’’; and to the extent that empirical grounds present themselves for
the apprehension of relating the course of the possible acts to
circumstances in such a way that a higher unity, an Egoical
individuality, is manifested in it, he has the character even when he is
sleeping.

The psychic subject, although abstractively distinguishable from
the psyche as its fundament, fuses with it into one in the usual mental
apprehension. (As already emerges from what was just said: when we
speak of the mental Ego of the human being in constast to the
animate organism, we separate off the whole of the Ego in and with its
psychic ground; if we take the animate organism with it, then we have
the whole human being: I, the human being to whom my human
animate organism belongs.)

84. THE CONNECTION OF PSYCHE AND ANIMATE ORGANISM.

If we consider animate organism and psyche in their real relationship
to one another, and if we put ourselves on the ground of nature, fitting
material things as well as animate organisms, and with them the
psyches, into nature, then animate organism and psyche show

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104 SUPPLEMENT I

themselves to be connected. But the connection is an accidental one
only from one side. The psychic reality is founded in the organismal
matter, but this is not conversely founded in the psyche. More
generally we can say: the material world is, within the total Objective
world that we call nature, a closed world of its own needing no help
from other realities. On the other hand, the existence of mental
realities, of a real mental world, is bound to the existence of a nature
in the first sense, namely that of material nature, and this not for
accidental but for fundamental reasons. While the res extensa, if we
inquire of its essence, contains nothing of mentalness and nothing that
would demand beyond itself a connection with real mentalness, we
find conversely that real mentalness essentially can be only in
connection to materiality as real mind of an animate organism. In all
this the term ‘‘animate organism”’ means not merely a material thing
in general, which — in whatever way — stands in a complex of
functional dependence with a second reality called psyche, or even
only with phenomena of consciousness of a stream of consciousness.
Let us imagine a consciousness (whether something psychically real
belongs to it or not), my consciousness, say, which would stand in
relation to a locomotive, so that if the locomotive were fed water this
consciousness would have the pleasant feeling that we call satiety; if
the locomotive were heated, it would have the feeling of warmth, etc.
Obviously, the locomotive would not, because of the make-up of such
relationships, become ‘“‘animate organism’’ for this consciousness. If,
instead of the thing that I at the time call my animate organism, the
locomotive stood in my consciousness as the field of my pure Ego,
then I could not call it animate organism also, for it simply would not
be an animate organism.

a) The animate organism as localization-feld of the sensations.

If we ask why, we become aware that an “‘aminate organism” as such is
distinguished in a definite manner, not only in general by the fact that
certain sorts of real effects that it undergoes in material nature bring
with them consequences of consciousness in my consciousness, but
also the fact that a considerable part of the large content-class
belonging to the sphere of consciousness under the title ‘‘matertal of
consctousness’’ 1s sO intimately at one with the material animate
organism that in the intuitive givenness not merely connection but
precisely unity is shown. What we call animate organism is therefore
already more than material thing; it already has a stratum belonging

SUPPLEMENT | 105

to the “psychic’’ that is not related by us to it merely in relating
consideration, but rather is there from the outset — intuitively,
therefore — as an apperceptive stratum belonging to the whole of the
animate organism itself. We must therefore first abstract from it in
order to obtain the merely material animate organism. The animate
organism is, we say, often the carrier of sensations and is always
‘‘stimulable”’ anew. It carrzes sensations, manifold sensations, like
touch sensations, kinaesthetic sensations; temperature-, smell-, taste-
sensations are ‘localized’ on it and in it; they form an existential
stratum lying on it and in it. All other sensations that are not localized in
this manner obtain apprehensions mediately and not accidentally, by
virtue of which apprehensions they acquire a relationship to the
animate organism and to its various “‘sense organs,” which further
presuppose localized sensations and therefore, all in all, likewise
““belong’’ to the animate organism in an essentially different manner than
do those dependent sensations of the above example of the loco-
motive. In general, the distinction that the animate organism as
localization-field of certain sensation groups has is the presupposition for
further distinctions that we will discuss in more detail below.

At first the particularity of localization must be described in more
detail, since it is of such importance. A certain group of “‘sensattons”’
(under which heading we can include all contents of consciousness
that, speaking from the standpoint of the pure consciousness, have
ownness and function of “‘materials’’) are therefore given in the
immediate experiential intuition as lying in or lying on the experienc-
ing animate organism, spread out over it, existing in it, in short, as
localized. One occasionally uses in reference to them the expression
“‘organismal sensations,” an unsuitable expression for the reason that all
sensations in general are experienced in a certain manner as related to
the animate organism, and therefore could be called organismal
sensations. We shall speak of “‘feelings,” in order to distinguish the
groups of sensations that have that aforementioned “‘localization”’ on
or in the animate organism. To them is due the fact that animate
organism is so essentially different in the simple experiential intuition
(therefore already prior to the level of the last Objectivation in which
the world of things and the animate organism are constituted as
member of Objective “‘nature”) from a merely material thing.
Indeed, if we disconnect everything that empirical knowledge and
scientific theorizing could bring in here, and also on the other hand
what we could owe to the intersubjective relationship of our empirical
intuition, then the animate organism confronts us already as a sensing
physical thing covered or filled with feelings. On the one hand, it is

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106 SUPPLEMENT I

physical thing . . .? Such occurrences (the feelings) are lacking in the
merely material things. Where an animate organism’s member comes
into physical contact with another one, the feelings are doubled. The
cold, smooth fingertip touches the warm, somewhat rough back of the
hand. I experience this and experience moreover the flow of the cold-
and smoothness-sensations as feelings of the back of the hand, and the
flow of the warmth- and roughness-sensations as feelings of the finger.
Obviously the correspondingly named material occurrences and
feelings are everywhere essentially different. The constant smoothness
of the finger is not the flow of the smoothness-sensation of the hand
surface touched by the finger, etc.

That not all sensations can possess this peculiarity of feelings,
animate organism localization, and in general assume it — this is
clear. Sensations of color and sound (phenomenologically so closely
related to the feelings) lack this localization. To the seen thing-color
there does not correspond a color-feeling as a feeling corresponds to
the felt roughness of a physical thing; ‘seeing with the eye’ is
essentially different from “‘feeling with the finger,” inasmuch as the
eye is not a localization field of the visual sensations as the finger is for
the sensations of touch. It (eye) is, to be sure, also a localization-field,
but only for contact-sensations ...%... the feelings do not disappear.
Only the real, on which, localized, they are intuited, disappears from
existence. Of course they have this in common with color sensations
and other sensations that are not given as localized, but it helps to say
that where localization is given it is nothing so little as it is extension.

b) The animate organism as organ of volition.

Up to now we have taken the examples from a closed group of
feelings. They belong completely to the large class of sensations in a
certain pregnant sense, characterized by the fact that they play the
role of constituting ‘‘materials”’ in the phenomenological constitution
of the material world of physical things. That the other sorts of
materials of consciousness are also represented by feelings shall be
discussed later. For now we will limit ourselves to the designated class
and study the significance of these feelings. We offer a preliminary
discussion of a distinction of the kinaesthetic sensations that belongs to
the mode of their flowing. Let us proceed from intuition. The animate

* The text that followed here is used in the second Section of /deen I] (p. 145, line 27-p. 146,
line 15), and is therefore omitted here.

?The text that followed here is used in the second Section of /deen I/ (p. 148, line 23-p. 150,
line 19), and is therefore omitted here.

SUPPLEMENT I 107

organism is not only sensing animate organism but also organ of
motion. In it the psyche, or the psychic subject, senses; in it the
subject moves and executes performances in the material world by
such self-movement (I move — I move something). We have,
therefore, to distinguish between mechanical movement, movement
of the material-thing: animate organism, as material doing; and
spontaneous movement, psychic doing, the action of the organismal
subject. Here emerge certain peculiarities of kinaesthetic sensations, if
we attend purely to them: they can have a double character in their
continuous flows. Either the flow is “‘spontaneous,”’ is “‘free’’ flow, or
it is characterized as “‘something done to”’ instead of “something
done,”’ as a passive flow in which spontaneity has no share.‘

In this way the animate organism is organ of voluntary movements,
and it is this in as many ways as there are series of kinaesthetic
sensations and member-movements that appear belonging to them.
This establishes extensions in an obvious manner. The subject now
becomes simultaneously active in the material extra-organismal
world, namely by means of the free movements of its organismal
members: I push a physical thing away, lift a weight with my hand,
and the like. Only animate organisms have a stratum of localized
feelings and among these kinaesthetic ones. They are the only objects
immediately movable by a freely willing subject. Mere material
things are only mechanically movable and furthermore only me-
diately spontaneously movable by means of an animate organism. We
see here that in the whole of the apprehension of animate organism
the spontaneity of kinaesthetic flows plays an essential role to the
extent that only through them can the animate organism appear as
moving by means of my freedom ... 5

S) The constitutive role of the movement-sensations in comparison with other
sensations and the relation between the constitution of animate organism and of
physical thing.

In order to understand the constitution of the givenness of the
animate organism in its essential interconnection with the givenness
of the material thing, we must penetrate still deeper. The beginnings
of the elucidation that we have given for the constitution of the
animate organism were concerned with the organismal stratum of

“Thc text that followed is used in the second Section of /deen II (p. 159, line 33— p. 160, line 9),
and is therefore omitted here.

$The text that followed is used in Ideen I/ as: ‘‘c) The Animate Organism As Organ of

Perception And As Center of Orientation,” in the first Section, p. 56, line 8—p. 57, line 6. In the
second Section §§39-4| correspond to d) and ¢) of this text. We continue with f).

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108 SUPPLEMENT I

those distinctive feelings which, like the touch-sensations, can be
brought (in their own different content levels) to “coincidence” with
the extended-appearing system of the places of sensing surfaces, and
this bringing-to-coincidence in the apprehension means the possi-
bility lying in their essence of integrating them into possible series of
perceptions in which an object moves over the skin surface, touching
as a Stimulator, or also in which the object rests relative to the hand,
but the skin surface of the hand, feeling over it (the object), moves in a
free act of movement. These free acts are not extra-essential; they play
an absolutely necessary role; only by means of them can the
constitution of physical-thing objects be carried out at all. We have in
our case of the animate organism already presupposed that it is there
as a physical thing; but it is a physical thing for us in experience only
through possible free touching it all over, seeing it all over, and the
like, which, for its part, is apprehended as organismal employment, in
which the apprehension of the animate organism as physical thing
points back again to possible organismal movements, so that we are
threatened with an embarrassing situation. (Difficulties also arise in
trying to understand the preference of the touch-sensations in their
double function as constituting physical things and organismally
localized — i.e., in preference to the sensations that are only
constitutive of physical things but are not localized.) All these must of
course have constituted functions, and these functions must be
capable of being understood. Here I can only give a few indications
and proceed from the particular distinction that is peculiar to the
kinaesthetic sensation-flows and which, as we shall see later, prede-
stines them to a quite exceptional role for constitution of physical
things. The kinaesthetic flows come forth in consciousness in a double
character: either the flow is a “spontaneous,” a “‘free’’ flow, or it is
characterized as “done to” instead of “‘done,’’ as passive flow in
which spontaneity has no part. In the apprehension of animate
organism the differentiation of the passive movements, the merely
mechanical movements of the animate organism as physical thing,
and the free organismal movements that are characterized in the
mode of the “I execute a movement of the hand,” “‘I lift the foot,”
etc., this differentiation is conditioned by this double character. If in
this objective apprehension the object: animate organism, and the
objective organismal movement has the character of activity and
passivity, then it is of course abstractively graspable that it already
belongs primarily to the kinaesthetic series in regard to the manner of
their flows. Let us for the present use nothing more than this
peculiarity, and let us make no further use of the apprehension of

SUPPLEMENT I 109

animate organism into which what is kinaesthetic enters, no further
use of the vague localization that it undergoes in the parts of the
animate organism and no further use of the animate organism at all;
let us attend, rather, to the remarkable functions that kinaesthetic
flows have, by virtue of their spontaneity, for all constituting of
extensive physicalness. In general we can assert the following (as a
thorough phenomenological analysis would absolutely confirm,
which analysis will be presented in another context): in all constitut-
ing of spatial physicalness two kinds of sensations with completely
different constitutive functions are involved .. .°

It is further to be noted that the question here is not whether the
kinaesthetic sensations themselves undergo objectifying apprehen-
sion, whether they can undergo or have undergone expressly localiz-
ing integrating into the animate organism. Certainly my eye moves,
my feeling hand moves, when I perceptually bring the object ‘“‘table”
to givenness; but the eye movement, devoted to experiencing the
table, does not come into action as such, i.e., as experienced in this
apprehension. We can attend to the eye movement and apperceive it
as such. But with that we bring in an experiential apprehension whose
legitimation itself would have to take place by means of organismal
movements, e.g., those of the hand touching the eye, etc. Originally
constitutive are only the free flows of the kinaesthetic sensations in
their motivational relation to the series of motivated table apprehen-
sions with the orderings of materials implicit therein, with which
orderings color, roughness and the like are presented; and if talk of
motivation here also implies such a thing as “‘apprehension”’ for the
kinaesthetic sensations, which is doubtless the case, then it is a totally
different apprehension from that on the side of the results of
motivation in which the physical-thing object “appears” by means of
this attitude.

If we now compare tactile sensations and visual sensations with
regard to their significance for the constitution of animate organism,
we notice that they belong to quite different constitutive orderings
and do not play the same role at all.’ This is seen in the fact that a
subject with eyes only (an idea that is to be made evident) could not
have any appearing animate organism, but a merely tactually
endowed subject could, understood only under conditions that are
fulfilled in the case of us humans. The former would have its physical-

*The text that followed is used in the first Section of deen I] (p. 57, line 10—p. 58, line 29) and
was therefore omitted here.

7The following sentences appear almost word for word in the second Section of /deen II, p.
150, lines 25-36.

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thing appearances in the play of kinaesthetic motivations (which it
therefore could not apprehend organismally); it would see real
physical things (of course only things pertaining to the senses that
would be inaccessible to an_ intersubjectively performable
Objectivation owing to the lack of organismal experiences). It will
not be said that the one only seeing sees his animate organism, for this
seen animate organism would lack the specific distinguishing charac-
teristic vis-a-vis any other physical thing, and even the free movement
of this “animate organism,’ movement going hand in hand with the
freedom of the kinaesthetic flows, would not make it an animate
organism and would not bring about any localization. For, it would
then only be as if the Ego, at one with this freedom in the kinaesthetic
realm, could immediately freely move any other physical thing at all.
What ts lacking is the possibility of localizing the visual contents on
the visual animate organism, the possibility of seeing the eye as feeling
the physical thing seen by the eye, so to speak, and correlatively, the
possibility of being able to see the physical thing seen as going across
the resting eye, “touching”’ it continuously (visually touching!) in the
familiar manner in which we can go over an object with an actually
touching organ, e.g., the hand surface, and can go over the hand
surface with the object. Thus touching offers something two-fold: it
feels the object, and the series of touch-sensations in their motivation-
relation to the kinaesthetic sensations can undergo apprehensions as
roughness or smoothness of the object in a spatial extension. On the
other hand, the feeling hand appears, actually present, e.g., in the
seeing of the hand or in the feeling of the one hand by the other, in all
of which the same touch-sensations are fitted into a new apperception.
If the perception of the hand is not an actually occurring one, then it
is simply an obscure one, i.e., one such that, if we inquire of it
according to the possibilities in it of conversion into legitimating
actually occurring experiences, it leads us into such series of
perceptions.

In general we are convinced that primary localization belongs only
to the touch-sensations and the sensations going parallel with them,
the temperature-sensations that follow the stimulated organismal
surfaces-with their extension, the taste-sensations, and (very imper-
fectly) the smell-sensations. They function simultaneously as con-
stituting physical things and as constituting animate organisms, and
in the latter regard as constituting animate organism as physical thing
and animate organism as field of localization, as carrier of feelings. In

®The preceding sentences are included almost word for word in the second Section of deen /1,
p. 148, lines 1-8.

SUPPLEMENT I 111

the constituting of physical things all other sensations are involved
through interconnection of the apprehensions; to the constitution of
animate organisms they cannot contribute primarily. Only the
kinaesthetic sensations — without detriment to the circumstance that
they function everywhere as motivating and precisely for this reason
do not function in what results from motivation — can simul-
taneously assume a secondary function of localization along with the
motivating function. This happens through continuous interweaving
with primarily localized sensations, in particular touch-sensations.
But since no parallelism of exactly differentiated levels prevails here
like that between temperature-sensations and touch-sensations, the
kinaesthetic sensations do not spread out in different levels through
the appearing extension. They undergo only a rather indeterminate
localization. The latter is however not for this reason insignificant; it
makes the unity between animate organism and freely movable thing
more intimate.®

But now, in further sequence, all of the sensations that are
constitutive for the constitution of spatially physical characteristics in
the mode of adumbration, which sensations are incapable of locali-
zation (even if it be only a secondary one), acquire a definite
relationship to the animate organism. The optical sensations, e.g.,
relation to the eye in the head, which is constituted as movable
member of the animate organism through touching. The eye “di-
rects’’ itself in seeing (in the free act of eye movement) toward what is
seen and accommodatingly adjusts itself to it. In all perceiving, in all
experiencing, the animate organism is there with its sense organs, and
all experienced things have in the experiencing a relation to the
organismal: already with the relation to the most fundamental strata
of experience, of which we have given a few descriptive indications,
which are joined by others that are on the whole less difficult because
they already presuppose constitution of physical thing and animate
organism. In particular we shall not discuss here in any more detail
the important distinctive feature the animate organism has of
containing within itself the orientation-center and this in connection
with the circumstance that it is what continually appears and is as
localization-field of all sensation-materials the distinguished Object,
that it is there in everything in this particular way. Interwoven with
the psychic subject as it is, it is the subjective Object to which all other
Objects are “vis-a-vis,” or surrounding Objects. Further, the animate
organism is “‘there too” not only with regard to all experiences of

®*The preceding sentences are included in the second Section of /deen //, p. 151, lines 7-16.

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physical-thing actuality but also with regard to the at first intuitively
grasped whole world of value and volition. By virtue of the interweav-
ings of all sensuous feelings and drive-sensations the former have an
organismal localization, as we have already said above; and if now,
with the help of such sensibilities, new kinds of Objectivenesses are
constituted, if the appearing Objects of nature receive a new stratum
of intuitively given value-predicates or of practical predicates (e.g., as
Objects that are there immediately as art works, Objects for use),
then these are also related to organicity with regard to the new
stratum of being that distinguishes them. Now added to this there is
still the distinctive place that the animate organism has as center of all
acts, indeed of all immediately intuitive action of the subject; in all
operating in the world it is what is immediately freely active and the
center of all “operating” in the original sense in relation to other
Objects of the world.

But if we still limit ourselves to the mere data of theoretical
experience, if we exclude all values and all practical Objectivenesses,
then it is an important result of our consideration that “‘nature’’ and
animate organism, and, in its interconnection with the latter, the psyche,
are constituted in mutual relationship to one another, at one with one
another.

§5. SoLipsisTIC AND INTERSUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE.

Our studies of the relations of material thing and animate organism
and their constitution in experience were confined to the framework
of the lower level of experience that to a certain degree is designated
as experience for an individual experiencing subject. Only to a certain
degree, for as soon as we speak of an individual subject, ourself, say, as
an individual human being with an individual animate organism and
an individual psyche, we have already apprehended ourself
Objectively, as individual vis-a-vis an actual and possible plurality
and, along with this, as an Object that is experienceable by many and
is in the experience of many an identical Object. In this Objectivity
we grasp everything that is experienced: physical things, animate
organisms, psyches or psychic subjects, humans and brutes; every-
thing finds its place in an Objective spatiotemporal world. The
components that relate to this Objectivity therefore lie hidden in all
natural experience; we have abstracted from them, and moreover
they can easily be abstracted; there then remains the whole content of
the actually occurring experience, insofar as the content is purely and

SUPPLEMENT I 113

simply intuitive experience, purely and simply intuitive perception,
pure and simple actually occurring perception-context in which what
is perceived legitimates itself in pure self-present givenness. The
components that go beyond this point to possible ‘“‘interpretation”’ of
certain physical things as animate organisms and as animate or-
ganisms to which a pure Ego, but not the inwardly seen one, rather,
only a presentiated Ego, belongs, with an “other”? stream of
consciousness as the immanently seen stream to which also belong
perceptions and in general experiences of precisely the same physical
things that we ourselves experience. And thus, all of a sudden, the
new manifold is there in which the Objectivity of nature can be
constituted; the external experiential contexts that belong to the
actually-occurring seeable pure Ego constitute real unities, and “‘the
same” unities are also constituted “‘correspondingly” in the experien-
tial contexts of other pure Egos only posited interpretatively, and they
are constituted there possibly with determinations, with real pre-
dicates that cannot belong to them as intersubjectively identical, in
which predicates the truly existent only manifests itself as in-
tersubjectively valid, or merely presents itself to a certain extent to the
various subjects. One can think of the formation of levels of the
constitution with the image of a genesis, by imagining experience to
be carried out actually only in the data of the lowest level alone; then
that which is new in the next level comes forth, and with it new
unities are constituted, etc. But this is a genesis of the same sort as 1s
carried out in mathematics. It would be most wrong-headed here to
think of psychological genesis and of an explanation of the ideas of
world and Ego in the human being of the world. We are not dealing
with that at all here. We are merely depicting what kinds of strata lie
in the essence of the real data themselves and, on the other hand, what
kind of strata there are in the apprehension of these data, in the
various levels of presentive acts, in which every stratum of the given is
documented as given, as unity of its manifolds of sensations, adum-
brations, presentations, etc. These are eidetic complexes when we
raise everything actually experienced or everything phantasized as
experienced to the level of the pure idea. We must always remain
mindful of this. Therefore, we can in certain measure imagine that
there is not performed at first any such thing as that interpretation,
that interpreting in [Eindeutung] (we abstract precisely from all
components of apprehension that could find their fulfillment through
interpretation [Eindeutung]), and then we bring it in ourselves. In
principle this level is already there as soon as only a second animate
organism understood as such, a second pure Ego and Ego-

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consciousness, is posited, and perhaps even a second real Ego, if, even
though only very limited, the Egoical-real can be constituted already
on the lower level. Inasmuch as the possibility exists in principle that
the circle of the intersubjectively associating subjects — exchanging
their experiences and thereby measuring, confirming, and refuting
them against one another — is again and again broadened and loses
members in the manner of a human society through “‘death,” while it
gains through “‘birth,”’ without the unity of intersubjective experience
thereby suffering (Tradition, Literature), inasmuch as this possibility
exists, the question is now: how, in view of this relativism of the
‘““Objectively existent,’’ that is to say, of what is constituted through
intersubjective relation, something Odbjectively true can be worked out;
how something like that is possible at all. It is clear that we can no
longer remain at the level of mere intuition, even if it is no longer
properly perception, at least no longer at the moment when the
intersubjective understanding produces discrepancies that cannot be
resolved by any subjective experience and broadening of experience.

The Objectivation is, with regard to all data of “‘subjective”’ or
“immediate” experience, the same level. It requires not merely
empathy but also mutual understanding and thinking that rests on
such understanding, which thinking unifies the intersubjective ex-
periences — or better, the experiences that vary from subject to
subject and that are nevertheless, by virtue of the mutual understand-
ing, graspable and grasped as experiences of the same thing — and
makes that which is identical understandable as that which presents
itself differently for the different subjects. Understandable for think-
ing, however, means explainable. And what does this explaining
accomplish?

We have everywhere, as a matter of experience, as a matter of at first
subjective and then intersubjective experience, a unity of manifolds.
Experiencing, however, is a seeing, an intuitive viewing on the basis
of details of the manifolds, a perceiving of a unity that is synthetically
perceived in the flow of such perceivings in the consciousness of the
‘one and the same.”” Thinking explicates. In experiencing, the unity is
there as unity of properties and manifoldly changing states, modes of
behaviour of the unity under circumstances. But if now the modes of
behaviour are given differently, as existing at first differently from
subject to subject, which is only reciprocally understandable if a circle
of concord (a normality of behaviour with relation to normal
organicity and normal circumstances) is given, then the Objective
property is posited as the identical something that belongs to the
unity, and belongs to it in relation to circumstances whose circle is to

SUPPLEMENT | 115

be conceived much more broadly: my organicity is only one among
others; organicity varies not only in the way in which mine varies
according to circumstances, but rather it is itself a diverse thing and
brings differences with it on which the modes of appearance depend.
Sense-qualities — this designates ‘‘appearing”’ properties related to
particular subjectivity, mine or that of a circle of normal humans.
There are, however, variants of subjectivity that reach beyond that
and thus are valid for sense-qualities only as unifications of the modes
of behaviour of the identical physical thing with relation to limited
circles of circumstances. The identical property is, however, the
identical something that pervades all circumstances as “‘property.”’
That is, a stratum of the physical-thing unity pervades manifold
presentations. Once it has been constituted, then the question is how
far the unity reaches, i.e., what kinds of states belong in this unity-
stratum under permanent circumstances. The simple experience sees
the unities under the circumstances, but the relations between unities
and circumstances (constant unities of the physical-thing properties
and unities of the circumstances in a condition of dependence) are not
dismembered, and in all this much remains open and unclear,
unanalyzed; the unity is seen under circumstances, but not de-
termined (the same physical thing is of course a quite “‘other’”’ one
under different circumstances; therefore simply to describe does not
determine; and the surroundings are infinitely many-formed; it is not
clear immediately what the physical thing depends on and by what it
is thus determined: the determination of the physical thing is
description and relation to the circumstances under which the
description is valid by virtue of dependency); on the other hand,
thinking tries to express Objectively valid truth, that is to say, truth
that is plainly and simply valid for the physical thing just as it is
expressed. Therefore there is need for the explication of the causal
relations. To perform this task, however, means to do physics and
mathematics for material things.

If thinking can be abundantly active already on the level of the
individual-Ego, it obviously acquires an incomparably higher impor-
tance at the level of social experience. Here there arise various large
problems. At the very bottom already the question of what in general
must be the condition for the possibility of an identical Objectivity for
several pure Egos and their life of consciousness. It is a matter here of
clarifying what many simply cannot understand: that in the sense of
such identical Objectivity there is required the possibility of legitimiz-
ing the identity, and that this legitimizing is in principle only
conceivable if either the two pure Egos deal with one another or if a

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third pure Ego deals with the two. If one further inquires as to the
conditions for the possibility of the intercourse, then one comes upon
the necessity as apriort that in the constituted world each of those in
intercourse must be an animate organism, characterized as own-
animate-organism and an animate organism characterized as the
alien one. At a higher level then come the higher transcendental
questions as to how the Objectivity must be constituted, with what
sense, what is left open as not yet determinate but determinable, with
what forms of being it is endowed — all these questions arise in order
to make possible such determinations as could make possible, in the
interchange of ever new Egos with changing subjective peculiarities,
the cognition of something true in itself, even if only in the form of
determinations that are always only relatively valid but could
nevertheless be valid in the continuing enlargement of intersubjective
experiences as an approach and substratum of the ultimately valid
truth that could as an idea continuously regulate the process of
investigation.

§6. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTION;
PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY.!?®

Such problems animate Kant’s critique of reason, although not in a
completely developed form; but they obviously presuppose a pheno-
menology and an insight into the constitution of the lower levels of
experience, a task that Kant did not grasp and of which, even where
he touched on it, he did not suspect the magnitude. Therefore he
lacks the correct formulation of the problem. The problem of
constitution in general in its levels, the necessity of carrying out, in all
levels, the systematic descriptions belonging thereto, of setting forth
the eidetic-complexes, of considering the various apriori possibilities
that are open possibilities in the framework of what is fixed, 1.e., of the
pure Ego and the pure consciousness with all its basic forms; and the
problem of then construing these in such a way that Justice is done to
the idea of an ‘‘Objective”’ cognition — all this is foreign to Kant,
how ever much his critique of reason tends in the direction of this
problematics and occasionally approaches very near to it. What
especially must not be overlooked is the constant reciprocal relation of
the constitution of Ego and animate organism on the one hand and of
real physicalness on the other; and at the higher level of humans and

'0See in regard to this the third chapter of Ideas III.

SUPPLEMENT I 117

human societies, of minds, mental commonalities with communal
cognitions, communal evaluations and willings on the one hand and
the objective world as nature and cultural world on the other. All
investigation must proceed here from the given of experience, insofar
as the investigation seeks to fully exhaust it Intuitively according to its
essential formations: Intuitively, i.e., making clear with the greatest
possible completeness what lies in the proper sense of the given of
experience. And from there it must reflectively go back to the
presentive consciousness and its modes of constituting such data as
unities of manifolds. The one lifts and intensifies the other. One thinks
one will soon achieve clarity and will have exhausted the given
according to its sense, and as soon as one investigates the modes of
givenness and tries to give himself an account of how the legitimizing
really looks, what paths it must take, and what intermediately plays
its role in all that, one notices again and again that one has
overlooked much in the Objective attitude, has pushed aside as being
apparently irrelevant much that is absolutely essential. So it happens
that for objectivities which, like nature and mind, are not constituted in
one level (as are the elementary thought-objects such as number,
size, and the like), but rather in manifold levels, an ontology has such
very great difficulties. For, in itself — and we will have more to say
about this — ontology ts not phenomenology.

The ontological mode of consideration is so to speak katastematic
[katastematisch]. It takes the unities in their identity, and for the sake of
their identity, as something fixed. The phenomenological-constitutive
consideration takes the unity in the flow, namely as unity of a
constitutive flow; it follows up the movements, the flows, in which such
unity and every component, side, real property of such unity is the
correlate of identity. This consideration is in certain measure kinetic
or ‘‘genetic’”’: a “genesis” that belongs to a totally different “‘transcen-
dental”’ world than does the natural and natural-scientific genesis.
Locke speaks once of a “history” of consciousness, and obviously he
meant such a genesis as he, the leader of Empiricism, soon enough
confused with the psychological genesis and therewith falsified
through and through. Every unity of cognition, in particular every
real one, has its “history” or also, correlatively speaking, the
consciousness of this real thing has its “history,” its immanent
teleology in the form of a regulated system of essentially appurtenant
modes of manifestation and documentation that can be gotten out of
it, or interrogated out of it. And what the thing [Sache] itself is
— that becomes evident on all sides of its essence only in its history,
which brings the unities and their moments to prominence by setting

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the constitutive manifolds in motion. In the method of phenome-
nological kinesis both things are separated at once: the essential
direction of intentionality and its intentional correlates and the
essential determinations of the identical existence of which there is
consciousness as something identical in the intentional lived-processes
and that makes itself objective as something identical through the
regulations of its correlates.

Now as for ontology, it is quite conceivable that someone can
actually execute such a perfect insight that he, e.g., is able to analyze
the essence of mind or of nature purely and completely, is able to fix
the axiomatic principles that belong to it. But de facto: what we
succeed in so well in mathematics does not turn out successfully for us
in the same way in the real ontologies. Here only phenomenology
educates us to complete seeing, and although what it strives for is not
eidetic doctrine of realities but rather of the constitution of realities
and on the other hand of the pure Ego and Ego-consciousness in
general, nevertheless, the full eidetic grasp of the real itself, and with
it the grounding of ontology according to categorial concepts and
principles, will come about only in communion with it.

SUPPLEMENT II, to p. 9

PERSONAL EGO AND ANIMATE ORGANISM

As soon as we touch upon the Ego, it governs our apprehensions.
It is, of course, not only alive as pure subject of the manifold
experiencing, thinking, evaluating, practical position-takings but also
preferred Object of our position-takings and as this it is personal Ego,
which in its doing and suffering exercises “‘self-preservation,”’ which
has personal properties, rudiments of character, and manifold dispo-
sitions with which it is exposed to praise and blame — not least of all
to its own, with which it must protect itself tolerably and honestly
against the dangers of the world of physical things and the world of
human beings or acquire them for itself, use them as a tool, etc. Thus
can be understood the view that the animate organism with its organs
“‘reacts’’ to the external things, that as a consequence of this the Ego
has certain perceptions of the physical things and on the basis of these
perceptions takes a position toward them in this or that manner. On
the one hand stand the physical things, between them the animate
organism, which is also only a physical thing, but a physical thing to
which a psychic life (psyche and Ego are not separated) is related, first
of all perceptions and sensations (which, again, remain unseparated),
which the psyche, as it simply is in its causal relation to the animate
thing, characteristically localizes toward the animate organism in
certain sense fields, in others not. This needs more clarification.

<130)

130)

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SUPPLEMENT III, to p. 15

IDENTITY OF THE PHYSICAL THING AND
IDENTITY OF THE PSYCHE

The material thing may change however it will; to its essence belongs
(in the sense of the apprehension of matter) the fact that the circle of
the physical states can revert into itself. That which is materially real
must remain identical, and, to be sure, in such a way that in reversion
to the same circumstances it has the same states, even if de facto the
course of the world is such that this is infinitely improbable. The same
holds for the organismally real to the extent that the sensibility
presents itself in such a way that we can say that if the animate
organism is the same one with regard to its materiality and its
material states, then it would also, as animate organism, have to be
the same one, and in reversion to the identical sets of states of animate
organism the stratum of sensation would also have to be the same one.

Quite different with the psyche: to its essence belongs, under the
title of the formation of dispositions, one-sided mutability. In prin-
ciple it cannot revert to the same state.

SUPPLEMENT IV, to §7-9

TYPE — EMPIRICAL CLASSIFICATION

A pure grasping of types of phenomenologically concrete formations
is quite possible. If we take, e.g., the perceptual appearances of one
and the same human being, of one and the same house, or the like,
then within the continuity of such appearances belonging to the same
Object we will be able in very manifold ways to find single particular
appearances and series of appearances which have a typical simi-
larity. Now if we proceed to greater generality and take the type of
the Caucasian human being, the Negro, the Mongolian, and the like,
then there also corresponds to this empirical type, or to the purely
apprehended racial type, a universal typology with regard to the
manifolds of appearance. Likewise, if we proceed from a still more
general intuited type of a human being in general, an animal in
general, etc. And now we see that, just as in the manifold of pure
types of experienceable realities we have inexhaustible infinities, so
also, and all the more and in greater measure do we have in-
exhaustible types of perceptual appearances that cannot be fixed by
any conceptual system. We see that there could be no thought of a
systematic, exhaustive classification of types of perceptual ap-
pearances and therefore certainly not any thought of a systematic
classification of all types of possible cogitationes in general. One can
also point to the fact that all possible types of formations produced by
nature and by mind, considered in pure idea, also occur as correlate-
types for cogitationes and that the limitlessness in the correlate-sphere
extends to that of the cogitationes themselves.

What remains now for phenomenology? The answer, of course, is:
even if, e.g., with regard to the perceptual appearances, we not only
cannot determine their individual types as these definite concreta, but
also cannot determine all possible universal types, which we can
however distinguish intuitively should the occasion arise, then we
easily attain a height of universality which permits apprehending in
concepts that are exact and identifiable again and again according to

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their content. Thus, e.g., with regard to the type: perception of a
physical thing, “‘external” perception. Likewise intuition of a physical
thing in general, which does not have to be precisely perception, but
can also be retention, recollection, anticipating, awaiting intuition,
even mere phantasy.

The phenomenological interest does not and cannot aim at the
conceptual fixing of all possible typical particularizations that lie
under these fixed universalities. Neither can phenomenology govern
the typical particularities down to the undifferentiable concreteness,
as geometry, say, through its axioms and its basic concepts governs all
possible pure spatial formations. Here there emerges an essential
difference in the phenomenological ascertainments of essence over
against the geometric ones. It becomes clear if we attend to the fact
that the geometric species-formations are not type-differentiations.
The type is an intuitive unity, e.g., the type of that which 1s egg-
shaped, that which is serrated, the wavy line, etc. But even though
figure in general can be understood as a universal type that includes
all such types within itself, nevertheless, geometry provides no
systematics of these sensory and ideally stated types and no law for
such types; rather, it has its own proper sort of concept-formation and
its own proper genera of ideas: geometrical purity excludes what is
typical in the sensuously intuited data. The types, e.g., the type “‘egg-
shape,” are not geometric formations. When we call upon geometry
as a doctrine of essences in order to illustrate the scientific character of
phenomenology, this indeed has its legitimacy therefore, to the extent
that phenomenology is also eidetic doctrine; but we must not
put phenomenological and geometrical concept- and judgment-
formation on the same level.!!

What we can first of all fix, and must fix purely, in phenomenology
are the class-ideas of concrete cogitationes, which are distinguished
by sharp demarcations; and it is then a question of carrying out the
eidetic analyses which fix those ideas of real components and of
correlates which belong to these class-ideas. It then turns out with
regard to the real components that the abstract material, so to speak,
the material comprising non-self-sufficient components and formg]
character traits, out of which all cogitationes are constructed, goes
back to certain essential basic genera within which one will then have
to pursue Classification in species. Already included in this is the fact
that one will also have to look at the fundamental sorts of the complex
forms and will have to fix them by means of stable concepts. This all-

"See pp. 125 ff.

SUPPLEMENT IV 123

inclusive elementary analysis, the bringing out of the elements,
characters, forms — the really intrinsic ones and those belonging to
the correlate — that lie in very different dimensions, is an enormous
and extraordinarily difficult task. Since everything takes place in the
attitude of the reduction, every ascertainment properly implies an
eidetic law for possible singular particulars. This elementary analysis,
which proceeds from ideas of concreteness (such as perception,
judgment, feeling, will) then finds application in solving the problem
of an apriori typology of possible concretenesses. First of all, in any
case, the material comprising rigorously descriptive basic concepts is
acquired, by means of which all concretenesses must be apprehen-
sible, and, conversely, it is possible in free modification of the concrete
formations of consciousness which at first thrust themselves to the fore
to form ever new concrete formations (cogitationes) and to construe
concepts of type.

All these tasks are, as to the general type, the same in all spheres of
the imagination; everywhere that formations are presented to us in
direct intuition we can pursue description, analysis, and also eidetic
analysis, and classification. In this regard therefore it is the same with
the data of phenomenological intuition, the intuition of cogitationes,
and with the data of the so-called external intuition, that is to say, as
we have earlier discussed, with, e.g., the possible imaginative spatial
formations which are to be considered apriori, the imaginative data of
fulfilled spatial shapes, the possible concrete physical-thing data, etc.

A closer investigation shows that these data of external imagination
all belong in phenomenology in a certain manner, even though they
can be explored in a way that pays no heed, or virtually none, to act-
characteristics, to the specific side of consciousness. In phenome-
nology, occupied with the concrete cogitationes, we come upon
appearing things as such, appearing spatial shapes as such with
appearing colors, determinate properties of smell, touch, etc., under
the heading of correlate with regard to the acts of so-called sensuous
intuition. And going on from there one convinces oneself that all
ascertainments of essence, with regard to the appearing data of the
external imagination, enter into essential interconnection with
ascertainments of essence concerning certain genera of cogitationes
and finally take their place in a universal eidetic doctrine of the
cogitationes. From this point of view, namely when one has this
taking of place in view, the talk about the phenomenology of the
possible physical-thing formations, including the possible spatial and
temporal shapes of the physical sphere, and also of the possible
sensuous phantoms, etc., is justified. But of course it must be said at

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the same time that under such a point of view ultimately everything
apriori takes its place in the unity of phenomenology.

The specifically phenomenological consists in the eidetic de-
liberation which puts us into the intentional all-encompassing con-
sciousness, which, that is to say, puts everything that eidetic de-
liberation yields in a relation to the eidetic essence of the conscious-
ness in which all being is — as I am accustomed to express it —
‘‘constituted.””

If we have turned ourselves without reflection to the numbers and
number-relations given in the mathematical Intuition, explored in
mathematical thinking, if we carry out the Intuitions and acts of
thinking concerned, then we are doing mathematics and we know
nothing of phenomenology. But if we take what has been in-
tellectually seen, what has been immediately or mediately grounded
as correlate, if we put it in relation to the intellectually seeing,
grounding, demonstrating, and construing process of thinking, and if
we explore the essential interconnections between number and
counting, collection and collecting, between mathematical theorem
and mathematical judging, between mathematical proof and acts of
proving, etc., then we are doing phenomenology, and all of mathe-
matics acquires phenomenological significance: each of its concepts
and theorems becomes an index for phenomenological connections
and enters into them as correlate. Likewise: if we move in the sphere
of imaginative data of external perception and intuition in general, if
we ascertain their essential sorts, their building up out of components
that are to be grasped imaginatively, if we engage in an apriori
typology of these data, then that is not, to be sure, a natural science in
the usual sense, but it is an apriori of possible nature-description
which we can acquire in the purely ontic attitude: nature is to be
“described purely imaginatively.’” Whatever imagination might be,
what external intuiting and the like might more precisely be and how
it can be more precisely described — that is not in question here. We
are addressing ourselves to what is intuited and the essences to be
taken therefrom. But as soon as we reflectively shift to the intuiting
of the intuited and explore the eidetic relationships between the
one and the other, we are doing phenomenology, and now everything
which formerly was explored in the ontic attitude acquires phenome-
nological significance. One can convince oneself, of course, that the
eidetics of the data of the external imagination has from the
beginning an especially close connection with the eidetics of the
cogitationes.

Phenomenology is carried on almost completely in the form of

SUPPLEMENT IV 125

eidetic descriptions which move in direct Intuition. That is, there is
not a complete lack of mediate inferences, but they are unimportant
compared with the enormous work of direct analyses. Immediate
Intuition is everywhere responsible for the decisive ascertainments.
But immediate Intuition moves not merely in phansic analyses; it also
points out the correlates to us, and dealing with the correlates leads
forthwith, within the fundamental class of the external imaginations,
to description of nature in general, but at first only of nature precisely
as imaginative datum. Since all of us in this age of natural science
have indeed been educated in the natural sciences, but have not been
educated to regard imaginative natural data in the eidetic attitude as
Objects that are as such worthy of scientific treatment; and since we
have all first come to this peculiar sphere of being and essence from the
new phenomenology, whose interest indeed requires eidetic con-
sideration of the species and forms of sensuous formations, one can
understand our tendency to regard such eidetic exploration of
imaginative natural data precisely as phenomenology. We speak of
phenomenology of physical things, phenomenology of illusion, etc.
But one must make clear to oneself that this is a correct designation
only in a certain sense, since in the end all sensuousnesses are in
themselves eidetically explorable, as well as numbers, in the ontic
attitude. Only when we describe them with the consciousness-
characteristics in which they present themselves as correlate of
consciousness, and only when we describe consciousness itself, in
which they come to meantness and givenness: only in this involve-
ment, to which, of course, they belong essentially, do we have in the
full sense phenomenology of the sensuousnesses.

In the sphere of the psychological realities it is essentially different than in
that of the physical realities. To the essence of the mind, of mental states
and qualities, belongs not mathematical determinability; there is not
any definite mathematical manifold as ideal scaffolding to be at-
tached to mental actuality. Psychic acts and states, like phantasies,
rememberings, judgments, wishes, hopes, willings, are not measur-
able, not “exactly” determinable as approximations to ideal math-
ematical formations. There is there also, to be sure, something
like continuity, and in many directions; but the psychic phenomena
are not resolvable into components each of which could be assigned
its place idealiter in a mathematical manifold, and their complication
conceals no mathematizable substance in the sense of matter. And
this holds all the more, in further sequence, for the psychic dispo-
sitions and the real properties of persons interconnected with them. If
we reduce phenomenologically to pure consciousness, then the same

«135

136)

126 SUPPLEMENT IV

holds of course for the manifold of the cogitationes. It is no
mathematical manifold. To be sure we can, e.g., in the flow of a
perceptual appearance, think exact ideas into it, as we do, of
course, when we speak of the temporal phases of the perceptual
appearances, when we imagine the phenomenon as a duration with
an ideally determined content that is new from one point in time to
another; likewise when we speak of a phenomenon fading from clarity
into obscurity and there imagine phases of this continuity of the
fading away. But there is here in principle a lack of possibilities of
approximately determining what is given at any time by exact
concepts with a fixed method; and above all the gradual levels are
levels of a rich qualitative content and a rich qualitative content of
manifold genera and species which one could not somehow grasp
mathematically by relating them to continua and exact concepts, or
integrate into a mathematical order.

The situation here, indeed, is a quite different one from that in
natural science; immediately experienced nature with its im-
mediately experienced properties is only an imperfectly given, always
merely appearing, nature, which always has ahead of itself the nature
that must first of all be worked out, must be cognized again and again
through presentations in different levels. In progressing from
experience to experience, from appearances built hierarchically
upon one another, mathematically ideal concepts which stand in
relation to the pure concepts that are to be taken from the content of
appearance itself but are not the concepts themselves, guide us for the
working out of the true, mathematically apprehensible nature. We
see physical things in color, but the concepts of colors, and also the
ideal concepts of pure colors which we can acquire at first are not yet
the concepts of colors by means of which what is perceived could
undergo exact determination. The concept formations of mathemati-
cal optics, which accomplish such things, are rooted in the experience
with its experiential colors, but are not themselves immanent in them,
are not ideal concepts to be taken from them by direct idea-
formation.

As for the phemomena of consciousness on the other hand, which
we want to make into Objects as they are in themselves, they are rfot,
like nature, something presenting itself through something else and
not something to be worked out of something else, out of phenomena.
The concepts that we use for their determination can be taken only
from them themselves, can be abstracted with regard to their
givenness and adequate givenness. If we find here something flowing,
then we simply must form the idea of the flow; if we find something

SUPPLEMENT IV 127

vague, the idea of vagueness; if we are able in certain spheres to find
only typical differences, then we must form concepts of type. We by
no means sink into a flow because of this. We have pluralities of
rigorously apprehensible differences that can hardly be overlooked,
and also, where lower concretenesses are typically differentiable only
in flow, we nevertheless find everywhere in higher universality fixed,
even though not mathematical, differences, concepts that cannot be
gotten through flowing transitions. Thus perception in general and
more especially also perception of the physical is something ab-
solutely fixed and to be described in its universality. Perception and
assertion or perception and willing, willing and being glad, and the
like, these are phenomenological class-differences which are as firmly
and absolutely separated as the imaginative differences of color and
tone in the sphere of external experience.

It is precisely this that makes valuable universal differentiations,
classifications, and descriptions possible in every sphere of imag-
inative ideas, even in that of external experience, and gives meaning
in these spheres to the goal of a systematic eidetics, since we are really
only standing in the flow with the lower concretenesses and concrete
universalities, but not when we enter into the higher universalities. A
classification of all conceivable imaginative types cannot, as we have
just said, be set as the goal in the field of external experience.

At least I do not see that one could set about fixing all possible
types of formations even for the field of sensuous spatial shapes; they
always have of themselves, and necessarily, something flowing, are
mediated by transitional shapes, which one can again apprehend
typically. Likewise if we wanted to apprehend all tone-formations
which of course pass over into one another in a flow, etc. On the other
hand we have concepts which are separated by chasms if we shift to
corresponding generality, as e.g., the spatial in general, the acoustical
in general, and the like. Further, one will probably be able to fix
typical chief and normal differences in every field and thus be able to
perform at a certain level of universality descriptions that will remain
valuable.

All the more is it so, however, in the sphere of the psychic, and
particularly, if we practice the phenomenological reduction, in the
sphere of the formations of consciousness.

«137

INDEX

Actuality, 24, 48 O4ff., 107, 116ff.
Alien animate organism, 7 Correlation (apriori), 5, 16, 30, 46, 72, 73
Alien human being, 97ff. Countersensical, 73, 75
Animate organism, If, 4ff., 94ff., 103, 104,
119 Death, 114
Animate thing, 96 Descartes, 3
Anschiitz, A., 44 Description, 39ff., 46ff., 51M, 77ff., 79
Appearances, 53ff., 97f,, 115 Discordancies, 78
Apperception, |, 5, 16, 17, 36, 46, 63;
of animate organism, 5 Ego, |, 5, 9, 17; alien pure, 95f ; and animate
Apprehension: of animate organism, 41; organism, 5f.; empirical, 17; personal,
of Ego, 99ff.; of material thing, Iff., 29; 119; psychic, 10, 96ff; pure, 94ff., 99f.;
of world, 1; realizing, 991. pure and psychic, 17
Apriori, 20ff., 27, 29, 31f,, 38f., 42, 60f.,, Ehrlich-Hata, 12
64, 71, 78 Eidetic analysis, 19, 26, 37, 51
Art works, 112 Eidetic attitude, 41, 53, 65
Eidetic definition, 25
Basis, ultimate legitimizing, | Eidetic description, 59f.
Being, 7, 55, 65, 72f. Eidetic law(s), 37, 42, 597.
Birth, 114 Eidetic necessities, 46, 49
Body (see Animate organism) Eidetic particulars, 71
Bolzano, 49ff. Eidetic reduction, 35
Brentano, 491ff. Eidetic seeing, 42
Brutes, 23 Eidetic truths, 37, 38, 41f.
Eidos, 35
Categories, 1, 20ff., 68 Empathy, 34, 94ff.
Causality: physical, 3ff.; psychological, 14f. Empiricist, 23
Change, 30 Epiphenomena, 15
Chwolson’s famous Xlth Commandment, 39 Epoché, 41, 47, 65
Clarification, 69, SOIT., 88 Essence(s), 3, 11, 23ff.; and concept,
Classification (empirical), 121 29, 41, 61; and noema, 73ff.
Clue, 22, 25, 27, 66 Existence, 3, 23, 29f., 34, 36, 39ff., 46, 70.
Community/-ies, 2, 171. Experience, Iff., 7, 9, 11, 17, 23, 30, 40f,,
Concepts: and words, 48; and essences, 59; 44, 59, LI4ff.
and noemata, 71; apriori and Experienced, Iff., 4, 29, 36, 39
aposteriori, 31, 66; formation of, Experiencing, 2f7., 65, 97, 114, 119;
3, 24, 25; concept of the concept, 25; theoretical, 2, 4 %

eidetic, 31; logical-formal, 84; making “Experts”, 11, 12, 19, 20, 82
c. clear, 86f.; making c. distinct, 86f.; Explanation, 52ff.
material particularizations of, 84; Expression(s), 23, 25, 87, 88
regional, 22ff., 84/1. Extension, 2ff., 30
Conceptual material, 831.
Consciousness, 10, 12f , 46, 61, 64, 66, 96M. Feelings, 12, 13, 14, 15, 105f.
Constitution, |, 31, 54, 58, 67, 74, 88f., Fiction, 28, 36, 40

INDEX

Fitting, the, 23, 76

Foundation/founding relations, 2, 3, 12ff.,
16f., 21ff., 31, 37, 42, 44, 48, 51M, 81

Freedom, 70, 10791.

Free variation, 26, 28

Galiana, Abbé, 42

Galileo, 38

Geiger, 8 (footnote), 46
Generalization, 23

Genetic method, Iff., 117ff.
Genus, 25, 30, 85

Geometry, 70ff.

Givenness, 8, 29, 68, 70, 83, 86

Harmony, 28f., 73, 75, 78
History, 117

Human being, 12ff., 96ff., 103
Hume, 17, 45

Idea(s), 29, 68, 78, 85; idea of a complete
realm of ideas, 85; idea of a complete
system of ontologies, 89

Ideation, 21f.

Identity, 27, 102, 120

Imagination, 23, 48, 123ff.

Immanence, 33, 77

Immediate insight, field of, 39

Impression(s), 5, 45

Insight, 82 (footnote)

Intentionality, 21, 36, 46, 47, 65

Interconnections of physical thing, animate
organism, and psyche, 2, 5, 7, 10, 12,
14, 35, 103

Interpretation (Eindeutung), x, 7, 8, 55, 94,
99f., 113M.

Intersubjectivity, 2, 54, 55, 94ff., 110, 112ff.,
LSM.

Interweaving of material nature and animate
organicity, 2ff.

Intuition, 20, 23ff., 44, 48, 52, 58, 78ff.

Intuitionism, 83

Judgment, 24

Kant, 22, 27, 87, 116
Kepler, 38

Kinesthetic sensations, 106ff.
Kinetic method, Iff., 11717.

Legitimation/-izing, 1, 7, 23, 24, 29, 41,
98ff., 115

Leibniz, 49

Levels (see Strata)

Lived process(es), 22, 33f., 47, S8ff., 64, 76,
77, 98; phenomenology of, 38

129

Lived-process correlates, 76

Localization, 5f., 101, 104ff.

Locke, 34, 117

Logical Investigations, 13, 21, 22

Logos article (‘Philosophy as Rigo:
Science’), 39, 43, 45

Lotze, 4917.

Material of animate organism, 4f.

Material thing, If.

Mathematics, 11

Mathesis, 37, 38, 49, 62

Meaning, 87ff.

Method: in all sciences, 21, 8ITf.;
of clarification, 80; of {ree variation,
26, 28; natural-scientific, 20; pheno-
menological, 59; phenomenological-
kinetic, Iff., 8Of., 11797.

Mill, 49

Mind, 18, 22, 117

**Mothers”’, 69

Naturalism, 33, 43

Nature, 2, 103ff., 117

Negative existential propositions, 71

Noema, 23ff., 36, 46, 61, 65, 71, 73ff., 87f;
and concept, 71; and essence, 73ff., 88

Noesis, 10, 20, 23, 36, 65

Normality, 52, 54, 57, 114

Norms, 19, 25, 80

Objectivation, 95ff., 110

Objective space, objective time, 56

Objectivities, 20, 78

Objectivity, 2, 4

Ontology, 21ff., 32, 51ff, 65ff., 85, 116ff.;
and phenomenology, 65ff.

Origin(s), 47, 69

Originarily bestowing acts, 20

Originarily presentive acts, 31

Perception, Iff., 27, 35; of animate
organism, |, 7

Person, 18

Pfander, 9 (footnote), 48

Phantasy, 28

Phantoms, 2, 27

Phenomenological reduction, 34f., 47, 51,
65, 69, 125

Phenomenology, 19ff., 46, 51ff., 59; and
ontology, 49; transcendental, 65ff.;
way to, 49

Physical thing, 1, 10, 25ff., 291f., 77, 86;
apprehension of, 29; essence of, 31

Physics, 16, 51ff., 57ff.

Physis (psychic), 16

130

Plants, 8&f.

Positing, 30, 71, 76, 90

Possibility, 23, 29, 48, 55, 71

Possible concepts, 24

Possible realities, 68

Possible subjects, 54

Possible worlds, 29, 48

Proof of existence, 70f.

Province, 41, 66, 72

Psyche, 1, 10ff., 15, 33ff., 94, 103;
communal, 18

Psychic Ego, |, 12, 96ff.

Psychic subject, 56ff.

Psychologism, 43

Psychology, 9ff., 16fT , 19, 42, SIM, 77;

experimental, 33, 43; rational, 21, 33ff.,

60ff.
Psycho-physical parallelism, 15

Quotation marks, 72, 73, 90 (footnote)

Reality, Iff., 4, 14, 29, 33, 125;
cognition of, 3

Regions of reality, Iff , 22ff., 33, 78

Res extensa, 29, 31

Rules, 24, 29

Science(s), 37, 81; botany, 8; biology,
general 8; cultural, 63; descriptive, 3;
empirical, 21; experiential, 36;
explanatory, 3; genuine, 10; physical-
natural, 16; physics, 51ff., 57ff.;
physiology, 10; theory of, 3; zoology, 8

Self-givenness, 89

Sensations, 5ff., 10, 12ff., 26f., 1041;
double function of, 13; kinesthetic, 13,
106; movement-sensations, 107;
presentive, 13

Sense fields: localization, 5; visual, 5

Signification, 23f., 73, 75, 76;
word-signification, 81, 86ff.

INDEX

Solipsistic, 1 12ff.

Somatology, 4ff., 7fff.

Sources, |, 32; phenomenological, 80

Space, 101

Spatiality, 101

Species, 30

Spinoza, 3

Stratum: 9; apprehensional, 10; nature-, 15;
of animate organism, 4f., 7ff.;
of feeling, 12; of material thing, Iff., 6;
of physical-thing unity, 115; of psyche,
16ff ; somatic s. of feelings, 15, 16, 18

Substance, 2ff , 15, 57

Symbols, 82

Technology, 82

Temporality, 101

Theory formation, 81

Thinking, Iff, 7ff , 29, 73, 81, 87, 114f.
Time, 10, 36, 101

Tone, 102

Tools, 6

Transcendental, 64f , 117
Transcendent being, 46, 47, 65

Types, 121 ff.

Unities, constitutive, 57, 611 , 68
Unity, 114ff., 122; Objective, 95ff.

Validity, 75; existential v. of concepts, 23, 30,
41, 70, 71, 81

Values, 82

Volition, 6, 15, 106M.

*“Wonder of wonders”, the, 64

Words, 23, 39, 86ff

World, 28, 35; cultural, 117; material, 104;
mental, 104; Objective, 56, 98, 101, 104;
practical surrounding, 99; surrounding,
94ff ; surrounding w. of values, 99;
transcendental, 117.